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Abstract
“God does not play dice. He flips coins instead.” And though for some reason He has denied
us quantum bit commitment. And though for some reason he has even denied us strong coin
flipping. He has, in His infinite mercy, granted us quantum weak coin flipping so that we too
may flip coins.
Instructions for the flipping of coins are contained herein. But be warned! Only those who
have mastered Kitaev’s formalism relating coin flipping and operator monotone functions may
succeed. For those foolhardy enough to even try, a complete tutorial is included.
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1 Introduction
It is time again for a sacrifice to the gods. Alice and Bob are highly pious and would both like the
honor of being the victim. Flipping a coin to choose among them allows the gods to pick the worthier
candidate for this life changing experience. To keep the unworthy candidate from desecrating the
winner, the coin flip must be carried out at a distance and in a manner that prevents cheating.
Very roughly speaking, this is the problem known as coin flipping by telephone [Blu81]. Quantum
coin flipping is a variant of the problem where the participants are allowed to communicate using
quantum information.
Why is quantum coin flipping interesting/important/useful? First of all, it is conceivably pos-
sible that someday somewhere someone will want to determine something by flipping a coin with
a faraway partner, and that for some reason both will have access to quantum computers. The
location of QIP 2050 could very well be determined in this fashion.
Secondly, coin flipping belongs to a class of cryptographic protocols known as secure two-party
computations. These arise naturally when two people wish to collaborate but don’t completely
trust one another. Sadly, the impossibility of quantum bit commitment [May96, LC98] shows that
quantum information is incapable of solving many of the problems in this area. On the other
hand, the possibility of quantum weak coin flipping shows that quantum information may yet
have untapped potential. Among the most promising open areas is secure computation with cheat
detection [ATSVY00, HK03] which may be better explored with the techniques in this paper. At
a minimum, the standard implementation of bit commitment with cheat detection uses quantum
weak coin flipping as a subroutine, so improvements in the latter offer (modest) improvements in
the former.
Finally, coin flipping is interesting because it appears to be hard, at least relative to other
cryptographic tasks such as key distribution [Wie83, BB84]. Of course, it is not our intent to
belittle the discovery of key distribution, whose authors had to invent many of the foundations
of quantum information along the way. But a savvy student today, familiar with the field of
quantum information, would likely have no trouble in constructing a key distribution protocol.
Most reasonable protocols appear to work. Not so with coin flipping, where most obvious protocols
appear to fail.
A cynical reader may argue that hardness is relative and may simply be a consequence of
having formulated the problem in the wrong language. But this is exactly our third point: that the
difficulty of coin flipping is really an opportunity to develop a formalism in which such problems
are (relatively) easily solvable.
This new formalism, which is the cornerstone of the protocols in this paper, was developed
by Kitaev [Kit04] and can be used to relate coin flipping (and many other quantum games) to
the theory of convex cones and operator monotone functions. From this perspective, the value of
the present coin flipping result is that it provides the first demonstration of the power of Kitaev’s
formalism.
We note that the formalism relating coin-flipping and operator monotone functions is an exten-
sion of Kitaev’s original formalism which was used in proving a lower bound on strong coin flipping
[Kit03]. When we need to distinguish them, we shall refer to them respectively as Kitaev’s second
and first coin flipping formalisms.
We will delay the formal definition of coin flipping to Section 1.1 and the history and prior
work on the problem to Section 1.2. Instead, we shall give below an informal description of the
new formalism. We shall focus more on what the finished formalism looks like rather than on how
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Figure 1: A point game sequence with three configurations. Numbers outside the axes label location
and numbers inside the axes label probability. The sequence corresponds to a protocol with P ∗A = 1
and P ∗B = 1/2, that is, a protocol where Alice flips a coin and announces the outcome.
to relate it to the more traditional notions of quantum states and unitaries (a topic which will be
covered at length later in the paper).
In its simplest form Kitaev’s formalism can be described as a sequence of configurations, each
of which consists of a few marked points on the plane. The points are restricted to the closure of
the first quadrant (i.e., have non-negative coordinates) and each point carries a positive weight,
which we call a probability.
Two successive configurations can only differ by points on a single vertical or horizontal line.
The rule is that the total probability on the line must be conserved (though the total number of
points can change) and that for every λ ∈ (0,∞) we must satisfy
∑
z
λz
λ+ z
pz ≤
∑
z′
λz′
λ+ z′
pz′ , (1)
where the left hand side is a sum over points before the transition and the right hand side is a
sum over points after the transition. The variable z is respectively the x coordinate for transitions
occurring on a horizontal line or the y coordinate for transitions occurring on a vertical line. The
numbers pz are just the probabilities associated to each point. An example of such a sequence is
given in Fig. 1.
The boundary conditions of the sequence are as follows: The stating configuration always
contains two points, each carrying probability one half, with one point located at x = 1 and y = 0
and the other point at x = 0 and y = 1. The final configuration must contain a single point, which
carries unit probability (as required by conservation of probability).
Each of these sequences can be translated into coin-flipping protocols such that the amount of
cheating allowed is bounded by the location of the final point. In particular, if the final point is
located at (x, y) then the resulting protocol will satisfy P ∗A ≤ y and P ∗B ≤ x, and hence the bias is
bounded by max(x, y)− 1/2.
We call these sequences “point games” and they are completely equivalent to standard protocols
described by unitaries. There exists constructive mappings from point games to standard protocols
and vice versa. The optimal coin-flipping protocol can be constructed and tightly bounded by a
point game. Hence, rather than searching for optimal protocols, one can equivalently search for
optimal point games. These point games are formalized in Section 2 and examples are given in
Section 3.
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The configurations above are roughly related to standard semidefinite programing objects as
follows: The x coordinates are the eigenvalues of the dual SDP operators on Alice’s Hilbert space,
the y coordinates are eigenvalues of the dual SDP operators on Bob’s Hilbert space, and the weights
are the probabilities assigned by the honest state to each of these eigenspaces.
The obscure condition of Eq. (1) can best be understood if we describe the points on the line
before and after the transition by functions p(z), p′(z) : [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support. We
then are essentially requiring that p′(z) − p(z) belong to the cone dual to the set of operator
monotone functions with domain [0,∞). For those unfamiliar with operator monotone functions,
their definition and a few properties are discussed later in the paper.
We note an unusual convention that was used above and throughout most of the paper: the
description of point games follows a reverse time convention where the final measurement occurs
at t = 0 and the initial state preparation occurs at t = n > 0. The motivation for this will become
clear as the formalism is developed.
Kitaev further simplified his formalism so that an entire point game can be described by a
single pair of functions h(x, y) and v(x, y) that take real values and have finite support. The main
constraint is that on every horizontal line of h(x, y) and every vertical line of v(x, y), the sum of the
weights must be zero, and the weighted average of λzλ+z must be non-negative for every λ ∈ (0,∞).
Furthermore, h(x, y) + v(x, y) must be zero everywhere except at three points: (1, 0) and (0, 1)
where it has value −1/2, and a third point (x, y), where it has value 1, and which is the equivalent
of the final point of the original point games. This variant of point games is described in Section 4.
A simple example can be constructed using Fig. 2. The labeled points with outgoing horizontal
arrows appear in h(x, y) with negative sign, whereas those with incoming horizontal arrows appear
in h(x, y) with positive sign. Similarly for v(x, y) and the vertical arrows. The final point at (23 ,
2
3 )
appears in both functions with positive coefficient and magnitude 1/2. That means that the point
game corresponds to a protocol with P ∗A = P
∗
B = 2/3, or bias 1/6, and is a variant of the author’s
previous best protocol [Moc05].
The power of Kitaev’s formalism is evident from the previous example as a complete protocol
can be described by a single picture. Section 5 discusses in detail how to build and analyze such
structures. Among the issues addressed are how to truncate the above infinite ladder so that
the resulting figure has only a finite number of points as required by our description of Kitaev’s
formalism.
To achieve zero bias in coin flipping, one can use similar constructions, but with more compli-
cated ladders heading off to infinity. In particular, for every integer k ≥ 0 we will build a protocol
with
P ∗A = P
∗
B =
k + 1
2k + 1
(2)
(technically, for each k we will have a family of protocols that will converge to the above values).
The case k = 0 allows both players to maximally cheat, the case k = 1 is the author’s bias 1/6
protocol, and the limit k →∞ achieves arbitrarily small bias. The details of this construction can
also be found in Section 5.
All the new protocols are formulated in the language of Kitaev’s formalism. Sadly, mechanically
transforming these protocols back into the language of unitaries, while possible, does not lead to
particularly simple or efficient protocols (i.e., in terms of laboratory resources). Finding easy to
implement protocols with a small bias remains an interesting open problem. A number of other
open problems can be found at the end of Section 6.
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Figure 2: A coin-flipping protocol with bias 1/6.
A first stab at finding good easy to implement protocols is given by Appendix A. The section
transforms the author’s original bias 1/6 protocol (which uses a number of qubits linear in the
number of messages) into a new form that uses constant space. In fact, the total space needed is
one qutrit for each of Alice and Bob, and one qubit used to send messages.
The key idea is to use early measurements to prune states that are known to be illegal. While
in a theoretical sense measurements can always be delayed to the last step, their frequent use
can provide practical simplifications (as is well know in key distribution). In fact, all the early
measurements are of the flying qubit in the computational basis.
The protocol in Appendix A is described in the standard language of unitaries, and an analysis
is sketched using Kitaev’s first formalism. As a bonus, the resulting protocol is related to the
ancient and most holy game of Dip-Dip-Boom, also described therein.
Appendix B proves strong duality for coin flipping, which is an important lemma needed for both
Kitaev’s first and second formalisms. While strong duality does not hold in general semidefinite
programs, it does in most, and there exists a number of lemmas that provide sufficient conditions.
Unfortunately, some of the simplest lemmas do not directly apply to coin-flipping. Instead, the
appendix directly proves strong duality using simple arguments from Euclidean geometry. While
all the ideas in this section are taken from standard textbooks, the presentation is still somewhat
clever and novel.
Finally, Appendix C proves another mathematical lemma needed for Kitaev’s second formalism.
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It is the key step needed to turn the functions that underlie the point games back into matrices out
of which states and unitaries can be constructed. Though some of the ideas are potentially novel,
mostly it deals with standard technical issues from the theory of matrices.
As a final goody, Section 3.2.3 includes a brief discussion and example of how to extend the
formalism to include cheat detection. Of course, because weak coin-flipping can be achieved with
arbitrarily small bias, adding in cheat detection isn’t particularly useful. However, similar tech-
niques may prove helpful in studying cheat detection for strong coin flipping and other secure
computation problems.
Author’s note: Sections 2 and 4 are based on my recollection of a couple of discussions with
Kitaev and a subsequent group meeting he gave (of which I sadly kept no written record). As I
have had to reconstruct some of the details, and as I have strived to move the discussion to finite
dimensional spaces, some of Kitaev’s original elegance has been replaced by a more pedantically
constructive (and hopefully pedagogical) approach. I claim no ownership of the main ideas in these
sections, though am happy to accept the blame for any errors in my write up. You should also know
that all the terms such as UBP, “point game,” and “valid transitions” are my own crazy invention,
and are unlikely to be familiar to those who have leaned Kitaev’s formalism from other sources.
At this point, those familiar with the definition and history of coin flipping may wish to skip
ahead to Section 2. Good luck!
1.1 Coin flipping defined
Coin flipping is a formalization of the notion of flipping or tossing a coin under the constraints that
the participants are mutually distrustful and far apart.
The two players involved in coin flipping, traditionally called Alice and Bob, must agree on a
single random bit which represents the outcome of the coin flip. As Alice and Bob do not trust
each other, nor anyone else, they each want a protocol that prevents the other player from cheating.
Furthermore, because they are far apart, the protocol must be implementable using only interaction
over a communication device such as a telephone. The problem is known in the classical literature
as “coin flipping by telephone” and was first posed by Manuel Blum in 1981 [Blu81].
There are two variants of coin flipping. In the first variant, called weak coin flipping, Alice
and Bob each have a priori a desired coin outcome. The outcomes can be labeled as “Alice wins”
and “Bob wins,” and we do not care if the players cheat in order to increase their own probability
of losing. In the second variant of coin flipping, called strong coin flipping, there are no a priori
desired outcomes and we wish to prevent either player from biasing the coin in either direction.
Obviously, strong coin flipping is at least as hard as weak coin flipping and in general it is
harder. However, this paper is mainly concerned with weak coin flipping which we often simply
refer to as “coin flipping”.
To be more precise in our definition, weak coin flipping is a two-party communication protocol
that begins with a completely uncorrelated state and ends with each of the participants outputting
a single bit. We say that Alice wins on outcome 0 and Bob wins on outcome 1. The requirements
are:
1. When both players are honest, Alice’s output is uniformly random and equal to Bob’s output.
2. If Alice is honest but Bob deviates from the protocol, then no matter what Bob does, the
probability that Alice outputs one (i.e., Bob wins) is no greater than P ∗B .
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3. Similarly, if Bob is honest but Alice deviates from the protocol, then the maximum probability
for Bob to declare Alice the winner is P ∗A.
The parameters P ∗A and P
∗
B define the protocol. Ideally we want P
∗
A = P
∗
B = 1/2. Unfortunately,
this is not always possible. We therefore introduce the bias max(P ∗A, P
∗
B)− 1/2 as a measure of the
security of the protocol. Our goal is to find a protocol with the smallest bias possible.
Note that the protocol places no restrictions on the output of a cheating player, as these are
impossible to enforce. In particular, when one player is cheating the outputs do not have to agree,
and when both players are cheating the protocol is not required to satisfy any properties. This also
means that if an honest player ever detects that their opponent has deviated from the protocol (i.e.,
the other player stops sending messages or sends messages of the wrong format) then the honest
player can simply declare victory rather than aborting. This will be an implicit rule in all our weak
coin-flipping protocols.
Occasionally, it is worth extending the definition of coin flipping to case where the output is not
uniformly random even when both players are honest. In such a case we denote by PA the honest
probability for Alice to win and by PB = 1− PA the honest probability for Bob to win.
1.1.1 Communication model
It is not hard to see, that in a classical world, and without any further assumptions, at least one
player can guarantee victory. For instance, if one of the players were in charge of flipping the coin,
the other player would have no way of verifying via a telephone that the outcome of the coin is the
one reported by the first player.
Coin flipping can be achieved in a classical setting by adding in certain computational assump-
tions [Blu81]. However, some of these assumptions will no longer be true once quantum computers
become available. Coin flipping can also be achieved in a relativistic setting [Ken99] if Alice and
Bob’s laboratories are assumed to satisfy certain spatial arrangements. However, these requirements
may not be optimal for today’s on-the-go coin flippers.
In this paper we shall focus on the quantum setting, where Alice and Bob each have a quantum
computer with as much memory as needed, and are connected by a noiseless quantum channel.
They are each allowed to do anything allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics other than
directly manipulate their opponents qubits. The resulting protocols will have information theoretic
security.
Although at the moment such a setting seems impractical, if ever quantum computers are built
and are as widely available as classical computers are today, then quantum weak coin flipping may
become viable.
1.1.2 On the starting state
The starting state of coin-flipping protocols is by definition completely uncorrelated, which means
that Alice and Bob initially share neither classical randomness nor quantum entanglement (though
they do share a common description of the protocol).
There are two good reasons for this definition. First, it is easy to see that given a known
maximally entangled pair of qubits, Alice and Bob could obtain a correlated bit without even using
communication. But the same result can be obtained when starting with a uniformly distributed
shared classical random bit. Such protocols are trivial, and certainly do not require the power of
quantum mechanics. The purpose of coin flipping, though, is to create these correlations.
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Still, at first glance it would appear that by starting with correlated states we can put the
acquisition of randomness, or equivalently the interaction with a third party, in the distant past.
In such a model Alice and Bob would buy a set of correlated bits from their supermarket and then
used them when needed. The problem is that they can now figure out the outcomes of the coin
flips before committing to them. It is not hard to imagine that a cheater would have the power
to order the sequence of events that require a coin flip so that he wins on the important ones and
loses the less important ones. We would now have to worry about protecting the ordering of events
and that is a completely different problem.
A good one-shot coin-flipping protocol should not allow the players to predict the outcome of
the coin flip before the protocol has begun, and enforcing this is the second reason that we require
an uncorrelated stating state.
It might be interesting to explore what happens when the no-correlation requirement is weakened
to a no-prior-knowledge-of-outcome requirement, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.1.3 On the security guarantees
The security model of coin flipping divides the universe into three parts: Alice’s laboratory, Bob’s
laboratory and the rest of the universe. We assume that Alice and Bob each have exclusive and
complete control over their laboratories. Other than as a conduit for information between Alice and
Bob, the rest of the universe will not be touched by honest players. However, a dishonest player
may take control of anything outside their opponent’s laboratory, including the communication
channel.
The security of the protocols therefore depends on the inability of a cheater to tamper with
their opponent’s laboratory. What does this mean? Abstractly, it can be defined as
1. All quantum superoperators that a cheater can apply must act as the identity on the part
of the Hilbert space that is located inside the laboratory (including the message space when
appropriate).
2. All operations of honest players are performed flawlessly and without interference by the
cheater.
3. An honest player can verify that an incoming message has the right dimension and can abort
otherwise.
In practice, however, this translates into requirements such as
1. The magnetic shielding on the laboratory is good enough to prevent your opponent from
affecting your qubits.
2. The grad student operating your machinery cannot be bribed to apply the wrong operations.
3. A nanobot cannot enter your laboratory though the communication channel.
As usual, the fact that a protocol is secure does not mean that it will protect against the preceding
attacks. The purpose of the security analysis is to prove that the only way to cheat is to attack an
opponents laboratory, thereby guaranteeing that one’s security is as good as the security of one’s
laboratory.
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1.1.4 On the restriction to unitary operations
It is customary when studying coin flipping to consider only protocols that involve unitary opera-
tions with a single measurement at the end. It is also customary to only consider cheating strategies
that can be implemented using unitary operations.
Nevertheless, any bounds that are derived under such conditions apply to the most general case
which includes players that can use measurements, superoperators and classical randomness, and
protocols that employ extra classical channels.
The above follows from two separate lemmas, which roughly can be stated as:
1. Given any protocol P in the most general setting (including measurements, classical chan-
nels, etc.) that has a maximum bias ǫ under the most general cheating strategy (including,
measurements, superoperators, etc.) then there exists a second protocol P ′ that is specified
using only unitary operations with a single pair of measurements at the end and that also
has a maximum bias ǫ under the most general cheating strategy (including, measurements,
superoperators, etc.).
2. Given any protocol P specified using only unitary operations with a single pair of measure-
ments at the end, and given any cheating strategy for P (which may include measurements,
superoperators, etc) that achieves a bias ǫ, we can find a second cheating strategy for P that
also achieves a bias ǫ but can be implemented using only unitary operations.
Unfortunately neither of the above statements will be proven here, and the proofs for the above
statements are distributed among a number of published papers, but good stating points are [LC98]
and [May96].
The first statement implies that we need only consider protocols where the honest actions can
be described as a sequence of unitaries. The result is important for proofs of lower-bounds on the
bias, but is not needed for the main result of this paper.
The reduction of the first statement also applies to protocols that potentially have an infinite
number of rounds, such as rock-paper-scissors, where measurements are carried out at intermediate
steps to determine if a winner can be declared or if the protocol must go on. Such protocols are
dealt with by proving that there exist truncations that approximate the original protocol arbitrarily
well. In such a case, though, the resulting bias will only come arbitrarily close to the original bias.
The second statement implies that in our search for the optimal cheating strategy (or equiv-
alently, in our attempts to upper bound the bias) we need only consider unitary cheaters. Note
that measurements are not even needed in the final stage as we do not care about the output of
dishonest players.
The basic idea of the proof of the second statement is that any allowed quantum mechanical
operation can be expressed as a unitary followed by the discarding of some Hilbert subspace. If
the cheater carries out his strategy without ever discarding any such subspaces he will not reduce
his probability of victory and will only need to use unitary operations.
The second statement also holds when the honest protocol includes certain projective measure-
ments such as those used in this paper. In fact, we will sketch a proof for this second statement in
Section 2.1.1 as we translate coin flipping into the language of semidefinite programing.
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1.2 A brief history muddled by hindsight
Roughly speaking, cryptography is composed of two fundamental problems: two honest players try
to complete a task without being disrupted by a third malicious party (i.e., encrypted communi-
cation), and two mutually distrustful players try to cooperate in a way that prevents the opposing
player from cheating, effectively simulating a trusted third party (i.e., choosing a common meeting
time while keeping their schedules private). The second case is commonly known as two-party
secure computation.
In the mid 1980s, quantum information had a resounding success in the first category by enabling
key distribution with information theoretic security [Wie83, BB84]. Optimism was high, and it
seemed like quantum information would be able to solve all problems in the second category as
well. But after many failed attempts at producing protocols for a task known as bit commitment,
it was finally proven by Mayers, Lo and Chau [May96, LC98] that secure quantum bit commitment
was impossible.
One of the reasons people had focused on bit commitment is that it is a powerful primitive
from which all other two-party secure computation protocols can be constructed [Yao95]. Its
impossibility means that all other universal primitives for two-party secure computation must also
be unrealizable using quantum information [Lo97].
We note that when we speak of possible and impossible with regards to quantum information we
always mean with information theoretic security (i.e., without placing bounds on the computational
capacity of the adversary). Classically all two-party secure-computation tasks can be realized under
certain complexity assumptions [Yao82] but become impossible if we demand information theoretic
security. Surprisingly, most multiparty secure-computations tasks can be done classically with
information theoretic security so long as all parties share private pairwise communication channels
and the number of cheating players is bounded by some constant fraction (dependent on the exact
model) of the total number of players [CCD88, BOGW88, RBO89]. Similar results hold in the
multiparty quantum case [CGS02].
Given the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, and the fact that most multiparty problems
can already be solved with classical information, the new goal in the late 1990s became to find any
two-party task that is modestly interesting and can be realized with information theoretic security
using quantum information.
One of the problems that the literature converged on [GVW99] was a quantum version of the
problem of flipping a coin over the telephone [Blu81]. Initially the focus was on strong coin flipping
and Ambainis [Amb01] and Spekkens and Rudolph [SR02a] independently proposed protocols that
achieve a bias of 1/4. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter Kitaev [Kit03] (see also [ABDR04]) proved
a lower bound of 1/
√
2− 1/2 on the bias.
Research continued on weak coin flipping [KN04, SR02b, RS04] and the best known bias prior
to the author’s own work was 1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≃ 0.207 by Spekkens and Rudolph [SR02b]. The best
lower bound was proven by Ambainis [Amb01] and states that the number of messages must grow
at least as Ω(log log 1ǫ ). In particular, it implies that no protocol with a fixed number of messages
can achieve an arbitrarily small bias.
At this point most known protocols used at most a few rounds of communication. The first non-
trivial many-round coin-flipping protocol was published in [Moc04a] by the author and achieved a
bias of 0.192 in the limit of arbitrarily many messages. In subsequent work [Moc05] it was shown
that this protocol (and many of the good protocols known at the time) were part of a large family
of quantized classical public-coin protocols. Furthermore, an analytic expression was given for the
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bias of each protocol in the family, and the optimal protocol for each number of messages was
identified. Sadly, the best bias that can be achieved in this family is 1/6, and this only in the
limit of arbitrarily many messages (a new formulation of this bias 1/6 protocol can be found in
Appendix A, wherein we use early measurements to reduce the space needed to run the protocol
to a qutrit per player and a qubit for messages).
Independently, Kitaev created a new formalism for studying two player adversarial games such
as coin flipping [Kit04], which built on his earlier work [Kit03]. The formalism describes the set of
possible protocols as the dual to the cone of two variables functions that are independently operator
monotone in each variable. Though the result was never published, we include in Sections 2 and
4 a description of the formalism. This formalism, which we shall refer to as Kitaev’s second coin-
flipping formalism, is the crucial idea behind the results in the present paper. A different extension
of Kitaev’s original formalism was also proposed by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07].
Looking beyond coin flipping, there is the intriguing possibility that we can still achieve most
of protocols of two-party secure computation if we are willing to loosen our requirements: instead
of requiring that cheating be impossible, we require that a cheater be caught with some non-zero
probability. Quantum protocols that satisfy such requirements for bit commitment have already
been constructed [ATSVY00, HK03] though the amount of potential cheat detection is known to
be bounded [Moc04b].
The possibility of some interesting quantum two-party protocols with information theoretic
security, plus many more protocols built using cheat detection, may mean that ultimately quantum
information will fulfill its potential in the area of secure computation. But more work needs to be
done in this direction, and we hope that the results and techniques of the present paper will be
helpful.
2 Kitaev’s second coin-flipping formalism
The goal of this section is to describe Kitaev’s formalism which relates coin flipping to the dual
cone of a certain set of operator monotone functions [Kit04].
The first step in the construction involves formalizing the problem of coin flipping and proving
the existence of certain upper bound certificates for P ∗A and P
∗
B . This is done in Section 2.1 and
we refer to the result as Kitaev’s first coin-flipping formalism as most of the material was used in
the construction of the lower bounds on strong coin flipping [Kit03].
The next step, carried out in Section 2.2, involves using these certificates to change the maxi-
mization over cheating strategies to a minimization over certificates, and overall to transform the
problem of finding the best coin-flipping protocol into a minimization over objects we call upper-
bounded protocols (UBPs).
The third step involves stripping away most of the irrelevant information of the UBPs to end
up with a sequence of points moving around in the plane. These “point games” are the main object
of study of Kitaev’s second formalism. They come in two varieties: time dependent (which are
studied in Section 2.3) and time independent (whose description is delayed to Section 4.1).
2.1 Kitaev’s first coin-flipping formalism
The first goal is to formalize coin-flipping protocols using the standard quantum communication
model of a sequence of unitaries with measurements delayed to the end.
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Definition 1. A coin-flipping protocol consists of the following data
• A, M and B, three finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces corresponding to Alice’s qubits, the mes-
sage channel and Bob’s qubits respectively. We assume that each Hilbert space is equipped
with a orthonormal basis of the form |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, . . . called the computational basis.
• n, a positive integer describing the number of messages.
For simplicity we shall assume n is even.
• A tensor product initial state: |ψ0〉 = |ψA,0〉 ⊗ |ψM,0〉 ⊗ |ψB,0〉 ∈ A ⊗M⊗B.
• A set of unitaries U1, . . . , Un on A⊗M⊗B of the form
Ui =
{
UA,i ⊗ IB for i odd,
IA ⊗ UB,i for i even,
(3)
where UA,i acts on A⊗M and UB,i acts on M⊗B.
• {ΠA,0,ΠA,1}, a POVM on A.
• {ΠB,0,ΠB,1}, a POVM on B.
Furthermore, the above data must satisfy
ΠA,1 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,0|ψn〉 = ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,1|ψn〉 = 0, (4)
where |ψn〉 = Un · · ·U1|ψ0〉.
Given the above data, the protocol is run as follows:
1. Alice starts with A and Bob starts with M⊗B. They initialize their state to |ψ0〉.
2. For i = 1 to n:
If i is odd Alice takes M and applies UA,i.
If i is even Bob takes M and applies UB,i.
3. Alice measures A with {ΠA,0,ΠA,1} and Bob measures B with {ΠB,0,ΠB,1}. They each output
zero or one based on the outcome of the measurement.
When both Alice and Bob are honest, the above protocol starts off with the state |ψ0〉 and proceeds
through the states
|ψi〉 = Ui · · ·U1|ψ0〉. (5)
The final probabilities of winning are given by
PA = |ΠA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,0|ψn〉|2 = Tr [ΠB,0 TrA⊗M |ψn〉〈ψn|] ,
PB = |ΠA,1 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,1|ψn〉|2 = Tr [ΠA,1TrM⊗B |ψn〉〈ψn|] , (6)
where Eq. (4) guarantees the second equalities above and the condition PA + PB = 1. In general,
we will also want to impose PA = PB = 1/2 to obtain a standard coin flip.
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How many messages does the above protocol require? Traditionally, we have one message after
each unitary. We also need an initial message before the first unitary so that Alice can get M. We
will think of this as the zeroth message. In total, we have n + 1 messages. However, the first and
last message are somewhat odd: Alice never looks at the last message, so we could have never sent
it. Also, in principle, Alice could have started with M and initialized it herself, which would at
most reduce Bob’s cheating power. So the whole protocol could be run with only n− 1 messages.
However, the moments in time when the message qubits are flying between Alice and Bob (all
n+1 of them), mark particularly good times to examine the state of our system. In particular, we
are interest in the state of A and B at these times which, when both players are honest, will be
σA,i = TrM⊗B |ψi〉〈ψi|, σB,i = TrA⊗M |ψi〉〈ψi|, (7)
for i = 0, . . . , n.
2.1.1 Primal SDP
Now that we have formalized the protocol, we proceed with the formalization of the optimization
problem needed to find the maximum probabilities with which the players can win by cheating.
The resulting problems will be semidefinite programs (SDPs).
We will study the case of Alice honest and Bob cheating (the other case being nearly identical).
As usual, we do not want to make any assumptions about the operations that Bob does, or even
the number of qubits that he may be using, therefore we must focus entirely on the state of Alice’s
qubits.
As Alice initializes her qubits independently from Bob, we know what their state must be during
the zeroth message:
ρA,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|. (8)
Subsequently we shall lose track of their exact state, but we know by the laws of quantum mechanics
that they must satisfy certain requirements. The simplest is that, since Bob cannot affect Alice’s
qubits, then during the steps when Alice does nothing the state of the qubits cannot change:
ρA,i = ρA,i−1 for i even. (9)
Note that this is true even if Bob performs a measurement as Alice will not know the outcome, and
therefore her mixed state description will still be correct.
The more complicated case is the steps when Alice performs a unitary. Let ρ˜A,i be the state
of A ⊗M immediately after Alice receives the ith message (for i even, of course). The laws of
quantum mechanics again require the consistency condition
TrM ρ˜A,i = ρA,i for i even, (10)
where ρ˜A,i is only restricted by the fact that Bob cannot affect the state of A. Note also that the
above equation holds valid even if Bob uses his message to tell Alice the outcome of a previous
measurement.
Now when Alice applies her unitary and sends off M she will be left with the state
ρA,i = TrM
[
UA,iρ˜A,i−1U
†
A,i
]
for i odd. (11)
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Finally, Alice’s output is determined entirely by the measurement of ρA,n. In particular, Bob
wins with probability
Pwin = Tr [ΠA,1ρA,n] . (12)
Now consider the maximization of the above quantity over density operators ρA,0, . . . , ρA,n and
ρ˜A,0, . . . , ρ˜A,n−2 subject to Eqs. (8,9,10,11). Because the optimal cheating strategy must satisfy the
above conditions we have
P ∗B ≤ maxTr [ΠA,1ρA,n] , (13)
where the maximum is taken subject to the above constraints.
The bound is also tight because any sequence of states consistent with the above constraints
can be achieved by Bob simply by maintaining the purification of Alice’s state. We sketch the
proof: we inductively construct a strategy for Bob that only uses unitaries so that the total state
will always be pure. Assume that Alice has ρA,i−1 (and the total state is |φi−1〉) and Bob wants
to make her transition to a given ρA,i consistent with the above constraints. If i is even this is
trivial. If i is odd, he must make sure to send the right message so that Alice ends up with the
appropriate ρ˜A,i−1. But let |φ˜i−1〉 be any purification of ρ˜A,i−1 into B. Because the reduced density
operators on A of both |φi−1〉 and |φ˜i−1〉 are the same, they are related by a unitary onM⊗B and
by applying this unitary Bob will succeed in this step. By induction he also succeeds in obtaining
the entire sequence, as the base case for i = 0 is trivial. We therefore have
P ∗B = maxTr [ΠA,1ρA,n] . (14)
2.1.2 Dual SDP
In the last section we found a mathematical description for the problem of computing P ∗B . Unfor-
tunately, it is formulated as a maximization problem whose solution is often difficult to find. It
would be sufficient for our purposes, though, to find an upper bound on P ∗B . Such upper bounds
can be constructed from the dual SDP.
In particular, in this section we will describe a set of simple-to-verify certificates that prove
upper bounds on P ∗B . These certificates are known as dual feasible points.
The certificates will be a set of n+1 positive semidefinite operators ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n on A whose
main property is
Tr[ZA,i−1ρA,i−1] ≥ Tr[ZA,iρA,i] (15)
for i = 1, . . . , n and for all ρA,0, . . . , ρA,n consistent with the constraints of Eqs. (8,9,10,11). Addi-
tionally, we require
ZA,n = ΠA,1. (16)
Given a solution ρ∗A,0, . . . , ρ
∗
A,n which attains the maximum in Eq. (14), we can use the above
properties to write
〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = Tr[ZA,0ρ∗A,0] ≥ Tr[ZA,nρ∗A,n] = P ∗B , (17)
14
obtaining an upper bound on P ∗B . The crucial trick is that while we do not know the complete
optimal solution, we do know that ρ∗A,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|, which gives us a way of computing the
upper bound.
How do we enforce Eq. (15)? We do it independently for each transition: For i odd, Eqs. (10,11)
give us ρA,i−1 = TrM ρ˜A,i−1 and ρA,i = TrM[UA,iρ˜A,i−1U
†
A,i]. We are therefore trying to impose
Tr [(ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM) ρ˜A,i−1] ≥ Tr
[
(ZA,i ⊗ IM)UA,iρ˜A,i−1U †A,i
]
. (18)
A sufficient condition (which is also necessary if ρ˜A,i−1 is arbitrary) is given by
ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,i (ZA,i ⊗ IM)UA,i for i odd. (19)
In general, even when Bob is cheating, not all possible density operators ρ˜A,i−1 are attainable
(otherwise he would have complete control over Alice’s qubits). Therefore, the above constraint
could in principle be overly stringent. However, we shall prove in the next section that arbitrarily
good certificates can be found even when when using the above constraint.
Using a similar logic, when i is even we have the relation ρA,i = ρA,i−1 and so a sufficient
condition on the dual variables is ZA,i−1 ≥ ZA,i. However, from Alice’s perspective these are
just dummy transitions. We introduced extra variables to mark the passage of time during Bob’s
actions, but really we want to keep Alice’s system unchanged during these time steps. Therefore,
we impose the more stringent requirement on the dual variables
ZA,i−1 = ZA,i for i even. (20)
We can summarize the above as follows:
Definition 2. Fix a coin-flipping protocol P . A set of positive semidefinite operators ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n
satisfying Eqs. (16,19,20) is known as a dual feasible point (for the problem of cheating Bob given
a protocol P ).
Our arguments above prove:
Lemma 3. A dual feasible point ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n for a coin-flipping protocol P constitutes a proof
of the upper bound 〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 ≥ P ∗B.
The importance of the above upper bounds is that the infimum over dual feasible points actually
equals P ∗B . In other words, there exist arbitrarily good upper bound certificates. This result is
known as strong duality and is proven in Appendix B.
2.2 Upper-Bounded Protocols
Thus far we have studied Kitaev’s first coin-flipping formalism. Given a protocol it helps us
find the optimal cheating strategies for Alice and Bob by formulating these problems as convex
optimizations. In general, however, we do not have a fixed protocol that we want to study. Rather,
we want to identify the optimal protocol from the space of all possible protocols. Kitaev’s second
coin-flipping formalism will help us formulate this bigger problem as a convex optimization.
The goal is to compute the minimum (over all coin-flipping protocols) of the maximum (over all
cheating strategies for the given protocol) of the bias. Alternating minimizations and maximizations
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are often tricky, but we can get rid of this problem by dualizing the inner maximization, that is, by
replacing the maximum over cheating strategies with a minimum over the upper-bound certificates
discussed in the last section. The goal becomes to compute the minimum (over all coin-flipping
protocols) of the minimum (over all upper-bound certificates for the given protocol) of the bias.
But we can go a step further and pair up the protocols and upper bounds to get a single math-
ematical object which we call an upper-bounded protocol. The space of upper-bounded protocols
includes bad protocols with tight upper bounds, good protocols with loose upper bounds and even
bad protocols with loose upper bounds. But somewhere in this space is the optimal protocol to-
gether with its optimal upper bound and by minimizing the bias in this space we can find it (though,
strictly speaking, we must carry out an infimum not a minimum and will only arrive arbitrarily
close to optimality).
Definition 4. An upper-bounded (coin-flipping) protocol, or UBP, consists of a coin-flipping
protocol together with two numbers β and α, a set of positive semidefinite operators ZA,0, . . . , ZA,n
defined on A and a set of positive semidefinite operators ZB,0, . . . , ZB,n defined on B which satisfy
the equations
ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = β|ψA,0〉 ZB,0|ψB,0〉 = α|ψB,0〉
ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,i (ZA,i ⊗ IM)UA,i ZB,i−1 = ZB,i (i odd)
ZA,i−1 = ZA,i IM ⊗ ZB,i−1 ≥ U †B,i (IM ⊗ ZB,i)UB,i (i even)
ZA,n = ΠA,1 ZB,n = ΠB,0 (21)
We shall refer to the pair (β, α) as the upper bound of the UBP.
Theorem 5. A UBP satisfies
P ∗B ≤ β, P ∗A ≤ α, (22)
where P ∗B and P
∗
A are the optimal cheating probabilities of the underlying protocol.
Note the reverse order of β and α. That is because β, which is the upper bound on Bob’s
cheating, must be computed from quantities that involve operations on Alice’s qubits. We will
normally list quantities defined or computed on A before those from B.
The proof of the bound on P ∗B from Theorem 5 follows directly from Lemma 3. We shall not
prove the equivalent bound on P ∗A tough it follows from nearly identical arguments.
The main difference between the dual feasible points described in the previous section and the
one used in the definition of UBPs is that the latter is more restrictive: rather than just setting
β = 〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 we additionally require that |ψA,0〉 be an eigenvector of ZA,0.
Clearly these more restricted dual feasible points still yield the desired upper bounds, proving the
theorem. What we shall argue below, though, is that we have not sacrificed anything by imposing
this additional constraint. Any upper bound that can be proven with the original certificates can
be proven with these more restricted certificates as well.
We use the fact that for every ǫ > 0 there exists a Λ > 0 such that(
〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉+ ǫ
)
|ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|+ Λ
(
I − |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|
)
≥ ZA,0. (23)
The left hand side has |ψA,0〉 as an eigenvector as desired, and by transitivity of inequalities it can
be used as the new ZA,0. On Bob’s side a similar construction can be used to replace both ZB,0
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and ZB,1 while maintaining their equality. By taking ǫ arbitrarily small we can get arbitrarily close
to the old dual feasible points, and so the infimum over both sets will be the same.
In summary, we have defined our UBPs and argued that finding the infimum over this set is
equivalent to seeking the optimal coin-flipping protocol. In particular, we have shown that:
Theorem 6. Let f(β, α) : R×R→ R be a function such that f(α′, β′) ≥ f(α, β) whenever α′ ≥ α
and β′ ≥ β, then
inf
proto
f(P ∗B , P
∗
A) = inf
UBP
f(β, α), (24)
where the left optimization is carried out over all coin-flipping protocols and the right one is carried
out over all upper-bounded protocols. In particular, the optimal bias f(β, α) = max(β, α)− 1/2 can
be found by optimizing either side.
2.2.1 Lower bounds and operator monotone functions
We begin our study of upper-bounded protocols by showing how to place lower bounds on the set
of UBPs. Though we will not prove any new lower bounds, the ideas presented in this section will
motivate the constructions of the next sections.
The main tool tool that we will be using is the following inequality
〈ψi−1|ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i−1|ψi−1〉 ≥ 〈ψi|ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i|ψi〉 (25)
which is the bipartite equivalent of Eq. (15). The proof for i odd is that
〈ψi−1|ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i−1|ψi−1〉 ≥ 〈ψi−1|
(
U †A,i ⊗ IB
)
ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i
(
UA,i ⊗ IB
)|ψi−1〉
= 〈ψi|ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i|ψi〉 (26)
and the proof for i even is nearly identical.
Iterating we obtain the inequality
βα = 〈ψ0|ZA,0 ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,0|ψ0〉 ≥ 〈ψn|ZA,n ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,n|ψn〉
= 〈ψn|ΠA,1 ⊗ IM ⊗ΠB,0|ψn〉 = 0 (27)
or equivalently P ∗BP
∗
A ≥ 0, which admittedly is rather disappointing.
But there is hope. If we had been studying strong coin flipping and were interested in the case
when both Alice and Bob want to obtain the outcome one, the above analysis would be correct
given the minor change ZB,n = ΠB,1. In such case the above inequality would read P
∗
BP
∗
A ≥ 1/2
which is Kitaev’s bound for strong coin flipping [Kit03].
For historical purposes we note that the results up to this point were already part of Kitaev’s
first formalism. Pedagogically, though, it makes more sense to call the optimizations given a fixed
protocol the “first formalism” and the optimizations over all protocols the “second formalism.”
Returning to the case of weak coin flipping, we can obtain better bounds by inserting operator
monotone functions into the above inequalities. An operator monotone function f : [0,∞)→ [0,∞)
is a function that preserves the ordering of matrices. That is
X ≥ Y ⇒ f(X) ≥ f(Y ) (28)
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for all positive semidefinite operators X and Y . The simplest example of an operator monotone
function is f(z) = z. Another example is f(z) = 1. Note that not all monotone functions are
operator monotone. The classic example is f(z) = z2 which is monotone on the domain [0,∞) but
is not operator monotone. A few more facts about operator monotone functions are collected in
the next section.
How do we use the operator monotone functions? A moment ago we were studying the ex-
pression 〈ψi|ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗ ZB,i|ψi〉. But we could just as well study the expression 〈ψi|ZA,i ⊗ IM ⊗
f(ZB,i)|ψi〉 for any operator monotone function f . We could then prove an inequality similar to
Eq. (25), and iterating we would end up with the condition βf(α) ≥ PBf(0), where PB is the
honest probability of Bob wining. Choosing f(z) = 1 we can derive the bound P ∗B ≥ PB , which at
least has the potential of being saturated.
The next obvious step is to put operator monotone functions on both sides and study expressions
of the form 〈ψi|f(ZA,i)⊗ IM⊗ g(ZB,i)|ψi〉. But because at any time step only one of ZA,i and ZB,i
increases, we can do even better.
Definition 7. A bi-operator monotone function is a function f(x, y) : [0,∞)×[0,∞)→ [0,∞)
such that when one of the variables is fixed, it acts as an operator monotone function in the other
variable.
More specifically, given c ∈ [0,∞) define f(c, z) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) to be the function z → f(c, z)
(i.e., where the first argument has been fixed). Similarly, let f(z, c) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be the function
obtained by fixing the second argument. We say f(x, y) is bi-operator monotone if both f(c, z) and
f(z, c) are operator monotone for every c ∈ [0,∞).
Furthermore, given f(x, y) : [0,∞)× [0,∞)→ [0,∞) we extend its definition to act on pairs of
positive semidefinite operators as follows: let X =
∑
i xi|xi〉〈xi| and Y =
∑
i yi|yi〉〈yi| then
f(X,Y ) =
∑
i,j
f(xi, yj)|xi〉〈xi| ⊗ |yj〉〈yj|. (29)
Bi-operator monotone functions satisfy a few simple properties:
• If Y ′ ≥ Y then f(X,Y ′) ≥ f(X,Y ).
• If U is unitary then f(X,UY U †) = (I ⊗ U)f(X,Y )(I ⊗ U †).
• When acting on a tripartite system f(X, I ⊗ Y ) = f(X ⊗ I, Y ).
We are now ready to prove our most general inequality. Given a bi-operator monotone function
f then we can write
〈ψi−1|f(ZA,i−1, IM ⊗ ZB,i−1)|ψi−1〉 ≥ 〈ψi|f(ZA,i, IM ⊗ ZB,i)|ψi〉, (30)
whose proof is nearly identical to Eq. (26). Iterating, we obtain the lemma:
Lemma 8. Given any bi-operator monotone function f , we obtain a bound on coin-flipping proto-
cols given by
f(P ∗B, P
∗
A) ≥ PBf(1, 0) + PAf(0, 1). (31)
Can we use bi-operator monotone functions to prove an interesting bound on weak coin flipping?
Certainly not if we believe that we can achieve arbitrarily small bias. However we shall see that
the spaces of bi-operator monotone functions and coin-flipping protocols are essentially duals. If
there were no arbitrarily good protocols then we would be able to prove that fact using the above
lemma.
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2.2.2 Some more facts about operator monotone functions
Operator monotone functions are well studied and a good reference on the subject is [Bha97]. As
they are also central to the task of constructing coin-flipping protocols we collect here some of their
most important properties which will be used throughout the paper.
Our main interest are functions that map the set of positive semidefinite operators to itself.
Therefore, when not otherwise stated, we assume all operator monotone functions have domain
[0,∞) and range contained in [0,∞). In general, though, operator monotone functions can be
defined on any real domain.
The space of operator monotone functions (on a fixed domain) forms a convex cone. If f(z)
and g(z) are operator monotone then so are
af(z) + bg(z) (32)
for any a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. Another simple property is that if f(z) is operator monotone on a domain
(a, b) then for any c ∈ R we have f(z − c) is operator monotone on (a+ c, b+ c).
A very important function which is operator monotone on the domain (0,∞) is f(z) = −1/z.
The proof is given by Y ≥ X > 0 ⇒ I ≥ Y −1/2XY −1/2 ⇒ I ≤ (Y −1/2XY −1/2)−1 ⇒ I ≤
Y 1/2X−1Y 1/2 ⇒ −Y −1 ≥ −X−1. By shifting and restricting the domain we get
f(z) = − 1
λ+ z
(33)
which is operator monotone on [0,∞) for λ ∈ (0,∞), though the range is negative. The range can
be fixed by scaling and adding in the constant function to get 1− λλ+z = zλ+z .
In fact, the above functions together with f(z) = z and f(z) = 1 span the extremal rays of the
convex cone of operator monotone functions. More precisely, every operator monotone function
f : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) has a unique integral representation
f(z) = c1 + c2z +
∫ ∞
0
λz
λ+ z
dw(λ), (34)
where c1, c2 ∈ R are non-negative and dw(λ) is a positive measure such that
∫∞
0
λ
1+λdw(λ) < ∞.
In particular, they are infinitely differentiable.
The general case, where the domain is the interval I = (a, b) ⊂ R, is nearly identical but with
the integral ranging over −λ ∈ R \ I. When the domain is the closed interval [a, b] then functions
must be operator monotone on (a, b) and monotone on [a, b] so that f(a) ≤ limz→a+ f(z) and
f(b) ≥ limz→b− f(z).
2.3 Time Dependent Point Games
In previous sections we have paired the honest probability distribution σA,i with the dual variable
ZA,i. We have also paired the full honest state |ψi〉 with the operator ZA,i⊗I⊗ZB,i. These pairings
have led to interesting results, but they can also become rapidly unwieldy because they contain too
much information, such as a choice of basis. The goal of this section is to get rid of most of this
excess information and strip the problem to a bare minimum that still contains the essence of coin
flipping.
The key idea for the following discussion is to use the honest state to define a probability
distribution over the eigenvalues of the dual SDP variables. This idea is captured by the next
definition.
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Definition 9. Given Z =
∑
z∈eig(Z) zΠ
[z], a positive semidefinite matrix expressed as a sum of its
eigenspaces, and σ, a second positive semidefinite matrix defined on the same space, we define the
function Prob(Z, σ) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) as follows
p(z) = Prob(Z, σ) ⇒ p(z) =
{
Tr[Π[z]σ] z ∈ eig(Z),
0 otherwise.
(35)
Similarly, given a vector |ψ〉 instead of σ we define Prob(Z, |ψ〉) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) by
p(z) = Prob(Z, |ψ〉) ⇒ p(z) =
{
〈ψ|Π[z]|ψ〉 z ∈ eig(Z),
0 otherwise.
(36)
Note that by construction Prob(Z, |ψ〉) ≡ Prob(Z, |ψ〉〈ψ|).
We think of the above functions p(z) as belonging to the space of functions [0,∞) → [0,∞)
with finite support. The motivation for the construction is that given any function with arbitrary
support f(z) : [0,∞)→ R we have
p(z) = Prob(Z, σ) ⇒
∑
z
p(z)f(z) = Tr[σf(Z)], (37)
where the sum on the left is over the finite support of p(z).
A similar construction can be used for the bipartite case. Take ZA =
∑
zA
zAΠ
[zA]
A on A,
ZB =
∑
zB
zBΠ
[zB]
B on B and |ψ〉 on A ⊗ M ⊗ B and combine them to form the two-variable
function
p(zA, zB) =
{
〈ψ|Π[zA]A ⊗ IM ⊗Π[zB]B |ψ〉 zA ∈ eig(ZA) and zB ∈ eig(ZB),
0 otherwise,
(38)
which we will denote by Prob(ZA, ZB , |ψ〉).
Often it will be useful to use an algebraic notation when describing functions with finite support.
For single-variable functions p(z) with finite support we introduce a basis {[zi]} of functions that
take the value one at zi and are zero everywhere else. For instance, a function with two nonzero
values p(z1) = c1 and p(z2) = c2 can be written as
p = c1[z1] + c2[z2]. (39)
Similarly, for the bipartite we use {[x, y]} as basis elements for the functions p(x, y) with finite
support. For instance, the initial state Prob(ZA,0, ZB,0, |ψ0〉) of a UBP always has the form
1[β, α]. (40)
On the other hand, because ZA,n = ΠA,1 and ZB,n = ΠB,0 are just the projections onto the
opposing player’s winning space, the final state Prob(ZA,n, ZB,n, |ψn〉) of a UBP always has the
form
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] (41)
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as can be verified from Eq. (6). Note, however, that the label 0 on ΠB,0 refers to the coin outcome
and not the associated eigenvalue. Because ZB,n = 1ΠB,0 + 0ΠB,1, the projector onto the one
eigenvalue of ZB,n is given by Π
[1]
B = ΠB,0 and similarly Π
[0]
B = ΠB,1.
In fact, given a UBP we can compute for every i the functions Prob(ZA,i, ZB,i, |ψi〉), which
allows us to visualize the UBP as a movie of sorts where at each time step there is a finite set of
points in the plane. The points move around between time steps according to some rules which
we will determine in a moment. We call these sequences point games and we shall show that they
contain all the important information about UBPs.
One important convention that we introduce, though, is that point games are always described
in reverse time order. Henceforth, we will refer to Eq. (41) as the first or t = 0 point configuration
whereas Eq. (40) will be referred to as the last or t = n point configuration. More generally, the
point configuration at t = i will be constructed from the operators ZA,n−i, ZB,n−i and |ψn−i〉.
The motivation for reversing the time order is as follows: first we get to begin at a known
starting configuration such as 0.5[1, 0] + 0.5[0, 1] (for the main case of interest PA = PB = 1/2).
From there, we can move the points around following the rules of point games until they merge
into a single point at some location [β, α]. We can do this without fixing in advance the number of
steps, but rather using the existence of a single point as an end condition. The sequence of moves
will then encode a UBP with upper bound (β, α).
So what are these rules for moving points around? Let begin with the one-variable case and
examine a transition between pi(z), constructed from ZA,n−i and σA,n−i, and pi+1(z), constructed
from ZA,n−i−1 and σA,n−i−1. A necessary condition is∑
z
pi(z)f(z) ≤
∑
z
pi+1(z)f(z) (42)
for every operator monotone function f , where again the sums range over the finite supports of the
respective probability distributions.
The condition is trivially necessary on the time transitions when Bob acts and Alice does
nothing because then pi = pi+1. To prove that the condition is necessary for the non-trivial tran-
sitions recall the usual relation ZA,n−i−1 ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,n−i(ZA,n−i ⊗ IM)UA,n−i. Also let σ˜A,n−i−1 =
TrB[|ψn−i−1〉〈ψn−i−1|] so that σA,n−i−1 = TrM[σ˜A,n−i−1] and σA,n−i = TrM[UA,n−iσ˜A,n−i−1U †A,n−i]
and therefore∑
z
pi(z)f(z) = Tr[σA,n−if(ZA,n−i)] = Tr[σ˜A,n−i−1f(U
†
A,n−iZA,n−i ⊗ IMUA,n−i)] (43)
≤ Tr[σ˜A,n−i−1f(ZA,n−i−1 ⊗ IM)] = Tr[σA,n−i−1f(ZA,n−i−1)] =
∑
z
pi+1(z)f(z).
Sadly, there are no sufficient conditions that can be derived just by looking at one side of the
problem. Nevertheless, it will be useful to define the transitions that satisfy the above constraints
as the valid set of transitions, as this notion will be used as a building block when studying the
more complicated bipartite transitions.
Definition 10. Let pi(z) and pi+1(z) be two functions [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with finite support. We say
pi(z)→ pi+1(z) is a valid transition if
∑
z pi(z) =
∑
z pi+1(z), and for every operator monotone
function f we have ∑
z
pi(z)f(z) ≤
∑
z
pi+1(z)f(z). (44)
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Furthermore, we say that the transition is strictly valid if
∑
z pi(z)f(z) <
∑
z pi+1(z)f(z) for
every non-constant operator monotone function f .
For reasons to become clear below, we do not restrict the functions pi(z) and pi+1(z) to sum to
one. However, we do require that their sum be equal so that probability is conserved.
Because we have a characterization of the extremal rays of the cone of operator monotone
functions, it is sufficient when checking for valid transitions to use the set of functions fλ(z) =
λz
λ+z for λ ∈ (0,∞). As for the other two extremal functions, the constraint from f(z) = 1 is
independently imposed as conservation of probability, and the constraint from f(z) = z follows
from the limit λ→∞ of fλ(z). It is worth stating this explicitly:
Lemma 11. Let pi(z) and pi+1(z) be two functions [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support. The
transition pi(z)→ pi+1(z) is valid if and only if
∑
z (pi+1(z)− pi(z)) = 0 and for every λ ∈ (0,∞)
we have
∑
z
λz
λ+z (pi+1(z)− pi(z)) ≥ 0.
Not surprisingly, a set of necessary conditions for bipartite transitions constructed from UBPs
is that ∑
x,y
pi(x, y)f(x, y) ≤
∑
x,y
pi+1(x, y)f(x, y) (45)
for every bi-operator monotone functions f , where as usual the sums are over the finite support of
the respective probability distributions. Unfortunately, the space of bi-operator monotone functions
is not as well characterized as the space of operator monotone functions, and therefore it would be
better to have a set of conditions that are constructed from the latter:
Definition 12. Let pi(x, y) and pi+1(x, y) be two functions [0,∞) ⊗ [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite
support. We say pi(x, y)→ pi+1(x, y) is a valid transition if either
1. for every c ∈ [0,∞) the transition pi(z, c)→ pi+1(z, c) is valid, or
2. for every c ∈ [0,∞) the transition pi(c, z)→ pi+1(c, z) is valid,
where as before pi(z, c) is the one-variable function obtained by fixing the second input. We call the
first case a horizontal transition and the second case a vertical transition.
The first case occurs when Alice applies a unitary and the second case when Bob applies a unitary.
As opposed to the single variable transitions, the bipartite condition of validity is not transitive.
However, we can define the notion of transitively valid for two functions if there is a sequence of
functions beginning with the first one and ending with the second one, such that each transition
is valid. The main object of study for this section will be transitively valid transitions of the form
PB [1, 0]+PA[0, 1]→ 1[β, α], where we always assume PA, PB ≥ 0 are some fixed numbers such that
PA + PB = 1.
Definition 13. A time dependent point game (TDPG) is a sequence p0(x, y), . . . , pn(x, y)
of functions [0,∞) ⊗ [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support, such that every transition pi(x, y) →
pi+1(x, y) is valid and such that the first and last distributions have the form
p0 = PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1], and pn = 1[β, α]. (46)
We say that [β, α] is the final point of the TDPG.
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The above definition can be extended to games beyond coin-flipping which have many possible
outcomes. If outcome i has honest probability qi, and pays ai ≥ 0 to Alice and bi ≥ 0 to Bob,
the same formalism applies if we use as starting state p0 =
∑
i qi[bi, ai]. This paper will focus
exclusively on weak coin-flipping though.
Our first task will be to prove that given a UBP with bound (β, α) we can build a TDPG
with final point [β, α]. We have already done most of the work by constructing the probability
distributions out of the UBP and showing that they have the right initial and final states. What
remains to be shown is that the transitions pi(x, y)→ pi+1(x, y) are valid.
We focus on the transitions when Alice applies a unitary, the other case being nearly identi-
cal. Given a UBP, we construct the distribution pi = Prob(ZA,n−i, ZB,n−i, |ψn−i〉) and the distri-
bution pi+1 = Prob(ZA,n−i−1, ZB,n−i−1, |ψn−i−1〉). The UBP operators satisfy the usual relations
ZA,n−i−1⊗IM ≥ U †A,n−i(ZA,n−i⊗IM)UA,n−i, ZB,n−i−1 = ZB,n−i and |ψn−i〉 = UA,n−i⊗IB |ψn−i−1〉.
We expand the state |ψn−i−1〉 as
|ψn−i−1〉 =
∑
y
|φy〉 ⊗ |y〉, (47)
where |y〉 are normalized eigenvectors of ZB,n−i and |φy〉 are non-normalized states on A ⊗M.
Because this is not necessarily a Schmidt decomposition, the vectors |φy〉 are not necessarily or-
thogonal, however this will not be a problem. The key idea now is to note that given a fixed y, the
function pi+1(x, y) = Prob(ZA,n−i−1, ρn−i−1,y) where ρn−i−1,y ≡ TrM[|φy〉〈φy|]. Similarly, the func-
tion pi(x, y) = Prob(ZA,n−i, ρn−i,y) where ρn−i,y ≡ TrM[UA,n−i|φy〉〈φy|U †A,n−i]. The relationship
between these quantities is the same as it was the analysis of one-sided probability transitions, and
the proof of Eq. (43) goes through with ρn−i−1,y, ρn−i,y and |φy〉〈φy| taking the place of σA,n−i−1,
σA,n−i and σ˜A,n−i−1. Therefore, for every y ∈ [0,∞) the transition pi(x, y) → pi+1(x, y) is valid
and therefore the full transition pi(x, y)→ pi+1(x, y) is valid as well.
We have just proven that given a UBP with bound (β, α) we can construct a TDPG with final
point [β, α]. The converse is also true in the following sense: given any TDPG with final point
[β, α] and an ǫ > 0 there exists a UBP with bound (β + ǫ, α + ǫ). This is enough because we are
only concerned with infimums, and the infimums over both sets will be equal. Constructing UBPs
from TDPGs will require a fair amount of work to be done in the next couple of sections. Some
readers may prefer to first study the TDPG examples in Section 3.
2.3.1 Coin-flipping protocols with projections
The description of the coin-flipping protocols built from TDPGs will be greatly simplified if we
can use measurements at intermediate steps throughout the protocol. Of course, there is nothing
special about protocols that involve measurements, as these can always be delayed to the last step.
However, doing so requires simulating the measurement with a unitary and keeping the simulated
outcomes in some extra qubits, which adds extra complexity to the description of the protocol.
Early measurements can result in significant improvements in the description of a protocol and the
number of qubits employed. An example of this is given in Appendix A which takes the author’s
original bias 1/6 protocol requiring arbitrarily many qubits and reduces the space used to a single
qutrit per player plus a single qubit for messages.
In fact, for such simplifications we need only allow a special kind of projective measurement:
at certain steps the players will use a two outcome POVM of the form {E, I − E}, where E is a
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projector (i.e., E† = E2 = E). The protocol will be set up so that if both players play honestly
the first outcome will always be obtained, and if the second outcome is observed the players will
immediately abort (at which point they can declare themselves the winner). We will place one such
projection immediately after each unitary.
The goal of this section is to formalize the needed notion of protocols with projections, describe
their dual feasible points, and show how they are equivalent to regular protocols. It can be safely
skipped by those familiar with the result.
Definition 14. A coin-flipping protocol with projections is a coin-flipping protocol with the
addition of n projection operators E1, . . . , En of the form
Ei =
{
EA,i ⊗ IB for i odd,
IA ⊗ EB,i for i even,
(48)
such that Ei|ψi〉 = |ψi〉 for every i = 1, . . . , n
The protocol is implemented as before, except that immediately after implementing Ui the acting
player measures using {Ei, I − Ei} and aborts on the second outcome.
To prove the equivalence of protocols with and without measurements, not only do we need
to construct a canonical unitary-based protocol for every protocol with measurements, but we
also need to show that the new protocol does not allow for any extra cheating. This is done by
constructing a canonical map from the dual feasible points of the protocol with measurements to
the dual feasible points of the unitary protocol such that the upper bounds are preserved (or at
least come arbitrarily close to each other). Effectively, we aim to construct a map from “UBPs
with measurements” to regular UBPs. As most of the constructions are fairly standard, we will
only sketch the details.
As usual we focus on the case of honest Alice and cheating Bob. The primal SDP requires
ρA,0 = |ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|, ρA,i = ρA,i−1 for i even, and Pwin = Tr [ΠA,1ρA,n] as before. However, the new
element is that for i odd we have
ρA,i = TrM
[
EA,iUA,iρ˜A,i−1U
†
A,iEA,i
]
, for TrM ρ˜A,i−1 ≤ ρA,i−1. (49)
The trace of ρA,i is no longer unity but rather it encodes the probability that we have reached step
i without aborting and ρA,i/Tr[ρA,i] is the state at step i given that no aborts have occurred. The
inequality on the right equation allows for Bob to abort, though it is certainly never optimal for
him to do so.
The dual SDP has as before ZA,n = ΠA,1, ZA,i−1 = ZA,i for i even, and β = 〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉
but now for i odd we impose the condition
ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,iEA,i (ZA,i ⊗ IM)EA,iUA,i. (50)
Given a protocol with projections and a dual feasible point let us build a unitary protocol with
a matching dual feasible point. We will put primes on all expressions of the new protocol that differ
from the one with measurements.
The number of rounds and the message space will be the same, but we will add n qubits to
both A and B so that A′ = (C2)⊗n ⊗ A and B′ = B ⊗ (C2)⊗n. These extra qubits will store the
measurement outcomes (though technically we only need n/2 qubits on each side). The new initial
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state will set all the new qubits to zero |ψ′A,0〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |ψA,0〉 and |ψ′B,0〉 = |ψB,0〉 ⊗ |0〉, and when
playing honestly they will always remain zero. The final projectors only give the victory to the
other player if all the extra qubits are zero so that Π′A,1 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ ΠA,1 and Π′A,0 = I − Π′A,1 and
similarly Π′B,0 = ΠB,0 ⊗ |0〉〈0| and Π′B,1 = I − Π′B,0. Finally, the new unitaries simply simulate a
measurement after applying the regular operation
U ′A,i =MA,i (I ⊗ UA,i) for i odd, (51)
U ′B,i =MB,i (UB,i ⊗ I) for i even, (52)
where MA,i and MB,i are controlled unitaries with target given by the original A (or B) and new
qubit number i and control given by the other n− 1 new qubits. The matrices acts as the identity
unless all the n− 1 control qubits are zero, in which case they apply the operation
MA,i →
(
EA,i I − EA,i
I − EA,i EA,i
)
, MB,i →
(
EB,i I − EB,i
I − EB,i EB,i
)
. (53)
where the blocks correspond to the computational basis of new qubit i.
It is not hard to check that the new protocol is indeed a valid coin-flipping protocol and that
the honest probabilities of winning PA and PB are the same as in the original protocol.
Now we take a dual feasible point for the original protocol and fix ǫ > 0. We will construct a
dual feasible point for the new protocol with β′ = β + nǫ. For i even define
Z ′A,i = |0〉〈0| ⊗ (ZA,i + (n − i)ǫI) + ΛiFi, (54)
where Fi is a projector onto the space such that at least one of the new qubits labeled i + 1
through n is non-zero, and Λi ≥ 0 is a constant to be determined in a moment. By construction
Z ′A,n = |0〉〈0|⊗ZA,n = Π′A,1 and β′ = 〈ψ′A,0|Z ′A,0|ψ′A,0〉 = 〈ψA,0|ZA,0+nǫ|ψA,0〉 = β+nǫ as required.
We can also set Z ′A,i−1 = Z
′
A,i for i even, so that the only constraint that remains to be checked is
Z ′A,i−2 ⊗ IM ≥ U ′A,i−1†
(
Z ′A,i ⊗ IM
)
U ′A,i−1. (55)
We will describe a decomposition A′ = H1 ⊕ H2 ⊕ H3 ⊕ H4 such that both sides of the above
inequality are block diagonal with respect to it, and therefore we can check the inequality on each
block separately. The decomposition is obtained by looking at the n new qubits of A′ from last
(qubit n) to first (qubit 1) and picking out the first non-zero qubit.
• H1 contains vectors where the first non-zero qubit is one of i+ 1, . . . , n.
• H2 contains vectors where the first non-zero qubit is either i−1 or i, but excluding the vector
where qubit i− 1 is the only non-zero.
• H3 contains vectors where the first non-zero qubit is one of 1, . . . , i− 2.
• H4 contains the space where all new qubits are zero or where all qubits but qubit i − 1 are
zero.
On H1 we have Fi−2 = Fi = I so the inequality reads Λi−2I ≥ ΛiI, and is satisfied so long as Λi
is a decreasing sequence. On H2 we have Fi−2 = I and Fi = 0 so the inequality reads Λi−2I ≥ 0.
On H3 we have Fi−2 = Fi = 0 so the inequality reads 0 ≥ 0. Finally, H4 is the only space on which
MA,i−1 acts non-trivially. Writing X = ZA,i−2⊗ IM+ (n− i+2)ǫI and Y = ZA,i⊗ IM+ (n− i)ǫI
and using U ≡ UA,i−1, E ≡ EA,i−1 we need to check the block diagonal inequality(
X 0
0 Λi−2I
)
≥
(
U † 0
0 U †
)(
E I − E
I − E E
)(
Y 0
0 0
)(
E I − E
I − E E
)(
U 0
0 U
)
=
(
U †EY EU U †EY (I − E)U
U †(I − E)Y EU U †(I − E)Y (I − E)U
)
.
From the constraints on the original dual feasible point we had ZA,i−2⊗IM ≥ U †E(ZA,i⊗IM)EU =
U †EY EU − (n− i)ǫE and therefore X > U †EY EU . In turn, this implies that for sufficiently large
Λi−2 the whole matrix inequality holds, and then we just need to make sure that Λi−2 is also larger
than Λi. We have not specified yet Λn but this one can be chosen to be zero as it effectively never
appears anywhere. That concludes the proof of the equivalence of protocols with and without
projective measurement.
2.3.2 Compiling TDPGs into UBPs
We had previously shown how to construct a TDPG out of a UBP. In this section we will describe
the reverse construction, thereby proving TDPGs and UBPs equivalent.
We assume that all transitions in the given TDPG alternate between horizontal and vertical
(i.e., if we have a sequence of two valid horizontal transitions we can combine them into a single
valid transition by removing the middle step). We also assume that the first transition p0 → p1
is vertical and the last one pn−1 → pn is horizontal (which can be accomplished by adding trivial
transitions at the beginning or end). All TDPGs obtained from UBPs have this form.
We will also need to assume that in the given TDPG all non-trivial one-variable transitions are
strictly valid. This is justified by the following lemma.
Lemma 15. Given any TDPG p0, . . . , pn with final point [β, α] and an ǫ > 0, there exists a second
TDPG q0, . . . , qm with final point [β+ǫ/2, α+ǫ/2] such that every non-trivial one-variable transition
is strictly valid.
Proof. We construct the new TDPG by shifting up (or left) each set of points in qi relative to its
predecessor. More specifically let ⌈i/2⌉ and ⌊i/2⌋ be i/2 rounded up and down respective. There
are respectively the number of vertical and horizontal transitions that have occurred to reach pi.
Now define the new TDPG by
qi(x, y) = pi(x−
⌊
i
2
⌋
ǫ
n
, y −
⌈
i
2
⌉
ǫ
n
). (56)
The final point is [β + ǫ2 , α +
ǫ
2 ] as required. Also each non-trivial transition is now strictly valid:
for instance, if qi → qi+1 is a horizontal transition and y ∈ [0,∞) such that
∑
z qi(z, y) 6= 0, then
(using y′ = y − ⌈ i2⌉ ǫn)
∑
z
p′i+1(z, y)f(z) =
∑
z
pi+1(z, y
′)f(z +
⌊
i
2
⌋
ǫ
n
+
ǫ
n
) (57)
>
∑
z
pi+1(z, y
′)f(z +
⌊
i
2
⌋
ǫ
n
) ≥
∑
z
pi(z, y
′)f(z +
⌊
i
2
⌋
ǫ
n
) =
∑
z
p′i(z, y)f(z)
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for every non-constant operator monotone f . The first inequality follows because non-constant
operator monotone functions are strictly monotone and the second because f(z + c) is operator
monotone for c ≥ 0.
The next step in our argument relies on two lemmas which we state below and prove in Appendix C.
They are the essential ingredient which takes pairs of functions, such as those in a TDPG, and
compiles them back into the language of matrices.
Lemma 16. Let p(z) and q(z) be functions [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support. If p(z) → q(z)
is strictly valid then there exists positive semidefinite matrices X and Y and an (unnormalized)
vector |ψ〉 such that X ≤ Y , p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and q = Prob(Y, |ψ〉).
Lemma 17. The matrices X and Y in Lemma 16 can be chosen such that
1. The spectrum of X is equal to {0} ∪ S(p), with all non-zero eigenvalues occurring once.
2. The spectrum of Y is equal to {Λ} ∪ S(q), for some large Λ > 0, with all other eigenvalues
occurring once.
3. The dimension of X and Y is no greater than |S(p)|+ |S(q)| − 1.
where S(p) and S(q) are respectively the supports of p and q.
Because we are now assuming that every non-trivial one-variable transition is strictly valid,
we can use Lemma 16 to turn the transitions into matrices from which we will extract unitaries.
However, first we need to standardize the Hilbert space on which all of these matrices are defined.
Let us fix a finite set S of non-negative numbers, and assume we are given a strictly valid
transition p → q such that the supports of both p and q are contained in S. What we want to
argue is that we can choose X and Y of Lemma 16 so that their spectrum is exactly S (union zero
for X or union some large value Λ for Y ) and such that the only degenerate eigenvalues are zero
for X and Λ for Y .
The argument is simple, we start with X and Y satisfying the requirements of Lemma 17. If
the Λ appearing in Y is not larger than the maximum of S we can simply increase it. Now we just
start appending in the missing eigenvalues from S one at a time (increasing the dimension of the
matrices by using a direct sum). If some value c ∈ S is in X but not in Y we can append it to Y if
at the same time we append a zero to X. Similarly if c ∈ S is in Y but not in X we can append it
to X if at the same time we append an extra Λ eigenvalue to Y . If c ∈ S appears in neither matrix
we append it to both at the same time. The dimension of the new matrices so constructed is no
larger than 2|S|. The dimension can be made exactly equal to 2|S| by appending in extra zeros to
X and Λs to Y .
To extract unitaries from these matrices, note that given any basis, we can find a unitary U
such that UXU † is diagonal and U |ψ〉 has non-negative coefficients with respect to this basis. In
particular, if we choose the basis that diagonalizes Y and such that |ψ〉 has non-negative coefficients,
then we can find such a unitary U and get
Yd ≥ U †XdU, (58)
where Xd and Yd are diagonal in the computational basis with the same spectrum as X and Y
respectively. Additionally, by construction the non-negative coefficients in the computational basis
must have the form |ψ〉 =∑i√qi|i〉 and U |ψ〉 =∑i√pi|i〉. Putting everything together, we obtain
the following rather surprising lemma.
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Lemma 18. Let S be a finite set of non-negative numbers. Let p→ q be a strictly valid transition
such that the support of both p(z) and q(z) are contained in S. Let H be the Hilbert space spanned
by {|i, s〉 : i ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ S} and define
Z =
∑
s∈S
s|0, s〉〈0, s|. (59)
Then there exists a sufficiently large number Λ > 0 and a unitary U such that
U
∑
s∈S
√
q(s)|0, s〉 =
∑
s∈S
√
p(s)|0, s〉 and Z + ΛP1 ≥ U †ZU, (60)
where P1 =
∑
s |1, s〉〈1, s| is the projector onto the space where the first qubit is one.
Note that the result is non-trivial. If p→ q is not valid then no such unitary exists.
In the protocol below we will essentially be able to choose all our dual operators equal to∑
s∈S s|0, s〉〈0, s| + ΛP1. We then use our projective measurements to reset the eigenvalue Λ to
zero on every transition so we can apply the above lemma. The unitaries, though, require more
care. During every bipartite transition pi(x, y) → pi+1(x, y) we have many one-variable strictly
valid transitions pi(x, y) → pi+1(x, y) during Alice’s turn (or pi(x, y) → pi+1(x, y) during Bob’s
turn), each of which defines a different unitary in the above lemma.What Alice needs to do on her
turn is to apply a block diagonal unitary with each block corresponding to a different strictly valid
transition. In other words she needs to be able to apply a controlled unitary with control given
by Bob’s state. That is what the messages are used for. Bob will store his state in an entangled
subspace of M⊗B so that Alice can use it as control but not change it too much. Similarly, Alice
will store her state in an entangled subspace of A⊗M so that Bob can access it. This construction
is similar to one used in [KMP04].
We are now ready to construct the protocol. Fix a TDPG by p0, . . . , pn with strictly valid
transitions and final point [β, α]. The protocol will be defined with the same n representing the
number of messages.
To define the relevant Hilbert spaces let SA (resp. SB) be the finite set of x coordinates (resp. y
coordinates) of points that are assigned non-zero probability by pi(x, y) for some i. By construction
0, 1, β ∈ SA and 0, 1, α ∈ SB . Set
A = span{|i, sa〉 : i ∈ {0, 1}, sa ∈ SA}, (61)
M = span{|sa, sb〉 : sa ∈ SA, sb ∈ SB}, (62)
B = span{|sb, i〉 : sb ∈ SB , i ∈ {0, 1}}. (63)
It will ocassionally be useful to write M = A′ ⊗ B′ where A′ = span{|sa〉 : sa ∈ SA} and B′ =
span{|sb〉 : sb ∈ SB}.
The initial states will be
|ψ0,A〉 = |0, β〉, |ψ0,M 〉 = |β, α〉, |ψ0,B〉 = |α, 0〉. (64)
The projections that follow the unitaries will have the form
EA,i = EA ≡
∑
sa∈SA
|0, sa〉〈0, sa| ⊗ |sa〉〈sa| ⊗ IB′ , (65)
EB,i = EB ≡ IA′ ⊗
∑
sb∈SB
|sb〉〈sb| ⊗ |sb, 0〉〈sb, 0|, (66)
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where EA,i is defined for i odd and EB,i for i even. Basically EA acts on A⊗M and ensures that
the first qubit is 0 and the registers sa in A and M agree.
The final measurement operators will have the form
ΠA,1 = |0, 1〉〈0, 1|, ΠB,0 = |1, 0〉〈1, 0| (67)
with ΠA,0 = I −ΠA,1 and ΠB,1 = I −ΠB,0.
All that remains is to describe the unitaries, which will be done in a moment. The unitaries
are to be chosen so that the honest state during the ith messages is
|ψi〉 =
∑
sa∈SA,sb∈SB
√
pn−i(sa, sb) |0, sa〉 ⊗ |sa, sb〉 ⊗ |sb, 0〉, (68)
where we remind the reader of our “reverse time” convention of TDPGs relative to protocols. The
above definition agrees with our choice of initial state |ψ0〉. It is also easy to see that the projection
operations that follow the unitaries will always succeed if both players are honest. Finally, we have
|ψn〉 = PB |0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0〉+PA|0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0〉 so Alice and Bob will agree on the coin outcome, which
will have the required probability distribution.
Before defining the unitaries, we fix a single Λ > 0 larger than all elements of SA and SB and
large enough so that all the strictly valid transitions in the given TDPG can be turned into unitaries
satisfying the constraints of Eq. (60).
To construct the unitaries for Alice it is useful to define the subspace A¯ ⊂ A ⊗ A′ given by
A¯ = {|i, sa, sa〉 : i ∈ {0, 1}, sa ∈ SA} and let P ⊥¯A be the the projector onto the complement of A¯
in A⊗A′. Let i be odd so that we can build UA,i out of the horizontal transition pn−i → pn−i+1.
The unitary will be block diagonal of the form
UA,i =
∑
sb∈SB
(
U
(sb)
A,i + P
⊥¯
A
)
⊗ |sb〉〈sb|, (69)
where U
(sb)
A,i can be viewed as a unitary operator on A¯. If pn−i(sa, sb) = pn−i+1(sa, sb) then we
choose U
(sb)
A,i = I otherwise pn−i(sa, sb)→ pn−i+1(sa, sb) is strictly valid and by Lemma 18 we can
choose U
(sb)
A,n−i on A¯ such that
Z¯A + ΛP¯1 ≥ U (sb)A,i
†
Z¯AU
(sb)
A,i (70)
for Z¯A =
∑
sa
sa|0, sa, sa〉〈0, sa, sa|, P¯1 =
∑
sa
|1, sa, sa〉〈1, sa, sa| and such that
U
(sb)
A,i
∑
sa∈SA
√
pn−i+1(sa, sb)|0, sa, sa〉 =
∑
sa∈SA
√
pn−i(sa, sb)|0, sa, sa〉. (71)
We can now directly verify the equation UA,i ⊗ IB|ψi−1〉 = |ψi〉 with states given by Eq. (68). The
unitaries UB,i for Bob are defined analogously, and otherwise we have completed the description of
the coin-flipping protocol associated to the TDPG.
What remains is to describe dual feasible points for the above protocol that prove the bounds
P ∗A ≤ α and P ∗B ≤ β. If we define the operators
ZA =
∑
sa
sa|0, sa〉〈0, sa|+ Λ
∑
sa
|1, sa〉〈1, sa| (72)
ZB =
∑
sb
sb|0, sb〉〈0, sb|+ Λ
∑
sb
|1, sb〉〈1, sb| (73)
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on A and B respectively. The desired dual feasible points are given by ZA,i = ZA and ZB,i = ZB
for all i except that we must set ZA,n = ZA,n−1 = ΠA,1 and ZB,n = ΠB,0 as required by our slightly
inflexible definitions. As usual, we will only verify the case of Alice honest and Bob cheating as the
other case is nearly identical.
We trivially have ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = β|ψA,0〉. The main constraint that we need to verify is
ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,iEA (ZA,i ⊗ IM)EAUA,i (74)
for i odd. The special case of i = n− 1 will be proven if we show that the above inequality holds
with ZA,n−1 = ZA because ZA ≥ ΠA,1 and inequalities are transitive.
First we note that in all cases
EA (ZA,i ⊗ IM)EA = Z¯A ⊗ IB′ ≡
∑
sa
sa|0, sa, sa〉〈0, sa, sa| ⊗ IB′ , (75)
where Z¯A has support on A¯. The unitary UA,i maps A¯ ⊗ B′ to itself, so the right hand side of
Eq. (74) has support on A¯ ⊗ B′. The operator ZA,i−1 ⊗ IM is block diagonal with respect to the
decomposition of A⊗M into A¯⊗B′ and its complement, and so the inequality is trivially satisfied
in the latter space. In A¯ ⊗ B′ what remains to be shown is
Z¯A + Λ ∑
sa∈SA
|1, sa, sa〉〈1, sa, sa|

⊗ IB′ ≥ U †A,i (Z¯A ⊗ IB′)UA,i = ∑
sb∈SB
U
(sb)
A,i
†
Z¯AU
(sb)
A,i ⊗ |sb〉〈sb|
(76)
and the inequality follows from the definition of U
(sb)
A,i .
What we have proven is that we can take a TDPG with strictly valid transitions and final point
[β, α] and turn into a UBP with projections with bound (β, α). However, in the last section we
proved that UBPs with projections come arbitrarily close to regular UBPs, and at the top of this
section we proved that TDPGs with strictly valid transitions come arbitrarily close to any arbitrary
TDPGs. Therefore, we have proven that TDPGs are equivalent to UBPs, which we state formally
as an extended version of Theorem 6:
Theorem 19. Let f(β, α) : R×R→ R be a function such that f(α′, β′) ≥ f(α, β) whenever α′ ≥ α
and β′ ≥ β, then
inf
proto
f(P ∗B, P
∗
A) = inf
UBP
f(β, α) = inf
TDPG
f(β, α), (77)
where the left optimization is carried out over all coin-flipping protocols, the middle one is carried
out over all upper-bounded protocols, and the right one is carried out over all time dependent point
games.
Note that the above construction of a UBP out of a TDPG is not optimal in terms of resources.
In particular, in most cases the number of qubits needed could be drastically reduced. It is also
not in general true that if we start with a UBP, translate it into a TDPG and then construct from
it a UBP we will end up with the same one. In fact, given two UBPs with the same underlying
protocol but different dual feasible points, if we converted into TDPGs and then back into UBPs,
the resulting protocols will be radically different!
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3 The illustrated guide to point games
The purpose of this section is to build an intuition about point games. In the first part of the
section we will classify a few of the simplest valid transitions. These moves will be part of a basic
toolbox of transitions that will be used throughout the paper.
In the second part of this section we use our basic moves to build some simple coin-flipping
protocols, all described in the language of TDPGs. The examples include the bias 1/
√
2 − 1/2
protocol of Spekkens and Rudolph [SR02b] and the author’s bias 1/6 protocol [Moc05].
In this section we will make extensive use of the basis for functions with finite support introduced
in the last section. In particular, we use [z] to denote a one variable function that evaluates to one
at a fixed point z, and is zero everywhere else. We also use [x, y] to denote a two-variable function
that is one at (x, y) and zero everywhere else.
3.1 Basic moves
We aim to systematically describe all non-trivial one-variable valid transitions of the following
forms: one points to one point, two points to one point and one point to two points. The latter two
respectively generate all transitions of the form n points to one point and one point to n points.
Nevertheless, these will not form a complete basis of all valid transitions. Even two point to
two point transitions contain moves that cannot be generated by the above set. Ultimately, the
most concise description of the set of all valid transitions is as the dual to the cone of operator
monotone functions.
3.1.1 Point raising
All possible one point to one point transitions have the form
p[z]→ p[z′], (78)
where we have already imposed the constraint of probability conservation, and we assume p > 0.
We now need to impose the constraints pf(z) ≤ pf(z′) for all operator monotone functions. Using
f(z) = z we have obtain the necessary condition
z ≤ z′. (79)
It is also sufficient because all operator monotone functions are monotonically increasing.
When working in a bipartite case we see that p[x, y]→ p[x′, y] is valid if and only if x ≤ x′ (and
similarly with p[x, y]→ p[x, y′] and y ≤ y′). More generally, p[x, y]→ p[x′, y′] is transitively valid if
and only if x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′. In simpler words: we can always move points upwards or rightwards
but not downwards or leftwards. We will call these moves point raising (even when we are moving
rightwards).
Note that the presence of extra unmoving points does not affect any of the one variable transi-
tions. The transition p[z] → p[z′] is valid if and only if p[z] +∑i pi[zi] → p[z′] +∑i pi[zi] is valid
(where
∑
i pi[zi] is any other set of points with positive probability).
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3.1.2 Point merging
All possible two point to one point transitions have the form
p1[z1] + p2[z2]→ (p1 + p2)[z′], (80)
where we have already imposed the constraint of probability conservation, and we assume p1 > 0
and p2 > 0. We now need to impose the constraints p1f(z1) + p2f(z2) ≤ (p1 + p2)f(z′) for all
operator monotone functions. Using f(z) = z we have obtain the necessary condition
p1z1 + p2z2
p1 + p2
≤ z′. (81)
It is also sufficient because operator monotone functions are concave (a property that can be checked
directly on the extremal functions f(z) = λzλ+z for λ ∈ (0,∞)).
When equality holds in Eq. (81) we call the move point merging. The more general case is
simply generated by point merging followed by point raising). In simpler words: point merging
takes two points and replaces them with a single point carrying their combined probability and
average z value.
For n points merging into one point it is easy to see that we must conserve probability and
average z (or strictly speaking average z cannot decrease). But this exact final configuration can
be achieved using a sequence of pairwise point merges with a possible point raising at the end.
For the bipartite case, the transition
p1[x1, y] + p2[x2, y]→ (p1 + p2)
[
p1x1 + p2x2
p1 + p2
, y
]
(82)
is clearly valid, and similarly with x and y interchanged. However, it does not follow that the
transition 0.5[0, 0]+0.5[1, 1] → 1[0.5, 0.5] is transitively valid. In fact, the proof of the impossibility
of strong coin flipping is a proof that 0.5[0, 0]+0.5[1, 1] → 1[z, z] is transitively invalid if z < 1/√2.
3.1.3 Point splitting
All possible one point to two point transitions have the form
(p1 + p2)[z]→ p1[z′1] + p2[z′2], (83)
where we have already imposed the constraint of probability conservation, and we assume p1 > 0
and p2 > 0. We now need to impose the constraints (p1 + p2)f(z) ≤ p1f(z′1) + p2f(z′2) for all
operator monotone functions. In particular, for λ ∈ (0,∞) the inequality is satisfied for f(z) =
λz
λ+z = λ(1− λλ+z ) if and only if it is satisfied for f(z) = − 1λ+z . If none of the points are located at
zero, then we can take the limit λ→ 0 and the inequality must still be satisfied. In other words, a
necessary condition is
− p1 + p2
z
≤ −p1
z′1
− p2
z′2
. (84)
It is also sufficient. Let w = 1/z and assume the above inequality holds, then verifying the original
constraint with f(z) = − 1λ+z is equivalent to verifying (p1 + p2)g(w) ≤ (p1 + p2)g(p1w1+p2w2p1+p2 ) ≤
p1g(w
′
1)+p2g(w
′
2) with g(w) = − w1+λw . But the first inequality holds because g(w) is monotonically
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decreasing and the second inequality holds because g(w) is convex. The special case of f(z) = z
follows by considering the limit λ→∞ of f(z) = λzλ+z .
When equality holds in Eq. (84) we call the move point splitting. In simpler words: point
splitting takes a point and replaces it with two points such that the total probability and average
1/z is conserved. All one point to two points valid transitions can then be generated by point raising
followed by point splitting. Similarly, all one point to n point valid transitions can be generated by
point-raising and a sequence of one-to-two point splittings.
The above arguments hold provided none of the points is located at zero. If either z′1 = 0 or
z′2 = 0 it is not hard to verify that we must also have z = 0. If z = 0 all valid moves can be
generated first by splitting the point into two points located at zero and then using point raising
to move them to the required destination. In fact, we allow this type of point splitting anywhere:
we can always replace a point at z with probability p with two points at z and probabilities that
add to p.
3.1.4 Summary
Lemma 20. The following are valid transitions:
• Point raising
p[z]→ p[z′] (for z ≤ z′). (85)
• Point merging
p1[z1] + p2[z2]→ (p1 + p2)
[
p1z1 + p2z2
p1 + p2
]
. (86)
• Point splitting
(p1 + p2)
[
p1 + p2
p1w
′
1 + p2w
′
2
]
→ p1
[
1
w′1
]
+ p2
[
1
w′2
]
. (87)
3.2 Basic protocols
The simplest of all protocols are the ones when one player flips a coin and tells the outcome to the
other player. If Alice is in charge of flipping the coin we get the TDPG
1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[0, 1] → 1
2
[1, 1] +
1
2
[0, 1] → 1
[
1
2
, 1
]
, (88)
where the first move is point raising and the second is point merging. Similarly, if Bob is in charge
of flipping the coin we get
1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[0, 1] → 1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[1, 1] → 1
[
1,
1
2
]
. (89)
These are graphically illustrated in Fig. 3.
Note that in the second protocol Bob sends the first non-trivial message (equivalently, the final
move is vertical). Whereas for UBPs we enforced the constraint that Alice always sent the first
message, for TDPGs we will let the first message be sent by whomever it is convenient.
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Figure 3: The two trivial protocols where Alice (left) or Bob (right) flip a coin and announce the
outcome.
To assign some meaning to the abstract operations we can think of point merging as occurring
when a player flips a coin and announces the outcome to their opponent (recall the reverse time
convention, in regular time point merging occurs first and makes two points out of one). Point
raising does not correspond to any physical operation, but rather to one player trusting or at least
accepting the state provided by the other player.
3.2.1 The Spekkens and Rudolph protocol
Fix x ∈ (1/2, 1). Consider
1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[0, 1] → 2x−12x
[
x, 0
]
+ 1−x2x
[
x
1−x , 0
]
+ 12 [0, 1] (90)
→ 2x−12x
[
x, 0
]
+ 1−x2x
[
x
1−x , 1
]
+ 12 [0, 1]
→ 2x−12x
[
x, 0
]
+ 12x
[
x, 1
]
→ 1
[
x,
1
2x
]
.
The TDPG is the sequence: split, raise, merge, merge. It is illustrated in Fig. 4 for the case
x = 1/
√
2. The resulting protocol satisfies P ∗B = x and P
∗
A =
1
2x , achieving the tradeoff curve
P ∗AP
∗
B = 1/2 from [SR02b].
From the point of view of point games, the clever step above is the initial split which was chosen
so that, after the first merge, the remaining points would be vertically aligned and a second merge
could immediately take place. The initial split corresponds to the cheat detection carried out at
the end of the protocol.
Another interpretation of the compromises made in the above protocol can be understood as
follows: We know that in each move the average value of x and y cannot decrease because f(z) = z
is operator monotone (and f(x, y) = x+ y is bi-operator monotone). A perfect zero-bias protocol
would never increase these averages. In a non-perfect protocol every such increase gets added to
the final bias. In particular, the above protocol has two such “bad” steps: the split (which increases
average x) and the raise (which increases average y). The protocol with P ∗A = P
∗
B = 1/
√
2 balances
these two effects so that they are equal.
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Figure 4: The Spekkens and Rudolph protocol with x = 1/
√
2.
3.2.2 Quantum public-coin protocols
The Spekkens and Rudolph protocol can be improved by using the TDPG depicted by Fig. 5 (left).
The idea is that we begin by splitting the initial point on the vertical axis and use the resulting
top point to help raise the rightmost point. The operation on the rightmost line becomes a point
merging which preserves average y instead of the old point raising which increased average y. The
cost of doing this, though, is the split on the vertical axis (which increases average y) and the
point raising of the top point (which increases average x). Nevertheless, when the parameters
(probabilities and coordinates) are chosen properly the above pattern results in a improvement.
Closer inspection shows that the added structure of the above protocol relative to the Spekkens
and Rudolph protocol is very similar to the added structure of the Spekkens and Rudolph relative
to the trivial protocol where Bob announces the coin outcome. In fact, the process can be iterated
as depicted in Fig. 5 (right). The process begins by splitting the two initial points into many
points on the axes. Then point raising is used on the rightmost point so that it is aligned with
the topmost point. The two points are merged and the resulting point ends up lined up with the
second-rightmost point. These two are again merged producing a point that is lined up with the
second-topmost point. All point are merged in this fashion until a single point remains.
Obviously, the initial splits must be chosen with care so that all the merges end up properly
lined up. We will not describe here the precise parameters needed to achieve this, though the details
can be found in [Moc05]. In fact, the paper describes an even larger family of coin-flipping protocols
which consisted of classical public-coin protocol with quantum cheat detection. In the language
of TDPGs all the protocols in the family can be characterized as follows: First the point PB [1, 0]
splits horizontally into as many points as needed. Similarly the point PA[0, 1] splits vertically as
needed. These steps are the cheat detection. After that only point raising and merging are allowed,
though in any order or pattern desired. Sadly, the optimal bias that can be achieved with protocols
of this form is 1/6, and is realized by the pattern from Fig. 5 (right) in the limit of an arbitrarily
large number of merges.
An improved version of the above protocol is presented in Appendix A, where we effectively
note that the initial splits can be done gradually as the protocol progresses (or equivalently, that
cheat-detection can be done gradually). The advantage of this is a reduction in the number of
required qubits to a constant number. The bias, though, remains fixed at 1/6.
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Figure 5: An improvement to the Spekkens and Rudolph protocol (left) and further iterations of
the improvement (right). Figures not to scale.
Below we intend to give an informal description of the bias 1/6 protocol in the limit of infinitely
many messages, in which our standard “finite points with probability” TDPGs get replaced by
probability densities. Though we will not formalize these TDPGs with probability densities, they
are occasionally useful in studying protocols. In fact, the main result of the paper will have this
form, though in the formal proof we shall approximate the continuous distribution by a discrete
finite set.
Let us imagine that we have carried out the initial point-splitting, and that we have split into
so many points that we effectively have a continuous probability density on the axes:
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)[z, 0]dz +
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)[0, z]dz, (91)
where p(z) is some probability distribution with
∫∞
z∗ p(z)dz = 1, and z
∗ > 0 is some cutoff below
which no points are located.
The continuum limit of the process depicted in Fig. 5 (right) consists of a point moving along
the diagonal and collecting the probability density off of the axes. The point starts at [∞,∞] with
zero probability and ends at [z∗, z∗] once it has collected all the probability. What we are trying to
determine is for what probability distributions p(z) is such as thing possible. In other words, for
what probability distributions p(z) is
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)[z, 0]dz +
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)[0, z]dz → 1[z∗, z∗] (92)
transitively valid?
Let Q(z) be the probability of the point that is traveling down the diagonal. Given the point
Q(z)[z, z] we can move downwards and rightwards in a two step process: first we merge with a
“point” on the x-axis (with effective probability p(z)2 dz) to get to (Q(z) + p(z)/2dz)[z, z − dz],
then we merge with a “point” on the y-axis (again with effective probability p(z)2 dz) to get to
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(Q(z)+ p(z)dz)[z − dz, z− dz]. Conservation of probability tells us that Q(z− dz) = Q(z)+ p(z)dz
or
dQ(z)
dz
= −p(z). (93)
But these transitions are point merges and should additionally conserve average height during the
first merge (and average x position during the second merge). In particular, we get a constraint
of the form (Q(z))z + (p(z)2 dz)0 = (Q(z) +
p(z)
2 dz)(z − dz). Canceling a few terms we get 0 =
−Q(z)dz + p(z)2 zdz or
Q(z) =
zp(z)
2
. (94)
Combining the two constraints we get a differential equation in Q(z)
dQ(z)
dz
= −2Q(z)
z
(95)
solved by Q(z) = c/z2 for some constant c. Our original probability distribution must have the
form p(z) = 2c/z3, and we can now fix the constant by the requirement
∫∞
z∗ p(z)dz = 1. We get
c = (z∗)2.
What our arguments above have shown is that for any z∗ > 0 the transition
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
2(z∗)2
z3
[z, 0]dz +
1
2
∫ ∞
z∗
2(z∗)2
z3
[0, z]dz → 1[z∗, z∗] (96)
is transitively valid.
But, of course, the true starting state is 12 [1, 0] +
1
2 [0, 1]. To reach the initial state above we
must use point splitting independently on each axis. The constraints are conservation of probability
(already imposed) and a non-increasing average 1/z:
1 ≥
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)
z
dz =
∫ ∞
z∗
2(z∗)2
z4
dz =
2
3z∗
⇒ 2
3
≤ z∗. (97)
In other words, we can achieve bias 1/6 but no better.
3.2.3 Protocols with cheat detection
As mentioned in the introduction, even bit commitment can be accomplished using quantum in-
formation if we are willing to settle for a cheat-detecting solution. These protocols with cheat
detection may prove to be an important component of quantum cryptography.
As an example of how Kitaev’s formalism can be extended to study cheat-detecting protocols
we will describe in this section a simple generalization of the above protocol.
One approach to cheat detection is as a payoff maximization problem. Specifically, in coin
flipping we would formulate the problem as follows: winning the coin flip earns you $1, loosing the
coin flip nets you $0, but if you get caught cheating you will lose $Λ (i.e., the cheating player wins
−$Λ and we assume Λ ≥ 0). Calculating the maximum expected earnings for each Λ is equivalent
to finding the tradeoff curve between the probability of winning by cheating and the probability of
getting caught cheating.
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As most of our equations so far have been designed for positive semidefinite matrices, it is
simplest to begin by modifying our payouts so that they are all non negative: $(Λ+1) for winning,
$Λ for losing, and $0 for getting caught cheating. These two formulations are equivalent in that an
optimal payout for one can be found from the optimal payout for the other by adding/subtracting
Λ.
Accommodating multiple payouts only requires modifying the final projection operators. For
instance, ZA,n = ΠA,1 (which could be though of as a payout matrix for the non-cheat detecting
problem), now needs to be replaced with a matrix with three eigenvalues: Λ + 1, Λ and 0 so that
the honest states in which Bob wins have the appropriate eigenvalue
ZA,n (ΠA,1|ψA,n〉) = (Λ + 1) (ΠA,1|ψA,n〉) , ZA,n (ΠA,0|ψA,n〉) = Λ (ΠA,0|ψA,n〉) , (98)
and the orthogonal subspace has eigenvalue zero. In particular, everything we have done so far is
still valid, but the transition of interest becomes
1
2
[Λ + 1,Λ] +
1
2
[Λ,Λ + 1] → 1[β, α], (99)
where now β and α are upper bounds on the expected payouts of Bob and Alice respectively.
What would happen if we were now to shift back to the original payouts of $1, $0 and $−Λ?
We would again return to looking for transitions of the form 12 [1, 0] +
1
2 [0, 1] → 1[β, α], however
our constraints for valid transitions would need to change. Rather than looking for transitions that
live in the dual to the cone of operator monotone functions with domain [0,∞) we would look for
transitions in the dual to the cone of operator monotone functions with domain [−Λ,∞).
In other words, in a setting with a penalty of Λ for cheating, a transition pi(z) → pi+1(z) is
valid if and only if probability is conserved and∑
z
pi(z)
λz
λ+ z
≤
∑
z
pi+1(z)
λz
λ+ z
(100)
for λ ∈ (Λ,∞). The old rule is simply the special case Λ = 0.
Note that for Λ > 0 we are simply removing restrictions from valid transitions. Therefore, not
surprisingly, any protocol that was valid with no cheat detection is still valid in a cheat detecting
world. However, one can often do better in the latter case.
Returning to the coin-flipping protocol we described in the previous section, Eq. (96) is still
valid and essentially optimal. However, the constraint imposed by Eq. (97) is no longer necessary.
It is not hard to check that in a cheat detecting setting, the dominant function that constrains
point splitting is f(z) = ΛzΛ+z (or f(z) = − 1Λ+z which is equivalent when probability is conserved).
Eq. (97) gets replaced by
− 1
Λ + 1
≤ −
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)
Λ + z
dz = −
∫ ∞
z∗
2(z∗)2
z3(Λ + z)
dz = −
(
Λ− 2z∗
Λ2
+
2(z∗)2
Λ3
log
z∗ + Λ
z∗
)
. (101)
Asymptotically, as Λ→∞, one finds an optimal expected winnings of z∗ ∼ 12 + log Λ4Λ .
4 Kitaev’s second coin-flipping formalism (cont.)
In this section we shall conclude the description, that begun in Section 2, of Kitaev’s second coin-
flipping formalism [Kit04]. The last step is the transition from points games that are ordered in
time to point games with no explicit time ordering.
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4.1 Time Independent Point Games
The new ingredient for this section is catalyst states. Given a transitively valid transition such as
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1]→ 1[β, α] it trivially follows that
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] +
∑
i
wi[xi, yi]→ 1[β, α] +
∑
i
wi[xi, yi] (102)
is also transitively valid, for any “catalyst” state
∑
iwi[xi, yi] with wi, xi, yi ≥ 0. The question we
consider here is whether the converse is true.
For one-variable transitions the converse is trivially true. The goal of this section is to prove
that the converse is also true for bipartite transitions (including transitively valid transitions). The
proof will basically show that we can use a small amount of probability to create the catalyst state,
and then run the catalyzed transition in small enough steps so that by comparison the catalyst
state appears large enough.
Before diving into the proof let us examine some of the surprising consequences that will follow.
The first consequence is that previously all our probability distributions had a range contained in
[0,∞), but now we can allow “probability” distributions with a range of (−∞,∞). Negative values
are simply points were we need to add in some more probability using a catalyst state. This leads
to the following definition
Definition 21. A function with finite support p : [0,∞) → R is valid if ∑z p(z) = 0 and∑
z
(
−1
λ+z
)
p(z) ≥ 0 for all λ > 0.
The definition implies p is in the dual to the cone of operator monotone functions. Note that
because λzλ+z = λ − λ
2
λ+z , and because of conservation of probability, checking
∑
z
(
λz
λ+z
)
p(z) ≥ 0
for all λ > 0 is equivalent to checking
∑
z
(
−1
λ+z
)
p(z) ≥ 0 for all λ > 0. The latter condition will
be easier to analyze in later sections, though.
The validity relation is essentially a partial order on functions. Instead of saying p→ q is valid
we could equally write p ≺ q. Similarly, a valid function p could be written as 0 ≺ p. We use the
earlier notation because it is easier to say “a function p is valid” than “a function p belongs to the
cone dual to the operator monotone functions.”
By construction any valid transition p→ q can be converted into the valid function q − p. We
therefore immediately obtain a number of standard valid functions (which follow from the proofs
in the previous section):
Lemma 22. The following are valid functions:
• Point raising
− p[z] + p[z′] (for z ≤ z′). (103)
• Point merging
− p1[z1]− p2[z2] + (p1 + p2)
[
p1z1 + p2z2
p1 + p2
]
. (104)
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• Point splitting
− (p1 + p2)
[
p1 + p2
p1w
′
1 + p2w
′
2
]
+ p1
[
1
w′1
]
+ p2
[
1
w′2
]
. (105)
The second, and more surprising, consequence of catalyst states is that all point games can be
run using exactly two transitions: one vertical and one horizontal. The idea is that given any point
game we can move all the horizontal transitions to the beginning and all the vertical transitions to
the end, combining each set into a single vertical or horizontal transition. Of course, the state after
the first transition but before the second may have some negative probabilities, but as discussed
above this can be fixed with an appropriate catalyst state. This leads to the following definition:
Definition 23. A function with finite support p : [0,∞)× [0,∞)→ R is valid if either
• for every c ∈ [0,∞) the function p(z, c) is valid, or
• for every c ∈ [0,∞) the function p(c, z) is valid.
where as before p(z, c) is the one-variable function obtained by fixing the second input. We call the
first case a valid horizontal function and the second case a valid vertical functions.
Of course, we don’t even need to specify whether the horizontal or the vertical transition
occurred first, and therefore we obtain a fully time independent point game:
Definition 24. A time independent point game (TIPG) consists of a pair of functions with
finite support h, v : [0,∞) × [0,∞)→ R such that
• h is a valid horizontal function.
• v is a valid vertical function.
• h+ v = 1[β, α] − PB [1, 0] − PA[0, 1].
We say that [β, α] is the final point of the TIPG.
4.1.1 Relating TDPGs and TIPGs
Given a TDPG specified as p0, . . . , pn with final point [β, α] we shall construct a TIPG with the
same final point. Let H (resp V ) be the set of indices 1, . . . , n such that pi−1 → pi is a valid
horizontal (resp. vertical) transition. Define
h =
∑
i∈H
(pi − pi−1), v =
∑
i∈V
(pi − pi−1), (106)
then h is a valid horizontal function, v is a valid vertical function and
h+ v = pn − p0 = 1[β, α] − PB [1, 0] − PA[0, 1] (107)
as required.
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To go the other way we begin with a TIPG specified by h, v with final point [β, α]. We define
v−(x, y) = −min(v(x, y), 0) ≥ 0 as the magnitude of the negative part of v. Then consider
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] + v
− → PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] + v− + v (108)
→ PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] + v− + v + h = 1[β, α] + v−.
The first is a valid vertical transition and the second is a valid horizontal transition. Also, the
intermediate state is non-negative with finite support. Therefore, it is a proof that PB [1, 0] +
PA[0, 1] + v
− → 1[β, α] + v− is transitively valid. Below we will show that we can get rid of the
catalyst v− and construct for every ǫ > 0 a sequence such that PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1]→ 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ]
is transitively valid. This is the desired TDPG.
What remains to be proven is that we can discard catalyst states. We will only prove this for
the special case of coin flipping, though the general case is also true. We first require two simple
lemmas. The first lemma shows we can construct arbitrary catalyst states (as long as we allow
extra junk) and the second lemma shows we can clean up the catalyst states (and extra junk).
Lemma 25. Given a function r : [0,∞)× [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support such that r(0, 0) = 0,
there exists c > 0 and a function r′ : [0,∞)× [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with finite support such that
cPB [1, 0] + cPA[0, 1]→ r + r′ (109)
is transitively valid, where we additionally assume both PA, PB > 0.
Proof. First we prove the lemma for the special case when r has support at a single point. Let
r = q[x, y] with q, x > 0 and y ≥ 0 (the case y > 0 and x ≥ 0 will follow by exchanging the axes).
If x ≥ 1 then
q
PB
PB [1, 0] +
q
PB
PA[0, 1]→ q[x, y] + q
PB
PA[0, 1] (110)
is transitively valid using point raisings, and the lemma is satisfied with c = qPB and r
′ = qPAPB [0, 1].
If x < 1 the sequence
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1]→ PB [1, y] + PA[0, 1]→ x
2
PB [x, y] +
(
1− x
2
)
PB [2− x, y] + PA[0, 1] (111)
is transitively valid by point raising followed by point splitting. Now we use the fact that we can
scale the probability in transitions. That is, if
∑
iwi[xi, yi] →
∑
j w
′
j [x
′
j , y
′
j] is transitively valid
then for a > 0 so is
∑
i awi[xi, yi]→
∑
j aw
′
j[x
′
j , y
′
j ]. In particular, if we scale the previous transition
by c = 2q/(xPB) we satisfy the lemma with r
′ = c(1− x/2)PB [2− x, y] + cPA[0, 1].
Finally, for the general case where r =
∑k
i=1 qi[xi, yi] let ci and r
′
i be chosen as above so that
ciPB [1, 0] + ciPA[0, 1]→ qi[xi, yi] + r′i is transitively valid. Then
k∑
i=1
ciPB [1, 0] +
k∑
i=1
ciPA[0, 1] →
k∑
i=2
ciPB [1, 0] +
k∑
i=2
ciPA[0, 1] + q1[x1, y1] + r
′
1
→ · · · →
k∑
i=j
ciPB [1, 0] +
k∑
i=j
ciPA[0, 1] +
j−1∑
i=1
qi[xi, yi] +
j−1∑
i=1
r′i
→ · · · → r +
k∑
i=1
r′i, (112)
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where by construction each transition is transitively valid and so the proof is completed by setting
c =
∑
i ci and r
′ =
∑
i r
′
i.
Lemma 26. Given ǫ > 0 and a function r′′ →: [0,∞) × [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support and∑
x,y r
′′(x, y) = 1, there exists 1 > δ > 0 such that
(1− δ)[β, α] + δ r′′ → 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ] (113)
is transitively valid.
Proof. Let x′′ be the largest x-coordinate over all points in r′′ and similarly let y′′ be the largest
y-coordinate over all points in r′′. By point raising r → 1[x′′, y′′] is transitively valid, so we focus
on proving that we can find 1 > δ > 0 such that
(1− δ)[β, α] + δ[x′′, y′′]→ 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ] (114)
is transitively valid. We can also assume (possibly using further point raisings) that x′′ > β + ǫ
and y′′ > α+ ǫ. Consider the following sequence
(1− δ)[β, α] + δ[x′′, y′′] → (1− δ′)[β, α] + (δ′ − δ)[β, y′′] + δ[x′′, y′′]
→ (1− δ′)[β + ǫ, α] + δ′[β + ǫ, y′′]
→ 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ] (115)
corresponding to raise, merge, merge. To make the first merge valid we need (δ′−δ)β+δx′′ = δ′(β+ǫ)
which is equivalent to δ(x′′ − β) = δ′ǫ. The second merge requires δ′(y′′ − α) = ǫ. Both conditions
can be satisfied by constants such that 1 > δ′ > δ > 0.
Putting the lemmas together we can prove the main result.
Lemma 27. Given r : [0,∞)× [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with finite support such that r(0, 0) = 0 and
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] + r → 1[β, α] + r (116)
is transitively valid then for every ǫ > 0
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] → 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ] (117)
is transitively valid as well.
Proof. Fix ǫ > 0. Note that by conservation of probability we must have PA + PB = 1. We also
assume PA, PB > 0 as otherwise the proof is trivial. Therefore, we can use Lemma 25 to get c > 0
and r′ so that cPB [1, 0] + cPA[0, 1] → r + r′ is transitively valid.
If we set r′′ = (1/c)(r+ r′) than again by conservation of probability we must have
∑
x,y r
′′ = 1.
We can therefore use Lemma 26 to get 1 > δ > 0 so that (1 − δ)[β, α] + δr′′ → 1[β + ǫ, αǫ] is
transitively valid. Now consider the sequence
PB [1, 0] + PA[0, 1] → (1− δ)PB [1, 0] + (1− δ)PA[0, 1] + δ
c
r ++
δ
c
r′
→ (1− δ)[β, α] + δ
c
r ++
δ
c
r′
→ 1[β + ǫ, α+ ǫ]. (118)
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The first transition follows from a scaled version of the transition obtained from Lemma 25, and the
third transition is the one obtained from Lemma 26. The middle transition follows from repeated
applications of aPB [1, 0]+aPA[0, 1]+ar → a[β, α]+ar for a ≤ δ/c. Therefore the whole transition
is transitively valid as required.
From the conditions of validity, it is easy to verify that neither h nor v can be positive at the
point (0, 0). Since their sum must be zero at this point, individually they must be zero as well.
Hence, our catalyst state is zero at (0, 0) and we can apply the above lemma to complete our
argument for the equivalence of TDPGs and TIPGs. We can state the result formally as a further
extension of Theorem 19.
Theorem 28. Let f(β, α) : R×R→ R be a function such that f(α′, β′) ≥ f(α, β) whenever α′ ≥ α
and β′ ≥ β, then
inf
proto
f(P ∗B , P
∗
A) = inf
UBP
f(β, α) = inf
TDPG
f(β, α) = inf
TIPG
f(β, α). (119)
5 Towards zero bias
In this section we will finally describe a family of protocols for coin-flipping that achieves arbitrarily
small bias. The protocols will be described in Kitaev’s second formalism using the tools of the
previous sections.
In the first part of the section we will attempt to give some intuition for our construction. Along
the way we will prove a couple of important lemmas. In Section 5.2 we will simply present the
corresponding pair of functions h and v and prove that they satisfy the necessary properties.
For those who have skipped ahead to this section, we review some of the key concepts that have
been defined in previous sections: A valid function f(z) has finite support and satisfies
∑
z f(z) = 0
and
∑
z
−1
λ+zf(z) ≥ 0 for all λ > 0. These constraints are equivalent to those discussed in the
introduction. Examples of valid functions are point raises, point merges and point splits as defined
in Lemma 22. A valid horizontal function h(x, y) is valid as a function of x for every y ≥ 0.
Similarly, a valid vertical function v(x, y) is valid as a function of y for every x ≥ 0. A TIPG is a
valid horizontal function plus a valid vertical function such that h+v = 1[β, α]−PB [1, 0]−PA[0, 1],
where [x0, y0] denotes a function that takes value one at x = x0, y = y0 and is zero everywhere
else. Such a TIPG leads to a coin-flipping protocol with P ∗A ≤ α and P ∗B ≤ β.
5.1 Guiding principles
We begin our discussion with a TIPG example. We will analyze the TIPG with bias 1/6 first
introduced in the introduction (Fig. 2) and reproduced here in Fig. 6. The two figures are intended
to denote the same TIPG, though the latter figure has a slightly different labeling convention.
The new labeling convention provides some useful intuition for TIPGs: because of probability
conservation, one can associate a probability with each arrow. The arrows carry the probability
from their base to their head. The probability associated to a point can be computed as the sum
of incoming probabilities, (which equals the sum of outgoing probabilities for all points except the
initial and final points). Furthermore, the probability carried by arrows not associated with the
initial or final points must go around in loops, such as boxes or figure eights. It is often easiest in
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Figure 6: A TIPG with bias 1/6.
a figure to label each loop with the probability that goes around it, and this is the idea behind the
labeling of Fig. 6.
We can also use our algebraic notation to express the TIPG. The horizontal arrows encode the
function
h = +
1
2
[
2
3
,
2
3
]
− 3
2
[
1,
2
3
]
+ 1
[
4
3
,
2
3
]
(120)
−1
2
[
0, 1
]
+
3
2
[
2
3
, 1
]
− 2
[
4
3
, 1
]
+ 1
[
5
3
, 1
]
+
∞∑
k=4
(
−1
[
k − 2
3
,
k
3
]
+ 2
[
k − 1
3
,
k
3
]
− 2
[
k + 1
3
,
k
3
]
+ 1
[
k + 2
3
,
k
3
])
.
The last line of h denotes a pattern that we shall call a ladder. More generally, we shall refer to
any regular pattern that heads to infinity on the diagonal as a ladder. The problem with ladders
is that they involve an infinite number of points, and we previously required that h have support
only on a finite set of points. In Section 5.1.2 we will study how to properly truncate these ladders,
but for the moment we shall ignore this issue.
By symmetry we can define v(x, y) = h(y, x). By construction all terms in the sum h+ v cancel
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except for the three required
h+ v = 1
[
2
3
,
2
3
]
− 1
2
[
1, 0
]
− 1
2
[
0, 1
]
. (121)
Let us verify that h is a valid horizontal functions (which by symmetry proves that v is a valid
vertical function). It is easy to see that for every y we have
∑
x h(x, y) = 0. The other constraint
that needs to be checked is
∑
x
−1
λ+xh(x, y) ≥ 0 for all λ > 0 and all y ≥ 0. We begin with the case
y = k/3 ≥ 4/3.
∑
x
−1
λ+ x
h
(
x,
k
3
)
=
1
λ+ k−23
− 2
λ+ k−13
+
2
λ+ k+13
− 1
λ+ k+23
=
1
3
(λ+ k−23 )(λ+
k−1
3 )
−
2
3
(λ+ k−13 )(λ+
k+1
3 )
+
1
3
(λ+ k+13 )(λ+
k+2
3 )
=
1
3
(λ+ k−23 )(λ+
k−1
3 )(λ+
k−1
3 )
−
1
3
(λ+ k−13 )(λ+
k+1
3 )(λ+
k+2
3 )
=
(13 )(
4
3 )
(λ+ k−23 )(λ+
k−1
3 )(λ+
k−1
3 )(λ+
k+2
3 )
≥ 0 (122)
for λ > 0, where the successive simplifications involves splitting the middle terms and using relations
of the form
1
λ+ x1
− 1
λ+ x2
=
x2 − x1
(λ+ x1)(λ+ x2)
. (123)
The idea is that we can interpret successive lines as follows: The first line is the standard sum
over points with a numerator corresponding to probabilities. The second line is a sum over arrows
with a numerator corresponding to probabilities times distance traveled (which we can think of as
momentum). Finally, the third line is a sum over pairs of arrows with zero net momentum.
The constraint at y = 1 is roughly the same, except that the leftmost arrow travels twice the
distance and carries half the probability. More specifically, we can write
−1
2
[
0
]
+
3
2
[
2
3
]
− 2
[
4
3
]
+ 1
[
5
3
]
(124)
=
(
−1
2
[
0
]
+ 1
[
1
3
]
− 1
2
[
2
3
])
+
(
−1
[
1
3
]
+ 2
[
2
3
]
− 2
[
4
3
]
+ 1
[
5
3
])
.
The right term is exactly what would be there if the ladder had been extended to y = 1. It is
valid by Eq. (122). The left term is the difference between the long arrow carrying probability 1/2
and the short arrow carrying probability 1. It is valid because it is a point merge. Therefore, the
original expression is a sum of two valid terms and itself is valid, as can also be checked by direct
computation.
The constraint for y = 23 can also be directly checked, though in fact it is just a point splitting,
and hence valid because 32/1 =
1
2/
2
3 + 1/
4
3 .
Except for the fact that the ladder involves an infinite number of points, we have completed
the proof that the resulting TIPG corresponds to a protocol with bias 1/6. The infinite number
of points, though, is a serious problem from the point of view of our constructive description of
45
Kitaev’s formalism: for instance, the canonical catalyst state used to convert the TIPG into a
TDPG carries an infinite amount of probability.
To proceed we therefore must truncate the ladder at some large distance Γ. The truncation will
add small extra terms to the bias, which will go to zero as Γ → ∞. We can think of the different
values for Γ as a family of protocols which converges to a bias of 1/6.
While the formal truncation is done in Section 5.1.2 we will try to paint an intuitive picture
here as to why truncation is possible. Let us imagine that we naively cut the ladder diagonally at
some point in such a way that the end looks like the top of Fig. 6. The ladder is still valid (the top
rung is just a point merge), however we are left with an excess of probability in the edges and a
deficit of probability in the center. To correct the situation we need to add in a term of the form
2[Γ3 ,
Γ
3 ]− 1[Γ+13 , Γ−13 ]− 1[Γ−13 , Γ+13 ], which is a coin-flipping problem!
Admittedly it is a coin-flipping problem with twice the probability and two thirds of the distance
between points but that does not make much of a difference. The problem is located far away from
the axes, though, so it really is a coin flipping with cheat detection problem as described by
Section 3.2.3. Even better, the cheat detection is proportional to Γ which can be made arbitrarily
large at no cost to us (us being the designers of the protocols, of course there is a practical cost
involved in implementing protocols with large Γ).
As the amount of cheat detection becomes infinite, the rules of point games become very simple:
probability is conserved and average x and y cannot decrease. As the problem we are carrying off
to infinity has zero net probability, and zero net average x and y, it should be resolvable at infinity.
Sadly, even at infinity zero-bias coin flipping is impossible (only arbitrarily small bias is allowed)
so after resolving the problem at infinity, we still need to bring back an error term down through
the ladder.
In practice, we still need to truncate the ladder at a finite distance, resolve the coin-flipping
problem at that height, and carry the error terms back down through the ladder. There is a fairly
automatic way of taking care of all of this, but it involves more complicated ladders. The next
section will present the most important result used in building such complicated ladders.
5.1.1 Obtaining non-negative numerators
Whenever we want to verify that a function p(x) is valid, we need to examine expressions of the
form
∑
i
( −1
λ+ xi
)
p(xi) =
f(−λ)∏
i(λ+ xi)
, (125)
where x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0 are the finite support of p, and f(−λ) is some polynomial whose coefficients
depends on the non-zero values of p(x). The reasons for making f a function of −λ rather than λ
will become clear below.
The function p(x) is valid only if the above expression is non-negative for λ > 0, which in turn
is true if and only if f(−λ) is non-negative for λ > 0. The problem is that combining the terms to
find f(−λ) is often tedious, and verifying its non-negativity can be fairly difficult.
On the other hand, constructing a non-negative polynomial is generally easy (for instance we
can specify it as a product of its zeros). Therefore, it is often easier to start with f(−λ), and
use it to compute an appropriate distribution p(x) over some previously selected points x1, . . . , xn.
That is the approach that we will be developing in this section. The next two lemmas will help us
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prove that the desired expression is p(xi) = −f(xi)/
∏
j 6=i(xj − xi), which also satisfies probability
conservation so long as f(−λ) has degree no greater than n− 2.
Lemma 29. Let n ≥ 2 and x1, . . . , xn ∈ R be distinct. Then
n∑
i=1
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
1
(xj − xi) = 0. (126)
Proof. We proceed by induction. For n = 2 we trivially have
1
(x2 − x1) +
1
(x1 − x2) = 0. (127)
For n > 2 we use the identities for 1 < i < n
1
(x1 − xi)(xn − xi) =
1
(xn − x1)
(
1
(x1 − xi) −
1
(xn − xi)
)
(128)
to expand
n∑
i=1
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
1
(xj − xi) =
1
(xn − x1)


n−1∑
i=1
n−1∏
j=1
j 6=i
1
(xj − xi) −
n∑
i=2
n∏
j=2
j 6=i
1
(xj − xi)

 (129)
and by induction both terms inside the parenthesis are zero.
Lemma 30. Let n ≥ 2 and x1, . . . , xn ∈ R be distinct. Let f(x) be a polynomial of degree k ≤ n−2.
Then
n∑
i=1
f(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
= 0. (130)
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. For k = 0 the result follows from the previous lemma. If
k > 0 we can write f(x) = c
∏k
j=1(xj − x) + g(x) for some scalar c ∈ R and a polynomial g(x) of
degree less than k. Then
n∑
i=1
f(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
= c
n∑
i=k+1
n∏
j=k+1
j 6=i
1
(xj − xi) +
n∑
i=1
g(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
(131)
and both terms are zero by induction.
Lemma 31. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct non-negative numbers and let f(−λ) be a polynomial in λ
of degree k ≤ n− 2 which is non-negative for λ > 0. Then
p =
∑
i
(
−f(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
)
[xi] (132)
is a valid function.
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Proof. Using the previous lemma with an appended point xn+1 = −λ, we get
n∑
i=1
−1
λ+ xi
(
f(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
)
+
f(−λ)∏
i(λ+ xi)
= 0 (133)
which proves the constraints for λ > 0. In fact, the above relation holds so long as f has degree
k ≤ (n + 1) − 2. However, we must reduce the allowed degree by one more to get probability
conservation
∑
i
p(xi) = lim
λ→∞
n∑
i=1
λ
λ+ xi
(
−f(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
)
= lim
λ→∞
−λf(−λ)∏
i(λ+ xi)
(134)
which converges to zero if the degree is k ≤ n− 2.
5.1.2 Truncating the ladder
A single rung of our ladder has the form
a
[
k − 2
3
,
k
3
]
+ b
[
k − 1
3
,
k
3
]
+ c
[
k + 1
3
,
k
3
]
+ d
[
k + 2
3
,
k
3
]
(135)
for some constants a, b, c, d ∈ R. Following the discussion in the last section we want to set
a =
−f(k−23 )(
1
3
) (
3
3
) (
4
3
) = −9f(k−23 )
4
(136)
and similarly
b = +
9f(k−13 )
2
, c = −9f(
k+1
3 )
2
, d = +
9f(k+23 )
4
. (137)
The ladder for the bias 1/6 protocol can be described this way with f(−λ) = 4/9, which is clearly
positive for λ ≥ 0. But, of course, we can allow f to be other quadratic functions. More importantly,
we can allow different quadratic functions at different heights of the ladder. That would lead to a
function f(x, y) with the constraint that for every y (on which the ladder is non-zero) f(−λ, y) is
a quadratic polynomial in λ that is non-negative for λ > 0.
But there is a catch. We want to keep the symmetry of the problem so that we can choose
v(x, y) = h(y, x) and still get h + v to cancel on the ladder. In other words, we want to ensure
h(x, y) = −h(y, x). This leads to the conditions
ax= k−2
3
,y= k
3
= −dx= k
3
,y= k−2
3
=⇒ −9f(
k−2
3 ,
k
3 )
4
= −9f(
k
3 ,
k−2
3 )
4
(138)
bx= k−1
3
,y= k
3
= −cx= k
3
,y= k−1
3
=⇒ 9f(
k−1
3 ,
k
3 )
2
=
9f(k3 ,
k−1
3 )
2
(139)
which are both satisfied if we enforce f(x, y) = f(y, x).
Now we can choose our function f to stop the ladder at a certain height y = Γ/3 by setting
f(x, y) = C
(
Γ + 1
3
− x
)(
Γ + 2
3
− x
)(
Γ + 1
3
− y
)(
Γ + 2
3
− y
)
(140)
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for some large integer Γ and positive constant C to be determined below. The ladder part of h
becomes
hlad =
Λ∑
k=3
(
− 9f(
k−2
3 ,
k
3 )
4
[
k − 2
3
,
k
3
]
+
9f(k−13 ,
k
3 )
2
[
k − 1
3
,
k
3
]
(141)
−9f(
k+1
3 ,
k
3 )
2
[
k + 1
3
,
k
3
]
+
9f(k+23 ,
k
3 )
4
[
k + 2
3
,
k
3
])
.
We have stopped the ladder sum at height Λ/3. Of course, we could also have simply stopped the
original ladder with f = 4/9 at a particular height, but we would have lost the antisymmetry of h.
The fact that f(Γ+23 ,
Γ
3 ) = f(
Γ+1
3 ,
Γ
3 ) = f(
Γ+1
3 ,
Γ−1
3 ) = 0 are all zero ensures that we can stop the
above pattern and still retain h(x, y) = −h(y, x).
The next step is to verify that hlad is horizontally valid, but that follows from the fact that
f(−λ, y) ≥ 0 for λ > 0 and y ≤ Γ/3, and that it is quadratic in λ.
Finally, let us examine the bottom of the ladder. If Γ is very large, and x and y are small
compared to Γ, then f ≃ CΓ4/34. If we further choose C ≃ 36/Γ4 we end up approximating the
original constant f = 4/9 ladder.
The rest of this section will work out the details of merging this truncated ladder with the
structure that needs to lie at the bottom. The discussion contains no critical new ideas and can be
skipped on a first reading.
Putting everything together we end up with a structure of the form
h = hlad (142)
−1
2
[
0, 1
]
+ 1
[
1
3
, 1
]
− 1
2
[
2
3
, 1
]
+
1
2
[
2 + δ
3
,
2
3
]
+
(
1
2
− hlad
(
2
3
, 1
))[
1,
2
3
]
− hlad
(
2
3
,
4
3
)[
4
3
,
2
3
]
−1
2
[
2
3
,
2 + δ
3
]
+
1
2
[
2 + δ
3
,
2 + δ
3
]
for some small δ > 0 to be determined in a moment.
Note that hlad runs up to y = 1, which produces a point at x = 1/3, y = 1. We must exactly
cancel the amplitude in this point with the term on the second line of h. We therefore choose
C =
4
9
(
3
Γ
)(
3
Γ + 1
)(
3
Γ− 2
)(
3
Γ− 1
)
(143)
so that hlad(
1
3 , 1) = −1. Note that this C has the right behavior as Γ → ∞. The validity of h at
y = 1 then follows because it is a sum of two valid terms (one coming from hlad), just as it was in
the original ladder in Eq. (124).
The difficult line is y = 2/3 where we have coefficients that are constrained by the symmetry
h(x, y) = −h(y, x). The coefficients are
1
2
,
1
2
− hlad
(
2
3
, 1
)
=
1
2
− 2
(
Γ− 1
Γ + 1
)
and − hlad
(
2
3
,
4
3
)
=
Γ− 3
Γ + 1
. (144)
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Figure 7: A few simple ladder protocols: Symmetric (left) and asymmetric (right), with initial
point split (bottom) and without (top).
Conservation of probability follows trivially, and the line will be valid if it satisfies the point splitting
constraint
∑
pi/xi = 0
3
2(2 + δ)
+
1
2
− 2
(
Γ− 1
Γ + 1
)
+
3
4
(
Γ− 3
Γ + 1
)
= 0 (145)
which implicitly defines δ = 8/(3Γ − 1).
Finally, without the last line we would have a protocol of the form
1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[0, 1]→ 1
2
[
2 + δ
3
,
2
3
]
+
1
2
[
2
3
,
2 + δ
3
]
. (146)
The last line uses point raising to merge the two final points at [2+δ3 ,
2+δ
3 ], giving us a protocol with
P ∗A = P
∗
B =
2+δ
3 where δ → 0 as Γ→∞.
5.1.3 Building better ladders
Having completed our analysis of the original bias 1/6 ladder, our task now is to apply the knowledge
gained to the building of better ladders.
We begin by studying a few simple variants of the 1/6 ladder which are depicted in Fig. 7.
Whereas the ladders discussed thus far have been symmetric (by reflection across the diagonal),
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all the TDPGs discussed in Section 3 were asymmetric. Because the space of TIPGs is a cone, an
asymmetric TIPG can always be made symmetric by taking a combination of itself and its reflection.
The advantage of working with symmetric TIPGs is that the validity of h implies the validity of v
so there are less constraints to check. The disadvantage is that the expressions are generally more
complicated (as we shall see below). Nevertheless, in this paper we will use symmetric ladders to
express the main result and only study asymmetric ladders for comparison.
There is also the possibility of starting the ladders with a point split on the axes. Numerical
optimizations of the ladders depicted in Fig. 7 using a variable ladder spacing indicate that the
optimal TIPGs with no initial point split can achieve P ∗A = P
∗
B ≈ 0.64 whereas those with an initial
point split can achieve P ∗A = P
∗
B ≈ 0.57. From this perspective, constructing TIPGs with an initial
point split may be better. On the other hand, TIPGs with no initial split tend to have simpler
analytical expressions.
Unfortunately, one can also analytically prove that none of the forms depicted in Fig. 7 can
achieve arbitrarily small bias. We will not cover the proof here and instead directly proceed to
studying more complicated ladders that have more than four points across a horizontal section.
A horizontal rung of an asymmetric ladder with 2k points across and constant lattice spacing
ǫ has the form
2k∑
i=1
−f(x+ iǫ)∏
j 6=i(jǫ− iǫ)
[
x+ iǫ
]
=
2k∑
i=1
(−1)if(x+ iǫ)
ǫ2k−1(i− 1)!(2k − i)!
[
x+ iǫ
]
. (147)
A symmetric ladder is similar, except that the center point is always missing. Therefore a rung
with 2k points can be written as
k∑
i=−k
i 6=0
−f(x+ iǫ)∏
j 6=i,j 6=0(jǫ− iǫ)
[
x+ iǫ
]
=
k∑
i=−k
i 6=0
(−1)k+i(i)f(x+ iǫ)
ǫ2k−1(k + i)!(k − i)!
[
x+ iǫ
]
. (148)
A complete symmetric ladder has the form
hlad =
Γ∑
j=j0
k∑
i=−k
i 6=0
(−1)k+i(i)f((j + i)ǫ, jǫ)
ǫ2k−1(k + i)!(k − i)!
[
(j + i)ǫ, jǫ
]
. (149)
The ladder has been truncated at y/ǫ = Γ which can be done if we pick
f(x, y) = g(x, y)
(
k∏
i=1
(Γǫ+ iǫ− x)
)(
k∏
i=1
(Γǫ+ iǫ− y)
)
(150)
and then we are still free to choose a symmetric polynomial g(x, y) = g(y, x) so long as g(−λ, y) is
non-negative for λ > 0 and y > 0, and has degree at most k − 2 in λ.
Because we only have k − 2 zeros to play with in g we can’t fully truncate the bottom of the
ladder as we did the top. But that is not a problem. After all, our goal is to attach the bottom of
the ladder to our coin-flipping problem.
It is still useful to truncate as much of the bottom of the ladder as we can in order to have fewer
points to deal with at the bottom. We can partially truncate at some height y = j0ǫ by setting
g(x, y) = C(−1)k
(
k−2∏
i=1
(j0ǫ− iǫ− x)
)(
k−2∏
i=1
(j0ǫ− iǫ− y)
)
. (151)
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Figure 8: A ladder with 2k = 8 points across terminated at top and partially terminated at bottom
(with an added point split). The dashed lines indicate the zeros of f(x, y).
The overall sign is chosen so that g(−λ, y) is positive for λ > 0 and j0ǫ ≤ y ≤ Γǫ.
With this truncation hlad has exactly three points to the left of the of the first truncation band
(j0−k+2)ǫ ≤ x ≤ (j0−1)ǫ. The three points are located at [(j0−k+1)ǫ, (j0+1)ǫ], [(j0−k+1)ǫ, j0ǫ]
and [(j0 − k)ǫ, j0ǫ]. If we add in an extra point split at y = j0− k+1, and use v(x, y) = h(y, x) we
end up with the situation depicted in Fig. 8.
With some further tuning we can end up with
h+ v = −1
2
[1, 0] − 1
2
[0, 1] +
1
2
[1− ǫ′′, ǫ′] + 1
2
[ǫ′, 1− ǫ′′] (152)
for some 0 < ǫ′′ < ǫ′, which is effectively a step along the diagonal connecting [1, 0] and [0, 1] towards
the center [12 ,
1
2 ]. The slope ǫ
′/ǫ′′ of the step should converge to one as k → ∞, and therefore one
can use a sequence of such steps to merge the two points in the center and obtain a coin-flipping
protocol with arbitrarily small bias. We shall not explore this construction further, though, and
instead will focus our efforts on a procedure that works is a single big step.
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5.1.4 Mixing ladders with points on the axes
In this section we will present a family of protocols that converges to zero bias. The corresponding
TIPGs will mix ladders with probability located on the axes. These TIPGs will be generalizations
of the protocol from Section 3.2.2, which is the simplest example of the constructions used in this
section. The discussion in this section will be informal and the formal proofs will be deferred to
the next section.
The complete protocol can be thought of as a three step process
1
2
[1, 0] +
1
2
[0, 1] → 1
2

 Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ)[jǫ, 0]

 + 1
2

 Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ)[0, jǫ]

 (153)
→ 1
2
[z∗, z∗ − kǫ] + 1
2
[z∗ − kǫ, z∗]→ 1[z∗, z∗]
and depends on the usual parameters: integer k ≥ 1, small ǫ > 0, large integer Γ > 0 and a final
point 1/2 < z∗ < 1. It also involves a function p(z) to be chosen below. There are a few obvious
constraints such as kǫ < z∗ and z∗/ǫ ∈ Z which will all be resolved in the limits ǫ→ 0 and Γ→∞
for fixed k. Our goal will be to prove that the above process is valid for some z∗, and then to find
the minimum valid P ∗A = P
∗
B = z
∗ for a given k.
The first transition of the above process is intended to be a series of point splits along the axes,
the second transition is the difficult step involving ladders, and the third transition is trivially valid
by point-raising. The first transition is also valid given the following simple constraints
1 =
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ) and 1 ≥
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ)/z (154)
which correspond to probability conservation and the point-splitting constraint (i.e., non-increasing
average 1/z). Note that, as opposed to Section 3.2.2, we are using here a discrete function p(z)
with finite support.
The second transition is the interesting step and will consist of a process involving a ladder that
slowly collects the amplitude on the axes and deposits it near x = z∗ and y = z∗. The complete
transition will be described as usual by a valid horizontal function h(x, y) and a valid vertical
function v(x, y) = h(y, x) such that
h+ v = −1
2

 Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ)[jǫ, 0]

 − 1
2

 Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
p(jǫ)[0, jǫ]

 + 1
2
[z∗, z∗ − kǫ] + 1
2
[z∗ − kǫ, z∗]. (155)
The new element is that when constructing the coefficients −f(xi, yi)/
∏
j 6=i(xj − xi) for the
ladder, one of the coordinates that appears in the product in the denominator is xj = 0. Why
is this different? So far we have exploited the fact that the product of distances for a point was
the same (up to sign) whether we computed its vertical or horizontal neighbors. But now the
expression includes an extra factor of (0 − xi) or (0 − yi), which means the two computations will
be different. In other words, using a symmetric f(x, y) = f(y, x) will not yield an antisymmetric
h(x, y) = −h(y, x). The solution is to pull out an extra factor of 1/y out of f(x, y), which will once
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again allow us to use symmetric functions f(x, y), and will not affect the computation of horizontal
validity (since 1/y is positive and order zero as a polynomial in x). We therefore set
h =
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ

−p(jǫ)2 [0, jǫ] +
k∑
i=−k
i 6=0
−f((j + i)ǫ, jǫ)
(jǫ)
∏
xℓ 6=xi(xℓ − xi)
[
(j + i)ǫ, jǫ
] , (156)
where
∏
xℓ 6=xi(xℓ − xi) still includes a factor of (0− xi) = −(j + i)ǫ.
In order to use Lemma 31, though, we must write the coefficient of [0, jǫ] is the standard form,
which imposes relation between p(z) and f(x, y)
p(jǫ)
2
=
f(0, jǫ)
(jǫ)
∏
xℓ 6=0(xℓ − 0)
=
f(0, jǫ)
ǫ2k+1
∏j+k
ℓ=j−k ℓ
. (157)
We now pick f as usual to fully truncate the ladder at the top and to truncate as much as possible
of the ladder at the bottom
f(x, y) = C(−1)k−1
(
k−1∏
i=1
(z∗ − iǫ− x)
)(
k−1∏
i=1
(z∗ − iǫ− y)
)
(158)
×
(
k∏
i=1
(Γǫ+ iǫ− x)
)(
k∏
i=1
(Γǫ+ iǫ− y)
)
.
We have the usual symmetry properties f(x, y) = f(y, x). Furthermore, f(−λ, y) is positive for
λ > 0 and z∗ ≤ y ≤ Γǫ (provided ǫ is small enough so that kǫ < z∗). Finally, f(−λ, y) has degree
2k − 1 in λ, which is allowed because we have 2k + 1 points across, once we include the point on
the axis.
Because the truncation at the bottom of the ladder uses k − 1 zeros, h will only have a single
point (excluding those on the axis) to the left of the first truncation band z∗−(k−1)ǫ ≤ x ≤ z∗−ǫ.
The point will be located at [z∗ − kǫ, z∗] and by probability conservation must have exactly the
same amount of probability as was originally located on the axes.
All that remains undone is to figure out what values of z∗ are allowed. For the moment we will
only compute this in the limit of ǫ→ 0 and Γ→∞ in which
f(0, z) = C ′
(
k−1∏
i=1
(z∗ − iǫ− z)
)(
k∏
i=1
(Γǫ+ iǫ− z)
)
→ C ′′(z − z∗)k−1 (159)
for some k-dependent constants C ′ and C ′′ where we used (Γ− z)/Γ→ 1. We then have
p(z) =
2f(0, jǫ)
z
∏
l 6=0(xl − 0)
→ C ′′′ (z − z
∗)k−1
z2k+1
(160)
and the two constants z∗ and C ′′′ are fixed by the constraints of Eq. (154), now in integral form
1 =
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)dz, 1 =
∫ ∞
z∗
p(z)
z
dz, (161)
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where we we have imposed equality in the second constraint to obtain the smallest z∗ for a given k.
Using w = z∗/z, we can transform the following integral into a representation of the Beta function
to get
∫ ∞
z∗
(z − z∗)j
zℓ
dz = (z∗)j−ℓ+1
∫ 1
0
wℓ−j−2(1− w)jdw = (z∗)j−ℓ+1B(ℓ− j − 1, j + 1)
= (z∗)j−ℓ+1
Γ(ℓ− j − 1)Γ(j + 1))
Γ(ℓ)
= (z∗)j−ℓ+1
(ℓ− j − 2)!(j)!
(l − 1)! . (162)
We then set our two constraint integrals equal to each other to cancel C ′′′ and solve for z∗
(z∗)−(k+1)
(k)!(k − 1)!
(2k)!
= (z∗)−(k+2)
(k + 1)!(k − 1)!
(2k + 1)!
=⇒ z∗ = k + 1
2k + 1
. (163)
In other words, we have constructed a coin-flipping protocol with P ∗A = P
∗
B = (k+1)/(2k+1). The
construction is valid for all k ≥ 1. The next section will formalize the protocol. All the main ideas
will be the same, though some of the functions will be redefined by constant factors.
5.2 Formal proof
Definition 32. Fix an integer k > 0, a small ǫ > 0 satisfying kǫ < 1/2, a large integer Γ > 4k
and a parameter z∗ ∈ (12 , 1) such that z∗/ǫ is an integer. Let Υ = {k, ǫ,Γ, z∗} and define
gΥ(z) =

k−1∏
j=1
(
z∗ − jǫ− z
z∗ − jǫ
)

 k∏
j=1
(
(Γ + j)ǫ− z
(Γ + j)ǫ
) , (164)
pΥ(z) = (−1)k−1gΥ(z)
k∏
j=−k
(
1
z + jǫ
)
, (165)
CΥ = 1
/ Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ), (166)
DΥ(i) = ǫ
2k−1
k∏
ℓ=−k
ℓ 6=i
(ℓ− i) , (167)
2hΥ = −1[1, 0] + CΥ
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ)[jǫ, 0] (168)
−1[z∗ − kǫ, z∗] + 1[z∗, z∗]
+CΥ
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ

−pΥ(jǫ)[0, jǫ] +
k∑
i=−k
i 6=0
(−1)kgΥ((j + i)ǫ)gΥ(jǫ)
(jǫ)((j + i)ǫ)DΥ(i)
[(j + i)ǫ, jǫ]


and vΥ(x, y) = hΥ(y, x).
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Lemma 33. Given Υ as in Definition 32, if
1 ≥ CΥ
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ)
jǫ
(169)
then hΥ is a valid horizontal function and vΥ is a valid vertical function.
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to prove that hΥ is a valid horizontal function. It is also sufficient
to check the conditions independently on each of the three lines of Eq. (168). Given the constraint
in the definition of the lemma, the first line is a valid point split and the second line is a valid point
raise (see Lemma 22).
Also pυ(z) ≥ 0 for z∗/ǫ ≤ z ≤ Γ so CΥ ≥ 0 and it can be canceled as we focus on the term in
parenthesis in the third line for each integer j ∈ [z∗/ǫ,Γ]. If we define
fj(x) =
(−1)k−1gΥ(x)gΥ(jǫ)
(jǫ)
(170)
then we can write the line at y = jǫ as
∑
i
(
−fj(xi)∏
j 6=i(xj − xi)
)
[xi, y], (171)
where xi ∈ {0} ∪ {(j − k)ǫ, . . . , (j − 1)ǫ, (j + 1)ǫ, . . . , (j + k)ǫ} and we used gΥ(0) = 1 among other
relations.
Now we can apply Lemma 31 which tells us that the above function is valid so long as fj(−λ) is a
polynomial in λ of order no greater than 2k−1 and positive for all λ > 0. The first condition is trivial
and the second follows because gΥ(−λ) > 0 for λ > 0 and (−1)k−1gΥ(jǫ) ≥ 0 for z∗ ≤ jǫ ≤ Γǫ.
Lemma 34. Given Υ as in Definition 32 we have
hΥ + vΥ = −1
2
[1, 0] − 1
2
[0, 1] + 1[z∗, z∗]. (172)
Proof. The only nontrivial cancellation is on the points [z∗− kǫ, z∗] and [z∗, z∗− kǫ] which have by
symmetry the same coefficient (with the same sign). Because each line of hΥ conserves probability,
hΥ + vΥ must have a net zero probability, and so the coefficients of these points must also be
zero.
Corollary 35. Given Υ as in Definition 32, if
1 ≥ CΥ
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ)
jǫ
(173)
then hΥ and vΥ is a TIPG with final point [z
∗, z∗].
Lemma 36. Given Υ as in Definition 32, there exists a family of solutions to
1 ≥ CΥ
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ)
jǫ
(174)
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such that ǫ→ 0, Γ→∞ and
z∗ → k + 1
2k + 1
. (175)
Proof. For a given ǫ and Γ, the best z∗ is constrained by z∗/ǫ ∈ Z and
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ) ≥
Γ∑
j=z∗/ǫ
pΥ(jǫ)
jǫ
, (176)
where we have expanded the definition of CΥ. We then use
(
z − (z∗ − kǫ)
z∗ − kǫ
)k−1( 1
z − kǫ
)2k+1
≥ pΥ(z) ≥
(
z − z∗
z∗
)k−1(Γ− z
Γ
)k ( 1
z + kǫ
)2k+1
(177)
to note that if we choose z∗ in accordance with the strict inequality
∞∑
j=z∗/ǫ
(
jǫ− z∗
z∗
)k−1( 1
jǫ+ kǫ
)2k+1
>
∞∑
j=z∗/ǫ
(
jǫ− (z∗ − kǫ)
z∗ − kǫ
)k−1( 1
jǫ− kǫ
)2k+2
(178)
then we can always find a large enough integer Λ so that the original inequality is satisfied (that
is because the new right-hand side is greater than or equal to the original right-hand side, whereas
the original left-hand side will converge as Λ → ∞ to an expression greater than or equal to the
new left-hand side).
Similarly, if we choose z∗ in accordance with the strict inequality
∫ ∞
z∗
(
z − z∗
z∗
)k−1(1
z
)2k+1
dz >
∫ ∞
z∗
(
z − z∗
z∗
)k−1(1
z
)2k+2
dz (179)
we can find an appropriate ǫ > 0 so that the original constraints are satisfied. The argument for
solving the above inequality is the same as the one used for Eq. (161) through Eq. (163). The
constraint becomes
z∗ >
k + 1
2k + 1
(180)
and therefore for any such z∗ we can find appropriate ǫ and Γ that satisfy the original constraints.
Corollary 37. For every integer k > 0 there is a family of coin-flipping protocols that converges
to
P ∗A = P
∗
B =
k + 1
2k + 1
. (181)
Corollary 38. There exists protocols for quantum weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias.
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6 Conclusions
We have constructively proven the existence of protocols for quantum weak coin flipping with
arbitrarily small bias. In the end, it appears that quantum information has fulfilled at least a small
part of its promise in the area of two-party secure computation.
We have also tried to provide a primer on how to use Kitaev’s formalism to build interesting
protocols. Hopefully the present result will be the first of many to be obtained by viewing quantum
games as dual to the cone of bi-operator monotone functions.
6.1 Open problems
1. Improvements and extensions to the proof:
(a) We did not explicitly complete the proof that if no coin-flipping protocols with arbitrarily
small bias exists, then the bound can be proven using a bi-operator monotone function.
Completing the proof would show that the cone of TIPGs and the cone of bi-operator
monotone functions are dual.
(b) We have only constructed protocols for the case PA = PB = 1/2. Protocols for other
cases can be constructed using serial composition of this protocol. Nevertheless, it should
also be straightforward to explicitly describe a TIPG for such cases.
(c) The alternative construction from Section 5.1.3 needs to be fleshed out. It may lead to
some elegant TIPGs.
(d) Appendix C needs to be simplified/made more elegant.
2. Improvements and extensions to the protocol:
(a) Can we find a simple unitary description (such as the one in Appendix A) of a family of
protocols that achieves arbitrarily small bias?
(b) Can we optimize the resources (messages, storage qubits, complexity of unitaries?)
needed to implement such a protocol.
i. What are the asymptotic costs of achieving arbitrarily small bias?
ii. What are the practical costs of achieving small bias? How hard would it be to make
a protocol with bias 0.001?
(c) What can be said about multiparty weak coin flipping?
3. Beyond weak coin flipping
(a) Weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias leads trivially to a new protocol for strong
coin flipping with bias (arbitrarily close to) 1/4. Is this the best that can be done?
(b) More generally, what is the optimal protocol for strong coin flipping with cheat detection?
While the formalism in this paper can be adapted to strong coin flipping, it probably
cannot be used unmodified. The difference is that in strong coin flipping we need to
simultaneously bound four quantities (Alice and Bob’s probabilities each of obtaining
zero and one). Even classically one can construct protocols that achieve P ∗A0P
∗
B0 = 1/2
(so long as one is willing to tolerate PA1 = PB1 = 1).
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(c) Strong coin flipping with cheat detection can be used to bound bit commitment with
cheat detection. Do they share an optimal protocol? Can it be used as a building block
for all secure two-party computations with cheat detection?
(d) Kitaev’s first formalism can also be used in the study of specific oracle problems. In this
context the second formalism could be used to study all oracles simultaneously, which
may prove useful in identifying optimal oracles in some sense (for instance for proving
separations between quantum and classical computation).
(e) What else?
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A Dip-Dip-Boom and the bias 1/6 protocol
We present in this section a reformulation of the bias 1/6 protocol from [Moc05]. The new version
of the protocol is simpler and uses measurements throughout the protocol in order to keep the total
storage space small: one qutrit for each of the players and one qubit for sending messages. In fact,
the message qubit can be discarded and reinitialized after each message, so that only the qutrits
need to be kept coherent for the length of the protocol.
The new protocol can be described as a quantum version of the ancient game of Dip-Dip-Boom,
whose classical version is played as follows: two players sequentially say either “Dip” or “Boom”.
In the first case the game proceeds whereas in the second case the game immediately ends and the
person who said “Boom” is declared the winner. There are no bonus points for longer games and
a player can begin and immediately win a game by saying “Boom”. Why this game is played at
MIT, and how it was accepted as a major component of the author’s doctoral thesis, are questions
beyond the scope of this paper.
What we shall do is build a coin-flipping protocol out of the above game. First, we introduce
honest and cheating players. Honest players will have to output “Dip” vs “Boom” according to
some previously fixed probability distribution, whereas cheating players are still free to say whatever
they want at each round. A game is now specified by a set of numbers p1, p2, p3, . . . so that pi is
the probability that the ith word is “Boom”. Note that p1, p3, . . . apply to the first player whom
we call Alice and p2, p4, . . . apply to the second player whom we call Bob. For convenience we shall
fix an n ≥ 1 and assume that the game ends after n messages by setting pn = 1.
We now define the quantities PA(i), PB(i) and PU (i) which are respectively the probabilities that
after i messages Alice has won the game, Bob has won the game, or the game remains undecided.
These quantities can be inductively calculated by
PA(i) =
{
PA(i− 1) for i even,
PA(i− 1) + piPU (i− 1) for i odd,
(182)
PB(i) =
{
PB(i− 1) + piPU (i− 1) for i even,
PB(i− 1) for i odd,
(183)
PU (i) = (1− pi)PU (i− 1), (184)
with initial conditions of PU (0) = 1 and PA(0) = PB(0) = 0.
The quantum version of the protocol is simply a coherent version of the above, with an additional
cheat detection step. Alice and Bob will each hold a qutrit
A = B = span{|A〉, |B〉, |U〉} (185)
which encodes the state of the game: “Alice has won”, “Bob has won” and “undecided” respectively.
The message space is just a qubit
M = span{|DIP〉, |BOOM〉} (186)
comprising the two possible messages.
Amplitude will be moved coherently using the unitary operator Rot defined by
Rot(|α〉, |β〉, ǫ) = (|α〉 |β〉)(√1− ǫ −√ǫ√
ǫ
√
1− ǫ
)(〈α|
〈β|
)
+
(
I − |α〉〈α| − |β〉〈β|
)
, (187)
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which simply effectuates a rotation in the |α〉, |β〉 plane. For instance, consider the classical step
where Alice says “Boom” with probability p given that her state is |U〉. In the quantum protocol
this is described by the rotation Rot(|U〉 ⊗ |DIP〉, |A〉 ⊗ |BOOM〉, p). Assuming that previously
|A〉 ⊗ |BOOM〉 had zero amplitude, the operation will move into this state an amplitude of √p
times the prior amplitude of |U〉 ⊗ |DIP〉. We are now ready to state the quantum protocol:
Protocol 39 (Weak coin flipping with bias 1/6, simplified).
Fix n ≥ 1 and numbers p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0, 1]. Define A, B, M, PA(i), PB(i) and PU (i) as above. The
protocol has the following steps
1. Initialization: Alice prepares |U〉 ⊗ |DIP〉 in A⊗M. Bob prepares |U〉 in B.
2. For i = 1 to n execute the following steps:
(where we use X to denote the player that would choose the ith message in the classical
protocol, and Y is the other player. That is X = A and Y = B if i is odd or X = B and
Y = A if i is even).
(a) X applies the operator
Ri ≡ Rot (|U〉 ⊗ |DIP〉, |X〉 ⊗ |BOOM〉, pi) . (188)
(b) X sends the qubit HM which is received by Y .
(c) Y applies the operator
R˜i = Rot
(
|U〉 ⊗ |BOOM〉, |X〉 ⊗ |DIP〉, pi PU (i− 1)
PX(i)
)
. (189)
(d) Y measures the message qubit M in the computational basis.
If the outcome is |BOOM〉 then Y aborts and outputs Y .
3. Alice and Bob each measure their qutrit in the computational basis. If the outcome is U they
declare themselves the winner, otherwise they output the measurement outcome as the winner.
It is not hard to see that when both players are honest the state of the system at the end of the
ith iteration of Step 2 can be written as(√
PA(i)|A〉 ⊗ |A〉+
√
PB(i)|B〉 ⊗ |B〉+
√
PU (i)|U〉 ⊗ |U〉
)
⊗ |DIP〉. (190)
To obtain a standard coin-flipping protocol we must therefore restrict the choices of p1, . . . , pn to
values such that PA(n) = PB(n) = 1/2. For simplicity, we will also assume that for i < n, the
other probabilities pi are neither zero nor one. In particular, this requires the previously discussed
condition pn = 1.
Step 2d is the new element of the quantum protocol, and serves as a cheat detecting step.
Without this measurement the protocol is exactly equivalent to the original classical protocol.
It is important to note that when both players are honest, neither will ever abort in Step 2d.
However, when one player is cheating then the honest player will abort at Step 2d with some
non-zero probability. Roughly speaking, the measurement compares the ratio of amplitude in
“Boom” (tensored with |U〉) in the present message, to the total amplitude of “Boom” from previous
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messages. The classical strategy of declaring with probability one “Boom” on the first message
is thwarted because this ratio will effectively be zero for all subsequent messages. The optimal
quantum cheating strategy involves a small amount of cheating on each message, but that gives an
honest player an opportunity to declare victory too.
In the next section we will sketch the computation of P ∗A and P
∗
B for the above protocol and
find that they match the expressions for the optimal protocols from [Moc05]. This is the first step
in proving the equivalence of the two protocols. A complete proof of equivalence would take us too
far afield, though one possible route follows from the discussion in Section 3.2.2.
In practice, the main difference between the protocols is that in the one presented above the
cheat detection is done gradually as the protocol progresses rather than in one big measurement
at the end. This simplifies the description of the protocol, and reduces the resources required for a
physical implementation. Alas, it does not make it any more cheat resistant. In the limit n → ∞
and with suitably chosen values for p1, . . . , pn (almost any choice so long as they go smoothly to
zero as n→∞) the above protocol achieves a bias of 1/6.
Analysis
In this section we will make use of Kitaev’s first formalism to compute P ∗B (P
∗
A can be obtained
by a similar argument). In other words we will find a feasible point of the dual SDP. Of course,
this only proves an upper bound on P ∗B , but the resulting expressions are in fact optimal, and a
matching lower bound can also be constructed.
The final result for this section will be P ∗B as a function of the variables p1, . . . , pn. We will not
attempt to find the optimal values for these parameters as that task is already done in [Moc05].
We will also not attempt to describe the result as a TDPG, though this is a simple task using the
dual feasible point constructed below.
Henceforth we will consider the case of honest Alice and cheating Bob. The analysis will be
done from the perspective of Alice’s qubits which must satisfy the following SDP:
ρ1 = TrM[R1 (|U〉〈U | ⊗ |DIP〉〈DIP|)R†1], (191)
TrM[ρi] = ρi−1 for i even, (192)
ρi = TrM
[
RiΠDIPR˜i−1ρi−1R˜
†
i−1ΠDIPR
†
i
]
for i > 1 odd, (193)
ρf =
{
ρn n odd,
TrM
[
R˜nρnR˜n†
]
n even,
(194)
Pwin = 〈B|ρf |B〉, (195)
where ρi is the state of Alice’s qubits immediately after the ith message (i.e., after Step 2b). The
state ρi for even i is an operator on A⊗M and is unknown but constrained by ρi−1. The state ρi
for odd i is an operator on A and can be computed from ρi−1 by applying the operators that Alice
would use.
Note that ΠDIP ≡ I ⊗ |DIP〉〈DIP| is a projector corresponding to a successful measurement in
Step 2d. The normalization of ρi will therefore be the probability that Alice has not aborted yet.
The final state ρf on A will have a similar normalization and Pwin will be the probability that
Alice outputs a victory for Bob. In particular, Bob’s maximum probability of winning by cheating,
P ∗B , is given by the maximization of Pwin over positive semidefinite matrices satisfying the above
constraints.
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The dual to the above SDP can be written in the following form:
P ∗B ≤ 〈U |Z0|U〉, (196)
Zi−1 ⊗ |DIP〉〈DIP| = ΠDIPR†i (Zi ⊗ IM)RiΠDIP for i odd, (197)
Zi−1 ⊗ IM ≥ R˜†i (Zi ⊗ |DIP〉〈DIP|) R˜i for i even, (198)
Zn ≥ |B〉〈B|, (199)
where the variables Z0, . . . , Zn are semidefinite operators on A. Any assignment of these variables
consistent with the above constraints provides an upper bound on P ∗B . The infimum of 〈U |Z0|U〉
will in fact be equal to P ∗B .
Now comes the crucial bit of guesswork, where we choose a diagonalizing basis for the operators
Zi. Because any assignment to Z0, . . . , Zn consistent with the constraints provides an upper bound
on P ∗B , choosing a bad basis will at worse give us a non-tight upper bound. Based on experience
from past protocols, we choose to restrict ourselves to studying matrices that are diagonal in the
computational basis, and we write
Zi =

ai 0 00 bi 0
0 0 ui

 . (200)
We can now express Eq. (197) as
ai−1 0 00 bi−1 0
0 0 ui−1

 =

ai 0 00 bi 0
0 0 (1− pi)ui + piai

 (201)
valid for i odd. We can also write Eq. (198) as

ai−1 0 0 0 0 0
0 ai−1 0 0 0 0
0 0 bi−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 bi−1 0 0
0 0 0 0 ui−1 0
0 0 0 0 0 ui−1


≥


ai 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− p˜i)bi 0 0
√
p˜i(1− p˜i)bi
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ui 0
0 0
√
p˜i(1− p˜i)bi 0 0 p˜ibi


(202)
valid for i even, where we introduced p˜i = piPU (i−1)/PB(i) as a notation for the rotation parameter
of R˜i. The above inequality can be simplified to ai−1 ≥ ai, ui−1 ≥ ui, plus the positivity of the
2× 2 matrix (
bi−1 − (1− p˜i)bi −
√
p˜i(1− p˜i)bi
−√p˜i(1− p˜i)bi ui−1 − p˜ibi
)
≥ 0 (203)
which is satisfied if its determinant and its diagonal elements are non-negative.
It is not hard to see that we can choose ai = 0 for all i. We are after all trying to minimize
〈U |Z0|U〉 = u0. We now get the relation ui−1 = (1 − pi)ui for i odd, and we know that the best
that we can hope for is ui−1 = ui for i even. If this were true we would have
ui = u0
i∏
j=1
j odd
1
1− pi . (204)
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Let us be optimistic, and assume the above holds and then check whether the remaining constraints
can be satisfied. Surprisingly, we shall find that the answer is yes.
The intuition for the bi variables is that bn = 1 and bi increases as i decreases. In fact, the
larger b0 is, the better the bound we will find, and the infimum is attained for b0 = ∞. With a
little care, we can directly handle this infinity and get b1 = b0 =∞ and b2 = u1/p˜2 which satisfies
Eq. (203) for i = 2.
The remaining conditions for bi will no longer involve infinities and are obtained by minimizing
the determinant Eq. (203), which leads to
1
bi
=
p˜i
ui−1
+
1− p˜i
bi−1
for i even, (205)
which also guarantees that the constraint on the diagonal elements of Eq. (203) is satisfied. By
induction we can write
1
bi
=
i∑
j=2
j even
p˜j
uj−1
i∏
k=j+2
k even
(1− p˜k) =
i∑
j=2
j even
p˜j
uj−1
i∏
k=j+2
k even
PB(k − 1)
PB(k)
=
i∑
j=2
j even
p˜j
uj−1
PB(j + 1)
PB(i)
(206)
=
i∑
j=2
j even
pjPU (j − 1)
uj−1PB(i)
=
1
u0PB(i)
i∑
j=2
j even
pjPU (j − 1)
j−1∏
k=1
k odd
(1− pk), (207)
where in the second equality we used PB(k)− pkPU (k− 1) = PB(k− 1) for k even, and in the third
equality we used PB(k + 1)/PB(k) = 1 for k even.
What we have done is solve for all the dual variables in terms of u0. We have also satisfied all
constraints except for those from Eq. (199), which tells to set bn = 1 and allows us to solve for u0
to obtain our upper bound:
P ∗B ≤ u0 = 2
n∑
j=2
j even
pj
(
j−1∏
k=1
(1− pk)
) j−1∏
k=1
k odd
(1− pk)

 , (208)
where we used PB(n) = 1/2.
The above expression is equivalent to the result found in [Moc05]. For a simple example, take
the Spekkens and Rudolph [SR02b] protocol with P ∗A = P
∗
B = 1/
√
2, which can be described in the
above formalism by setting p1 = 1− 1/
√
2, p2 = 1/
√
2 and p3 = 1. The above bound then becomes
u0 = 2p2(1− p1)2 = 1/
√
2 as expected.
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B Proof of strong duality
We say strong duality holds when the maximum of the primal SDP and the infimum of the dual
SDP are equal. Though strong duality does not hold in general, it does hold in most cases. A
number of lemmas which provide sufficient conditions for strong duality can be found in convex
optimization books such as [BV04] or [Bar02]. In this section, however, we aim to give a direct
proof of strong duality for the particular case of the coin-flipping SDP. This appendix follows the
notation of Section 2.1
More specifically, the goal for this section is to prove the existence of arbitrarily good upper
bound certificates. Mathematically, we aim to show that inf 〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = P ∗B , where the
infimum is taken over all dual feasible points.
Let us begin by defining Ri as the set of density matrices ρA,i on A that are attainable by a
cheating Bob after i messages. We will focus only on even i. These sets satisfy the properties:
• R0 = {|ψA,0〉〈ψA,0|}.
• Ri+2 =
{
TrM[UA,i+1ρ˜A,iU
†
A,i+1] : ρ˜A,i ≥ 0 and TrM ρ˜A,i ∈ Ri
}
.
• Ri is convex for all i.
The last property follows from the previous two by induction.
Though in general we cannot find a dual feasible point such that 〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = P ∗B , we can
get arbitrarily close. Specifically, we can prove that for every ǫ > 0 we can pick the dual variables
one by one, starting with Zn−2 and working our way backwards towards Z0, such that
• ZA,i ⊗ IM ≥ U †A,i+1 (ZA,i+2 ⊗ IM)UA,i+1
• maxρA,i∈Ri Tr[ZA,iρA,i] ≤ maxρA,i+2∈Ri+2 Tr[ZA,i+2ρA,i+2] + 2ǫ
for even i, where as usual ZA,n = ΠA,1. The first condition guarantees that the constructed solution
is indeed a dual feasible point (the operators for i odd can be found from the equality ZA,i = ZA,i+1).
The second condition gives us
〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 = max
ρA,0∈R0
Tr[ZA,0ρA,0] ≤ max
ρA,n∈Rn
Tr[ZA,nρA,n] + nǫ = P
∗
B + nǫ (209)
which is the desired result since ǫ > 0 is arbitrary and we already know by weak duality that
〈ψA,0|ZA,0|ψA,0〉 ≥ P ∗B .
Let us assume that ǫ > 0 has been given and that ZA,i+2, . . . , ZA,n have been constructed
according to the above criteria. We shall find a ZA,i satisfying the criteria as well.
Let Γ = U †A,i+1 (ZA,i+2 ⊗ IM)UA,i+1, define Pos(A) to be the set of positive semidefinite oper-
ators on A and define the function f : Pos(A)→ R by
f(ρ) = max
ρ˜∈Pos(A⊗M)
TrM[ρ˜]=ρ
Tr[Γρ˜], (210)
where we are maximizing over positive semidefinite operators ρ˜ on on A⊗M whose partial trace
is ρ. The function f has a number of simple to verify properties
• maxρ∈Rn f(ρ) = maxρA,i+2∈Ri+2 Tr[ZA,i+2ρA,i+2] ≡ γ.
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• f is continuous.
• f is concave (equivalently f(ρ) + f(ρ′) ≤ f(ρ+ ρ′)).
where we used the first equality to define γ.
We now aim to construct a convex set out of f by using the space of points below its graph.
More specifically let V be the vector space of Hermitian operators on A. We want to think of V as a
real Hilbert space of dimension (dimA)2 with inner product 〈H|H ′〉 = Tr[H†H ′]. Let W = V ×R,
which can be parametrized by ordered pairs (H, a) where H is a Hermitian operator on A and
a ∈ R. Now define the set X ⊂W by
X =
{
(H, a) : H ∈ Pos(A),TrH ≤ 2 and − 1 ≤ a ≤ f(H)
}
. (211)
The numbers 2 and −1 are arbitrary, and are mainly there to make X compact. It is easy to check
that X is a convex and has non-empty interior.
Now we define a second compact convex set Y which will be disjoint from X but will sit above
it (see Fig. 9). We use the fact that f is continuous to find a δ > 0 such that
max
ρ∈Pos(A),dist(ρ,Ri)≤δ
f(ρ) ≤ max
ρ∈Ri
f(ρ) + ǫ ≡ γ + ǫ, (212)
where dist(ρ,Ri) is the ℓ2 distance. The idea is that we want Y to sit atop the set Ri but we also
want Y to have non-empty interior. Therefore we expand Ri to a small (closed) neighborhood of
Ri still consisting of positive semidefinite matrices R
δ
i = {ρ ∈ Pos(A) : dist(ρ,Ri) ≤ δ}. Now we
define Y ⊂W as
Y =
{
(H, a) : H ∈ Rδi and γ + 2ǫ ≤ a ≤ γ + 2ǫ+ 1
}
. (213)
The set Y is convex because Ri was convex and the distance function is convex. Y is also compact
with non-empty interior and disjoint from X.
Now we use the separating hyperplane theorem (see for instance [BV04] §2.5) which says that
given two disjoint compact convex sets there exists a hyperplane such that each set is on one side
(a proof sketch is let x ∈ X and y ∈ Y attain the minimum distance between X and Y , then define
the hyperplane by the equation (x− y) · (w − (x+ y)/2)) = 0 for w ∈W ).
Because Rδi is of non-empty interior in V , and X and Y respectively provide lower and upper
bounds on the hyperplane is this region, the hyperplane cannot be vertical and its normal vector
can be written in the form (M, 1) whereM is Hermitian. The hyperplane itself can be parametrized
as (M, 1) · (H, a) = c for (H, a) ∈ W and some parameter c ∈ R. As the hyperplane separates the
sets X and Y we can write
• (H, a) ∈ X ⇒ c− TrMH ≥ a,
• (H, a) ∈ Y ⇒ c− TrMH ≤ a.
We are now ready to choose ZA,i = cI −M . The two properties above tell us that
• For all density operators ρ on A we have Tr[ZA,iρ] ≥ f(ρ).
=⇒ For all density operators ρ˜ on A⊗M we have Tr [(ZA,i ⊗ I)ρ˜] ≥ Tr[Γρ˜].
=⇒ ZA,i ⊗ I ≥ U †A,i+1 (ZA,i+2 ⊗ IM)UA,i+1.
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ρ∗
V
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Y
X
Figure 9: The sets X and Y . The horizontal axis is a cross section through the density operators
given by ρ = x|0〉〈0|+(1−x)|1〉〈1|. The curve is given by f(x) = (√x+√1− x)2/2 corresponding
to Γ being a projector onto a bell state. The optimal state ρ∗ maximizes f on the feasible set
Ri. The ideal hyperplane is the tangent to f at ρ
∗. Unfortunately, it is quite common that along
some cross sections Ri corresponds to a single boundary point where the slope of f is infinite. The
non-zero width of Y guarantees a finite slope for our (non-optimal) hyperplane even in this case.
• For all ρ ∈ Ri we have Tr[ZA,iρ] ≤ γ + 2ǫ.
=⇒ maxρA,i∈Ri Tr[ZA,iρA,i] ≤ maxρA,i+2∈Ri+2 Tr[ZA,i+2ρA,i+2] + 2ǫ.
Therefore our chosen ZA,i satisfies the two required properties and we have completed the proof
of strong duality for coin flipping.
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C From functions to matrices
TDPGs are specified in terms of pairs of functions constituting valid transitions. In order to compile
them back into the language of quantum mechanics and semidefinite programming, we need to have
a way of extracting matrices (states and unitaries) out of these transitions. That is our goal below.
As a corollary we shall prove Lemmas 16 and 17. This section uses the notation from Section 2.3.
We begin our discussion by considering the following alternate condition on transitions:
Definition 40. Let p(z) and q(z) be two functions [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support. We say
p(z) → q(z) is expressible by matrices if there exists positive semidefinite operators X and
Y , and an (unnormalized) vector |ψ〉 such that X ≤ Y and p(z) = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and q(z) =
Prob(Y, |ψ〉).
It is not hard to verify that all transitions expressible by matrices are also valid, justifying our
notation. It is also true that all transitions constructed from UBPs are expressible by matrices (the
only non-trivial step is to expand the Hilbert space so as to purify the density operator). What
we will end up showing by the end of this section is essentially the converse: that all strictly valid
transitions are expressible by matrices. This is the content of Lemma 16.
Given that valid transitions and transitions expressible by matrices are essentially equivalent
concepts, we could have used the latter in our definition of TDPGs. However, that would diminish
one of the main accomplishments of TDPGs: moving the problem of coin flipping outside the
traditional realm of quantum-mechanics/matrices/SDPs.
We note that there do exist valid (but not strictly valid) transitions that are not expressible by
matrices unless we allow infinite eigenvalues. However, all operators in this paper are assumed to
have finite dimension and finite eigenvalues.
The restriction to strictly valid transitions can be lifted if we work with functions defined on
a compact domain rather than our usual domain of [0,∞). For this section it will be useful to
work with such compact domains, and we extend to them our definitions of valid and expressible
by matrices:
Definition 41. Fix a compact interval [a, b]. Given two functions p(z), q(z) : [a, b] → [0,∞) with
finite support we say p→ q
• is valid on [a, b] if ∑z p(z) =∑z q(z) and ∑z λzλ+z (q(z)− p(z)) ≥ 0 for all −λ ∈ R \ I .
• is expressible by matrices in [a, b] if there exists matrices X, Y with spectrum in [a, b],
and a vector |ψ〉 such that X ≤ Y and p(z) = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and q(z) = Prob(Y, |ψ〉).
These definitions become useful with the following lemma:
Lemma 42. Given two functions p(z), q(z) : [0,∞) → [0,∞) with finite support such that p → q
is strictly valid, there exists Λ > 0, larger than the maximum of the supports of p and q, such that
p→ q is valid on [0,Λ].
Proof. Because p→ q is strictly valid ∑z z(q(z) − p(z)) > 0, which implies
lim
λ→−∞
∑
z
λz
λ+ z
(q(z) − p(z)) > 0, (214)
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where the expression inside the limit is only defined for |λ| larger than the maximum of the support
of p and q. The expression inside the limit is continuous as a function of λ, so there must exists a
finite Λ > 0 such that for λ ≤ −Λ we also have satisfy the inequality ∑z λzλ+z (q(z)− p(z)) > 0.
We can now restrict our attention to probability distributions and operator monotone functions
with domain [0,Λ] and matrices with eigenvalues in [0,Λ], for some large Λ > 0.
One approach to proving that valid on [0,Λ] implies expressible by matrices in [0,Λ] is as follows:
define K to be the set of functions with finite support of the form g(z) ≡ q(z) − p(z) : [0,Λ] → R
where p→ q is expressible by matrices with eigenvalues in [0,Λ]. The set K is a convex cone, and
we can define its dual cone K∗ in the space of functions with arbitrary support f(z) : [0,Λ] → R.
The inner product between the two spaces is defined by 〈f |g〉 =∑z f(z)g(z) which is well defined
because g has finite support. It is easy to check that K∗ is exactly the set of operator monotone
functions with support [0,Λ]. The dual K∗∗ of K∗ is the set of functions with finite support of the
form g(z) ≡ q(z) − p(z) : [0,Λ] → R where p → q is valid. Proving K∗∗ = closure(K) covers most
of what we want to prove. The two difficulties with this approach is that it requires some fairly
advanced analysis to properly place K and K∗ into a pair of locally convex dual topological vector
spaces (see for instance [Bar02] §IV.4), and that in the end we prove something slightly weaker than
needed: mainly we find a transition expressible by matrices p′ → q′ so that q′(z)−p′(z) = q(z)−p(z)
rather than the stronger conditions p′(z) = p(z) and q′(z) = q(z).
Instead we will use a more constructive approach to completing the proof: Given p → q valid
on [a, b], we will construct a perturbation p′ of p so that p′ → q is still valid on [a, b] and such that
proving that this new transition is expressible by matrices in [a, b] will also prove that the original
transition is expressible by matrices in [a, b]. Alternatively, we may find a perturbation q′ of q and
reduce the problem to studying p → q′. A sequence of such transformations can be used until we
end up with a valid transition that is also trivially expressible by matrices.
To formalize the perturbations we need to introduce some notation. Given p : [a, b] → [0,∞)
with finite support we define a canonical representation p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) by choosing X diagonal
with a non-degenerate set of eigenvalues equal to S(p), the support of p, and then choosing |ψ〉 =∑
z∈S(p)
√
p(z)|z〉. In particular, the dimension of X is the size of the support of p, denoted
by |S(p)|. Similarly we can construct a canonical representation for q : [a, b] → [0,∞) as q =
Prob(Y, |ξ〉) with the spectrum of Y is equal to S(q). Note, however, that even if p→ q is valid on
[a, b] the matrices X and Y so constructed have no a priori relation, and in general are of different
dimensions.
All perturbations will be of the following form: let c > 0 be a constant and |φ〉 a non-zero
vector. Set X ′ = X + c|φ〉〈φ| and (assuming X ′ has eigenvalues in [a, b]) set p′ = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉).
Then p→ p′ is trivially constructable by matrices in [a, b]. Similarly, we can set q′ = Prob(Y ′, |ξ〉)
for Y ′ = Y + c|φ〉〈φ| where now we want c < 0. Ensuring that the perturbations can be chosen so
that p′ → q or p→ q′ are valid will take up most of the rest of the section.
Our first simple result bounds the dimension of the space needed when studying general tran-
sitions that are expressible by matrices. It also standardizes the spectra of the matrices involved.
Lemma 43. Let p → q be expressible by matrices in [a, b], then we can find matrices X ≤ Y and
a vector |φ〉 such that p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and q = Prob(Y, |ψ〉) and additionally:
1. The spectrum of X is equal to {a} ∪ S(p), with all eigenvalues (excluding a) occurring once.
2. The spectrum of Y is equal to {b} ∪ S(q), with all eigenvalues (excluding b) occurring once.
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3. The dimension of X and Y is no greater than |S(p)|+ |S(q)| − 1.
Proof. The fact that p→ q is expressible by matrices in [a, b], guarantees the existence of matrices
X ≤ Y with spectrum in [a, b] and a vector |φ〉 such that p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and q = Prob(Y, |ψ〉).
What we need to prove that we can modify the given matrices to satisfy the additional properties.
We begin by working with X and |ψ〉. We can write |ψ〉 = ∑z√p(z)|z;X〉 where z ranges
over the support of p and |z;X〉 is a normalized eigenvector of X with eigenvalue z. Let Π =∑
z |z;X〉〈z;X | be the projector onto the spaced spanned by these eigenvalues. If we define X ′ =
ΠXΠ + a(I − Π) we obtain a new matrix with eigenvalues in [a, b] that is diagonal in the same
basis as X, but may have some eigenvalues changed to a. Therefore, X ′ ≤ X ≤ Y . Furthermore,
X ′ has the desired spectrum and p = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉).
We can do something similar with Y . We can again write |ψ〉 =∑z√q(z)|z;Y 〉 where z ranges
over the support of q and |z;Y 〉 is a normalized eigenvector of Y with eigenvalue z. Note that even
if p and q both have support on z we may have |z;X〉 6= |z;Y 〉. We now set Π = ∑z |z;Y 〉〈z;Y |
and define Y ′ = ΠYΠ + b(I − Π). The new matrix satisfies X ≤ Y ≤ Y ′, q = Prob(Y ′, |ψ〉), and
has the desired spectrum.
Everything is correct except for the dimension. Now let Π be the projector onto the space
spanned by both {|z;X〉} and {|z;Y 〉}. The dimension of this space is no greater than |S(p)| +
|S(q)| − 1 (the minus one occurring because |ψ〉 is in the span of both sets of vectors). Clearly
Π|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and both X ′ and Y ′ are block diagonal with respect to Π and I − Π. Therefore, the
required objects are X ′, Y ′ and |ψ′〉 restricted to the support of Π.
Corollary 44. Expressible by matrices in [a, b] is a transitive relation.
Proof. Let p → r and r → q be expressible by matrices in [a, b]. We use X1, Y1 and |ψ1〉 for the
first transition and X2, Y2 and |ψ2〉 for the second transition, all chosen in accordance with the
conditions of Lemma 43. The matrices Y1 and X2 have the same spectrum, except that the second
one has extra a eigenvalues and the first one has extra b eigenvalues. We can append eigenvalues
to both of them using a direct sum so that(
Y1 0
0 aI
)
and
(
X2 0
0 bI
)
(215)
have the same spectrum and dimension, where the blocks may be different sized. We can also map
|ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 into this enlarged space by using a direct sum with a zero vector.
Because the two unitaries have the same spectrum, there exists a unitary that maps the second
into the first by conjugation. We can further ask that the unitary satisfy U |ψ2〉 = |ψ1〉 because up
to a phases they assign the same coefficient to each eigenvector. Then(
X1 0
0 aI
)
≤
(
Y1 0
0 aI
)
= U
(
X2 0
0 bI
)
U † ≤ U
(
Y2 0
0 bI
)
U †. (216)
We can construct p out of the first matrix and the extended |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and we can construct q out
of the last matrix and |ψ1〉〈ψ1| as well. Therefore p→ q is expressible by matrices in [a, b].
Before studying the perturbations, we need one final simplification. Though the domain [0,Λ]
is good, the domain [−1, 1] is even better because we can write λzλ+z = z1+γz and −λ ∈ R \ [−1, 1] is
equivalent to γ ∈ (−1, 1), which is a connected set. Note that the value γ = 0 corresponds to the
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function f(z) = z, and by continuity in γ we can always include/exclude it among our conditions.
The following lemma follows by a simple rescaling argument.
Lemma 45. If every valid transition on [−1, 1] is expressible by matrices in [−1, 1] then every valid
transition on [0,Λ] is expressible by matrices in [0,Λ].
It will also be convenient to work with functions p and q with support in (−1, 1), though we
still keep a domain of [−1, 1].
Lemma 46. If every valid transition on [−1, 1] involving functions with support on (−1, 1) is
expressible by matrices in [−1, 1] then every valid transition on [−1, 1] is expressible by matrices in
[−1, 1].
Proof. Fix p, q : [−1, 1] → [0,∞) with finite support so that p → q is valid in [−1, 1]. For any
0 < c < 1 we define functions [−1, 1]→ [0,∞) by
pc(z) =
{
p(zc ) z ∈ [−c, c],
0 otherwise,
qc(z) =
{
q(zc ) z ∈ [−c, c],
0 otherwise,
(217)
which have support in (−1, 1) and furthermore pc → qc is valid in [−1, 1]. Therefore, the transition
is expressible by matrices in [−1, 1] and and we can choose Xc, Yc and |ψc〉 in accordance with
the constraints of Lemma 43. Furthermore, by changes of basis we can ensure that Xc and |ψc〉
converge as c→ 1 to the canonical representation of p (appended with −1 eigenvalues). Any limit
point of Yc as c→ 1 will complete the proof.
For the rest of this section we will be concerned with the interval [−1, 1]. When clear from
context we will use the terms valid and expressible by matrices to refer to valid on [−1, 1] and
expressible by matrices in [−1, 1].
We now begin studying perturbations on p and q which will have constraints arising from
rational functions in γ of the form
∑
z
z
1+γz (q(z)− p(z)). The main difficulty will be near the zeros
of the function, which we want to approximate by simple expressions of the form a|γ − γ0|k. The
following is a standard result.
Lemma 47. Let N(γ) and D(γ) be two non-negative polynomials for γ ∈ [−1, 1]. If N has a zero
of order k at γ = γ0 ∈ [−1, 1] and D(γ0) 6= 0 then for any k′ ≥ k ≥ k′′ > 0 there exists ǫ, a, b > 0
such that
a|γ − γ0|k′ ≤ N(γ)
D(γ)
≤ b|γ − γ0|k′′ for γ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying |γ − γ0| < ǫ. (218)
Proof. Choose ǫ > 0 so that N(γ) and D(γ) are non-zero for 0 < |γ−γ0| ≤ ǫ. Let a be the infimum
of N(γ)|γ−γ0|k′D(γ) and b be the maximum of
N(γ)
|γ−γ0|k′′D(γ) for γ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying 0 < |γ − γ0| ≤ ǫ.
Note that the cases γ0 = −1 and γ0 = 1 are special in that k can be odd, and the inequalities will
only hold inside the region [−1, 1].
For the next set of lemmas let H be a real n-dimensional Hilbert space, let X be an operator on
H, let |ψ〉 and |φ〉 be non-zero vectors in H and let c 6= 0 be a real constant. Also let fγ(x) = x1+γx
for x ∈ [−1, 1] and γ ∈ (−1, 1).
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Lemma 48. Let X, |φ〉, c and fγ(x) be as above. If both X and X + c|φ〉〈φ| have eigenvalues in
[−1, 1], then
fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)− fγ(X) =
(
c
1 + γc〈φ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉
)
(I + γX)−1 |φ〉〈φ| (I + γX)−1 . (219)
Proof. The proof for γ = 0 is trivial. Otherwise fγ(x) =
1
γ
(
1− 11+γx
)
. Let Z = I + γX and
c′ = γc. Because Z is positive definite and Z + c′|φ〉〈φ| is also positive definite, then
(
Z + c′|φ〉〈φ|)−1 = (Z1/2 (I + c′Z−1/2|φ〉〈φ|Z−1/2)Z1/2)−1
= Z−1/2
(
I + c′Z−1/2|φ〉〈φ|Z−1/2
)−1
Z−1/2
= Z−1/2
(
I +
(
−1 + 1
1 + c′〈φ|Z−1|φ〉
)
Z−1/2|φ〉〈φ|Z−1/2
〈φ|Z−1|φ〉
)
Z−1/2
= Z−1/2
(
I −
(
c′
1 + c′〈φ|Z−1|φ〉
)
Z−1/2|φ〉〈φ|Z−1/2
)
Z−1/2
= Z−1 −
(
c′
1 + c′〈φ|Z−1|φ〉
)
Z−1|φ〉〈φ|Z−1, (220)
where the third equality follows because I + c′Z−1/2|φ〉〈φ|Z−1/2 is a matrix with only two eigen-
values. The main result follows because its LHS equals − 1γ ((Z + c′|φ〉〈φ|)−1 − Z−1).
We are ready to start imposing constraints on the transitions p→ p′ for p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) and
p′ = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉), where X ′ = X + c|φ〉〈φ|. In particular, we want to place an upper bound on∣∣∣∑z z1+γz (p′(z)− p(z))∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)− fγ(X))|ψ〉∣∣∣ in the form of a polynomial with a
zero of order 2k. The next lemma will show that there are many choices for |φ〉 that satisfy the
bound. In fact, there is an n− k subspace of such vectors.
Lemma 49. Let H, n, X, |ψ〉 and fγ(x) be as above, with the eigenvalues of X restricted to (−1, 1).
Given a polynomial b(γ − γ0)2k with constants b > 0, integer k > 0 and γ0 ∈ [−1, 1], then we can
construct an (n − k)-dimensional subspace H′ ⊂ H such that for every |φ〉 ∈ H′ there exists c > 0
and ǫ > 0 satisfying∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)− fγ(X))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ b(γ − γ0)2k for γ ∈ (−1, 1) satisfying |γ − γ0| < ǫ,
(221)
where additionally |c| must be small enough so that X + c|φ〉〈φ| also has eigenvalues in (−1, 1).
The same conditions can also be satisfied while demanding that in every case c < 0.
Proof. Because we are only considering matrices X with eigenvalues in (−1, 1), the matrix |X| has
a maximum eigenvalue λmax < 1 and if for a given |φ〉 we restrict |c| < (1 − λmax)/(2〈φ|φ〉) then
Eq. (219) implies
∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)− fγ(X))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ 2|c| ∣∣∣〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉∣∣∣2 . (222)
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The expression 〈ψ|(I + γX)−1|φ〉 is a rational function in γ (recall we are working in a real vector
space) with no poles in [−1, 1]. If we can choose |φ〉 such that it has a zero of order at least k at γ0
then by Lemma 47 we can choose small enough c > 0 (or large enough c < 0) and ǫ > 0 such that
2|c|
∣∣∣〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉∣∣∣2 ≤ b(γ − γ0)2k for γ ∈ (−1, 1) satisfying |γ − γ0| < ǫ, (223)
thereby proving the constraint. What remains to be shown is that there exists an n−k dimensional
space H′ such that |φ〉 ∈ H′ implies that 〈ψ|(I + γX)−1|φ〉 has a zero of order at least k at γ0.
If we choose δ > 0 such that δ|I + γ0X|−1 < I then we can write
〈ψ|(I + γX)−1 = 〈ψ|(I + γ0X + (γ − γ0)X)−1 (224)
=
∞∑
j=1
(γ − γ0)j〈ψ|(I + γ0X)−1
(
X
I + γ0X
)j
for |γ − γ0| < δ,
where all matrices are diagonal in the eigenbasis of X, which justifies the unordered products. We
have shown that the requirement that 〈ψ|(I + γX)−1|φ〉 have a zero of order at least k at γ0 is
equivalent to k linear constraints on |φ〉, and therefore there exists a subspace of dimension n− k
that simultaneously satisfies all of them. The lemma follows so long as we ensure to pick the
constants ǫ small enough so that ǫ ≤ δ.
The following fact will also be useful: given c > 0 and ǫ > 0 satisfying the inequality in the above
lemma (for a given |φ〉), then it is also satisfied by any c′ and ǫ′ such that 0 < c′ < c and 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ,
the former property arising because fγ is operator monotone and hence 〈ψ|fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)|ψ〉 is
monotone as a function of c. In the next lemma we will use this to deal with multiple simultaneous
constraints.
Lemma 50. Let p and q be functions with support in (−1, 1) such that p → q is valid. Let S(p)
and S(q) be respectively the supports of p and q, and let m be the number of zeros (including
multiplicities) for γ ∈ [−1, 1] of the rational function ∑z z1+γz (q(z)− p(z)).
• If m+ 2 < 2|S(p)| there exists a vector |φ〉 6= 0 and constant c > 0 such that p′ → q is valid,
where p′ = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉), X ′ = X+ c|φ〉〈φ| and p is canonically represented by Prob(X, |ψ〉).
• If m+ 2 < 2|S(q)| there exists a vector |φ〉 6= 0 and constant c < 0 such that p→ q′ is valid,
where q′ = Prob(Y ′, |ξ〉), Y ′ = Y + c|φ〉〈φ| and q is canonically represented by Prob(Y, |ξ〉).
Proof. We will prove the first case, the second case being nearly identical. The key idea is that
q(z)− p′(z) = (q(z) − p(z)) − (p′(z)− p(z)), and therefore p′ → q will be valid if
〈ψ|
(
fγ(X + c|φ〉〈φ|)− fγ(X)
)
|ψ〉 ≤
∑
z
z
1 + γz
(q(z) − p(z)) for all γ ∈ [−1, 1]. (225)
By construction the right-hand side has no poles and exactly m zeros (including multiplicities) for
γ ∈ [−1, 1]. For each zero we can find, by Lemma 47, a lower bound for the right-hand side of the
form a(γ− γ0)2k valid in some neighborhood of the zero. Since all multiplicities for zeros in (−1, 1)
are even we can chooses 2k to equal the multiplicity of the respective zero. Zeros occurring at the
end points −1 and 1 can have odd multiplicities, in which case we can choose 2k to be at most
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one plus the multiplicity of the zero. By Lemma 49 for each neighborhood there is an S(p) − k
subspace of vectors |φ〉 that satisfies the constraint, possibly in a smaller neighborhood, for some
c > 0. The sum of the constants 2k over each of the zeros is therefore at most m+ 2 (and this can
only occur if there are zeros of odd order at both γ0 = −1 and γ0 = 1). Therefore, the number
of linear constraints needed to specify all the subspaces is at most ⌊m+22 ⌋ < |S(p)|. Therefore, the
intersection of all these subspaces is non-trivial and we can find a non-zero |φ〉 and a c > 0 (chosen
as the smallest of the given c constants) such that the inequality of Eq. (225) is satisfied in the
union of all the neighborhoods.
We also need to ensure that c > 0 is chosen small enough so thatX ′ = X+c|φ〉〈φ| has eigenvalues
in (−1, 1), but because X has eigenvalues in (−1, 1) that is always possible. What remains to be
checked is that the inequality is satisfied outside the neighborhoods surrounding the zeros. But the
complement of these neighborhoods in [−1, 1] is a compact set on which the inequality becomes a
strict inequality. Therefore, for any vector |φ〉 we can find a c > 0 such that the inequality holds.
The lemma is proven by choosing c > 0 small enough to satisfy all the preceding conditions.
To make use of the above lemma we note that the degree of the numerator of the rational
function of γ given by ∑
z
z
1 + γz
(q(z)− p(z)) (226)
is at most |S(p)| + |S(q)| − 1 because we are summing at most |S(p)| + |S(q)| terms. In fact, the
degree of the numerator is at most |S(p)| + |S(q)| − 2 because the coefficient of γ|S(p)|+|S(q)|−1 is
(
∏
z z)
∑
z(q(z)− p(z)) = 0.
In the following discussion the number of zeros of p→ q refers to the number of zeros (including
multiplicities) for γ ∈ [0, 1] of the numerator of the rational function ∑z z1+γz (q(z) − p(z)). The
argument from the last paragraph shows that the number of zeros of p → q is at most |S(p)| +
|S(q)| − 2.
As a consequence, if |S(p)| > |S(q)|, then 2|S(p)| > |S(p)| + |S(q)| ≥ m + 2 where m is the
number of zeros of p → q. Therefore, we can always find a |φ〉 as in the above lemma to perturb
p. Similarly, if |S(p)| < |S(q)| there exists a |φ〉 that can be used as a perturbation on q. Both
perturbations can be found if |S(p)| = |S(q)| and the number of zeros of p → q is less than its
maximal value of 2|S(p)| − 2. The special case of |S(p)| = |S(q)| with maximal zeros will be dealt
with separately later in the section
Let us now discuss what happens once we have found a valid |φ〉 and c, and start increasing the
value of c. For concreteness, we take the first case of the preceding lemma so that p′ → q is valid,
p′ = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉), p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) is a canonical representation so that X has dimension |S(p)|,
and X ′ = X + c|φ〉〈φ|.
As we increase c there are two constraints that can force us to stop: either X ′(c) ≡ X + c|φ〉〈φ|
gets an eigenvalues larger than 1, or p′ → q is no longer valid. Let c0 be the largest allowed value
of c and let p′0 = Prob(X
′(c0), |ψ〉). Note that p→ p′0 is still expressible by matrices and p′0 → q is
still valid because the respective constraints are defined using non-strict inequalities.
If the stopping condition for increasing c is that the eigenvalues get too large, then X ′(c0) ≤ I
but X ′(c0) has 1 as an eigenvalue. Because q has support in (−1, 1), the value of
∑
z
z
1+γz q(z) at
γ = −1 is finite, so as c → c0 the amplitude of |ψ〉 on the largest eigenvector of X ′(c) must be
going to zero, and must be zero at c = c0. The first consequence of this is that p
′
0(z) ultimately
does not have support on z = 1, and therefore its support is still contained in (−1, 1). The second
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consequence is that the size of the support of p′0 is smaller than the dimension of the space on
which X is defined, which equals the support of p. In other words |S(p′0)| < |S(p)|.
On the other hand lets assume that for c > c0 the transition to q is no longer valid. In
such a case the rational function
∑
z
z
1+γz (q(z) − p′0(z)) must have an extra zero in [−1, 1] that∑
z
z
1+γz (q(z)− p(z)) did not have, or one of the existing zeros must have a higher degree. That is,
the number of zeros in p′0 → q is greater than the number of zeros in p→ q. Note that in this case,
by construction |S(p′0)| ≤ |S(p)|, whereas in the previous case (where we proved |S(p′0)| < |S(p)|)
the number of zeros cannot decrease.
Let p → q be valid with |S(p)| > |S(p)|. We can repeatedly apply the above perturbation
process to obtain a sequence of valid transitions p ≡ p0 → p1 → · · · → pl → q, such that, as
functions of i, the number of zeros of pi → q is monotonically increasing along the chain and |S(pi)|
is monotonically decreasing along the chain. Furthermore, in each transition either the number of
zeros increases or |S(pi)| decreases. The number of zeros is upper bounded by |S(p)| + |S(q)| − 2,
and therefore after a finite number of steps we must get to a pℓ such that either |S(pℓ)| < |S(q)| or
|S(pℓ)| = |S(q)| and the number of zeros is maximal. In the former case, we can continue the chain
by perturbing q. Repeatedly working on both sides we can end up with a chain
p ≡ p0 → p1 → · · · → pℓ ≡ p′ → q′ ≡ qℓ′ → · · · → q1 → q0 ≡ q (227)
such that all transitions are valid, and all but p′ → q′ are known to be expressible by matrices.
Furthermore, |S(p′)| = |S(q′)| and p′ → q′ has 2|S(p′)| − 2 zeros. If we can prove that p′ → q′ is
expressible by matrices then by transitivity we will have also proven that p → q is expressible by
matrices.
To complete the result of this section, we now need to study the remaining special case of
|S(p′)| = |S(q′)| with maximal zeros. From the proof of Lemma 50 we can see that in fact the only
case when we can’t find a perturbation is when there are zeros of odd order at both γ0 = −1 and
γ0 = 1. In all other cases we can continue the above chain until p
′ = q′.
To deal with zeros of odd order at γ0 = −1 and γ0 = 1 we need to enlarge the vector space on
which we are working. Rather than using a canonical representation p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) we append
to X an extra eigenvalue −1, so that we end up with a new matrix X¯ having dimension |S(p) + 1|
and eigenvalues in [−1, 1). Similarly, we can request a representation q = Prob(Y¯ , |ξ〉) so that
Y¯ has dimension |S(q)| + 1 including a single eigenvalue 1. Note that it is pointless to append
eigenvalues of 1 to X (or −1 to Y ) as we can’t add (resp. subtract) in any vectors |φ〉〈φ| to that
subspace without ending up with eigenvalues outside [−1, 1].
The following discussion will concern the first case, where the matrix X¯ has a single eigenvector
|−1〉 with eigenvalue −1. It will be useful to define H¯ as the space containing X¯ , and H ⊂ H¯ as
the subspace orthogonal to |−1〉. We want to keep n as the size of the support of p, so H will have
dimension n and H¯ will have dimension n+ 1. We still want p = Prob(X¯, |ψ〉) to have support in
(−1, 1), though, so 〈−1|ψ〉 = 0 or equivalently |ψ〉 ∈ H. We will consider perturbations of the form
X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| where |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|−1〉.
Our immediate goal is to extend Lemma 49 to deal with matrices X with eigenvalues in [−1, 1)
for c > 0. For γ0 ∈ [−1, 1) it will be a straightforward extension: We want to find an (n − k)-
dimensional subspace H′ ⊂ H of vectors |φ〉 so that for any a ∈ R the vector |φ¯〉 = |φ〉 + a|−1〉
satisfies the inequality∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ b(γ− γ0)2k for γ ∈ (−1, 1) satisfying |γ − γ0| < ǫ (228)
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for some c > 0 and ǫ > 0.
As the proof of the above is nearly identical to the proof of Lemma 49, we will only discuss the
differences. Our main tool is Eq. (219) which also applies to our extend matrix X¯. For convenience
we rewrite it here
fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯) =
(
c
1 + γc〈φ¯| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉
)(
I + γX¯
)−1 |φ¯〉〈φ¯| (I + γX¯)−1 . (229)
Given |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|−1〉 we want to choose c > 0 small enough so that∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ 2|c| ∣∣∣〈ψ| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉∣∣∣2 (230)
for γ ∈ (−1, 1) satisfying |γ − γ0| < ǫ. To accomplish this let λmax be the largest eigenvalue of X¯
and restrict c < (1− λ′max)/(2〈φ¯|φ¯〉). We then have γc〈φ¯|
(
I + γX¯
)−1 |φ¯〉 > −1/2 as required. We
then note that 〈ψ| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉 = 〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉 where X is the restriction of X¯ to H. We
end up with an equation identical to Eq. (222) in the proof of Lemma 49. The rest of the proof
carries through.
The interesting extension of Lemma 49 occurs at γ0 = 1. For γ ∈ (−1, 1) we have
|a|2(1− γ)−1 ≤ 〈φ¯| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉 (231)
because 1 + γX¯ is positive definite and the left-hand side drops some positive terms. If a 6= 0 we
can further write for γ ∈ (0, 1)(
c
1 + γc〈φ¯| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉
)
≤ c
1 + γc|a|2(1− γ)−1 =
c(1− γ)
1− γ(1− c|a|2) ≤
1− γ
|a|2 , (232)
where in the last step we assumed c < 1/|a|2 so that the denominator is minimized by γ → 1.
Combined with Eq. (229) we get∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ 1− γ|a|2
∣∣∣〈ψ| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉∣∣∣2 (233)
for γ ∈ (1− ǫ, 1) so long as we choose ǫ < 1. Therefore, at γ0 = 1 we can prove something stronger
than Lemma 49. The constructed (n − k)-dimensional subspace will satisfy an upper bound of
b(γ − γ0)2k+1 rather than just b(γ − γ0)2k. The caveat is that the bound will only hold when |a| is
large enough:
Lemma 51. Let H¯, H, n, X¯, |ψ〉 and fγ(x) be as above. In particular, X¯ has eigenvalues in
[−1, 1) with a unique eigenvector |−1〉 with eigenvalue −1 and 〈−1|ψ〉 = 0. Given a polynomial
b(1 − γ)2k+1 with constants b > 0 and integer k ≥ 0, we can find an (n − k)-dimensional subspace
H′ ⊂ H and a number Θ > 0 such that for any |φ〉 ∈ H′ and a ≥ Θ〈φ|φ〉 there exists c > 0 and
ǫ > 0 satisfying X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| < I and∣∣∣〈ψ|(fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯))|ψ〉∣∣∣ ≤ b(1− γ)2k+1 for γ ∈ (1− ǫ, 1), (234)
where |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|1〉.
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Proof. The proof starts from Eq. (233). As before, 〈−1|ψ〉 = 0 implies 〈ψ| (I + γX¯)−1 |φ¯〉 =
〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉 where X is the restriction of X¯ to H. The argument from the proof of Lemma 49
gives us an (n − k)-dimensional subspace H′ ⊂ H of vectors |φ〉 ∈ H′ such that the numerator of
the rational function 〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉 has a zero of order k at γ = 1. Given |φ〉 ∈ H′ we can find,
by Lemma 47, a small enough ǫ > 0 and large enough a > 0 so that
1− γ
|a|2
∣∣∣〈ψ| (I + γX)−1 |φ〉∣∣∣2 ≤ b(γ − γ0)2k+1 for γ ∈ (1− ǫ, 1). (235)
To complete the proof choose Θ to be the maximum of such choices of |a|2 over the compact set of
|φ〉 ∈ H′ that additionally satisfy 〈φ|φ〉 = 1.
A similar result holds for Y¯ with eigenvalues in (−1, 1] and c < 0. We now prove a special
version of Lemma 50.
Lemma 52. Let p 6= q be functions with support in (−1, 1) such that p→ q is valid, |S(p)| = |S(q)|
and the number of zeros of p→ q is maximal with odd order at both γ = −1 and γ = 1. Then
• There exists a vector |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|−1〉 and constant c > 0 such that p′ → q is valid,
where p′ = Prob(X¯ ′, |ψ〉), X¯ ′ = X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| ≤ I, p = Prob(X¯, |ψ〉), the dimension of X¯ is
|S(p)|+ 1 including a unique eigenvector |−1〉 with eigenvalue −1, 〈φ|−1〉 = 0 and |φ〉 6= 0.
• There exists a vector |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|1〉 and constant c < 0 such that p→ q′ is valid,
where q′ = Prob(Y¯ ′, |ξ〉), Y¯ ′ = Y¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| ≥ −I, q = Prob(Y¯ , |ξ〉), the dimension of Y¯ is
|S(q)| + 1 including a unique eigenvector |1〉 with eigenvalue 1, 〈φ|1〉 = 0 and |φ〉 6= 0.
Proof. We prove the first case, the second being nearly identical. As in the proof of Lemma 50 the
main goal is to ensure
〈ψ|
(
fγ(X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯|)− fγ(X¯)
)
|ψ〉 ≤
∑
z
z
1 + γz
(q(z)− p(z)). for all γ ∈ [−1, 1]. (236)
By assumption, the number of zeros of the right-hand side is 2|S(p)| − 2, with odd order at both
γ = −1 and γ = 1. The problem with the original proof of Lemma 50 is that it would seek vectors
|φ¯〉 such that the left-hand side had an even number of zeros at γ = −1 and γ = 1 and the total
number of zeros was 2|S(p)|. Therefore, the total number of linear constraints on |φ¯〉 would be
|S(p)| and the only vector |φ¯〉 that satisfies all the constraints is |−1〉.
However, Lemma 51 allows us to satisfy the bound while placing only an odd number of zeros
at γ = 1 (though still an even number of zeros at γ = −1), and therefore requiring only |S(p)| − 1
constraints (so long as the coefficient of |−1〉 is large enough). In particular, there exists a non-zero
vector |φ〉, a large enough a > 0 and small enough c > 0 so that |φ¯〉 = |φ〉+ a|1〉 satisfies the above
inequality in a neighborhood of each of the zeros of the right-hand side.
The proof is then completed by picking a potentially smaller c > 0 to ensure that the inequality
is satisfied outside the neighborhoods and that X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| ≤ I.
Lemma 53. Let p 6= q be functions with support in (−1, 1) such that p→ q is valid, |S(p)| = |S(q)|
and the number of zeros of p→ q is maximal with odd order at both γ = −1 and γ = 1. Then
• There exists p′ : (−1, 1) → [0,∞) such that p′ 6= p, |S(p′)| = |S(p)|, p → p′ is expressible by
matrices and p′ → q is valid.
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• There exists q′ : (−1, 1) → [0,∞) such that q′ 6= q, |S(q′)| = |S(q)|, q′ → q is expressible by
matrices and p→ q′ is valid.
Proof. We shall prove the first case. Take p′ from the previous lemma and increase c until either
p′ → q gets a new zero or until X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| gets an eigenvalue of 1.
In the first case, either we either end up with p′ = q, or we have |S(p′)| = |S(q)|+1 and p′ → q
has maximal zeros, in which case we can use Lemma 50 to create a second perturbation to get
p′′ → q. Increasing this second c > 0 cannot increase the number of zeros or decrease the support
size of the support of p′′ unless we end up with p′′ = q. In either case we have proven that p → q
is expressible by matrices and we can choose p′ = q to satisfy the lemma.
Alternatively if X¯ + c|φ¯〉〈φ¯| gets an eigenvalue of 1, then we end up with |S(p′)| = |S(p)| and
by construction p→ p′ is expressible by matrices and p′ → q is valid. To prove that p′ 6= p we note
that because |φ¯〉 is not proportional to |−1〉 the maximum c must be less than 2, so the trace of the
canonical matrix expressing p′ is smaller than the trace of the canonical matrix expressing p.
Lemma 54. Let p and q be functions with support in (−1, 1) such that p→ q is valid, |S(p)| = |S(q)|
and the number of zeros of p → q is maximal with odd order at both γ = −1 and γ = 1. Then
p→ q is expressible by matrices.
Proof. Let p = Prob(X, |ψ〉) with X a 2|S(p)| − 1 dimensional matrix which includes |S(p)| − 1
orthogonal eigenvectors with eigenvalue −1. We seek the infimum of ∫ 1−1∑z z1+γz (q(z) − p′(z))dγ
over p′ = Prob(X ′, |ψ〉) satisfying p′ → q valid and X ≤ X ′ ≤ I. Because we are optimizing X ′
over a compact set the infimum is achievable, and the resulting p′ will satisfy p→ p′ is expressible
by matrices and p′ → q is valid.
If p′ = q the lemma is proven. Otherwise, by the preceding theorem there exists p′′ 6= p such
that p′ → p′′ is expressible by matrices and p′′ → q is valid. Then ∫ 1−1∑z z1+γz (p′′(z)−p′(z))dγ > 0
and hence
∫ 1
−1
∑
z
z
1+γz (q(z) − p′(z))dγ >
∫ 1
−1
∑
z
z
1+γz (q(z) − p′′(z))dγ. But also, by transitivity,
p→ p′′ is expressible by matrices and in fact, because the dimension of X is large enough, we can
write p′′ = Prob(X ′′, |ψ〉) for X ≤ X ′′ ≤ I. That is a contradiction with the optimality of p′.
Corollary 55. If p→ q is valid in [−1, 1] then it is expressible by matrices in [−1, 1].
The results used in Section 2.3.2 can be proven as follows: Lemma 16 follows from the above
corollary, Lemmas 42 and 45, and the definition of expressible by matrices. Lemma 17 follows from
Lemma 43.
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